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Abstract 
Climate change is the most pressing environmental threat faced by humans, yet responses 
– individually, collectively, and politically – have frequently lacked urgency. Why a threat of 
such magnitude should meet with inaction is a topic of growing conjecture among social 
science researchers. Social psychologists in particular have increasingly focused on the 
possible psychological mechanisms underlying denial and scepticism of anthropogenic 
climate change. I argue that all responses to climate change can be considered rational and 
adaptive, because these responses (be they opinions, emotions, or behaviour) afford the 
individual functional value. 
 
In this thesis, I examine what underlies the discordance between climate change threat and 
response by applying a functional analysis to responses associated with climate change. 
This analysis is theoretically guided by a motivated social cognition approach. I use the term 
to refer to theories and perspectives that assume that people’s values, attitudes, and 
beliefs have motivational underpinnings, and satisfy certain psychological and social needs. 
These motivations affect reasoning and belief and attitude formation by biasing how 
information is processed. The approach incorporates accounts such as motivated 
reasoning, interpersonal and social identity theories, social and system-level legitimacy 
theories, moral disengagement, and Terror Management Theory. Drawing upon these 
accounts, I construct a framework detailing the various goals and needs that responses to 
climate change might function to fulfil. Five main functional areas are identified: the 
reduction of internal psychological discomfort, self-image and self-esteem maintenance, 
the maximisation of positive affect, social-system justification, and effort reduction. To test 
aspects of the framework, I conducted two online national surveys: one in July-August 2010 
(N = 5036), the other in July-August 2011 (N = 5030). A total of 1355 respondents 
completed both surveys. Respondents were asked about their beliefs, opinions, attitudes, 
and behaviours relevant to climate change, as well as individual difference measures, their 
levels of support for climate change policy, their emotional responses, and personal and 
image associations with climate change. In addition, four workshops (total N = 52) were 
undertaken in December 2010 and March 2011. These workshops were designed to elicit 
implicit associations and attendant emotions associated with climate change imagery 
drawn from the national surveys. 
 
Analyses of national survey data revealed several key findings:  
 The scientific consensus that climate change is happening, and is mostly caused by 
human activity, is not reflected in the opinions of the broader community;  
 While opinions about the causes of climate change are important in understanding 
pro-environmental behaviour, considerable variation in behaviour exists within 
opinion-types;  
 Negative high-arousal emotions are linked to climate change acceptance and pro-
environmental behaviour;  
 Levels of moral engagement are central to action on climate change, and mediate 
the link between opinions and behaviour;  
 Those sceptical of climate change still consider big-polluting countries and multi-
national corporations as partly responsible for both causing and responding to it;  
 Estimates about what the Australian community thinks about climate change differ 
markedly from actual opinions, and nearly everybody overestimates the levels of 
‘climate change denial’ in the Australian community;  
 Underlying ideological values associated with system justification explain 
relationships with climate change responses above and beyond political 
preferences.  
 
Analyses of both the survey and workshop data revealed that politicians dominate who we 
associate with climate change, while scientists and people close to us are less commonly 
associated with climate change. Images commonly associated with climate change were 
broad and remote, although national-level impacts of climate change were salient for many 
people.  
 
Together, the results support the idea that responses function to fulfil different needs and 
goals for individuals, such as a need for social support, the negation of guilt and existential 
anxiety, maintaining a coherent self-identity, feeling morally adequate, and seeing 
prevailing social and economic systems as just. I conclude the thesis by modelling the 
psychological processes involved in fulfilling these needs and goals, and the expressions 
through which they might be observed with respect to responses to climate change.  In 
particular, the model articulates how the implicit associations of individuals are shaped by 
societal, group, and intra-individual forces, and by the biased searching of sets of rules and 
beliefs. A series of recommendations for climate communicators is provided, including 
framing climate change in such a way as to appeal to competing needs and goals 
concurrently, alongside an overview of future research directions, and an explanation of 
why I probably won’t ride my bicycle to work tomorrow. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
"We are in an extremely precarious and urgent situation that compels immediate action" 
         Professor 
David Karoly 
School of Earth Sciences, University of Melbourne 
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change lead author 
Canberra, Monday June 16, 2008 
 
Climate change is the most pressing environmental threat humans face. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded in its Fourth Assessment Report 
that “warming of the climate system is now unequivocal” (IPCC, 2007, p. 5), and that 
observed increases in average global temperatures are “very likely due to the observed 
increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations” (p. 10). Despite ongoing 
scientific consensus and mounting evidence that human-induced climate change threatens 
the very existence of our societies, the response – individually, collectively, and politically – 
has frequently lacked urgency.  Why a threat of such magnitude should meet with inaction 
is a topic of growing conjecture in many forums, not least among social scientists.  
 
In this thesis I examine the discordance between climate change threat and our individual 
responses to climate change by applying a functional analysis to the opinions, attitudes, 
beliefs, emotions, associations, and behaviours (which collectively I term ‘responses’) that 
are linked to the concept of climate change in Australia. The basic premise of my analysis is 
that all responses to climate change afford the individual functional value, be it 
psychological value, social value, or a mixture of the two. This first chapter commences with 
an overview of social psychological research in the climate change domain, including the 
growing interest in climate change ‘maladaptation and denial’ and the limitations of this 
focus. The functional approach is then briefly introduced, followed by a statement of aims 




1.1 Psychological Investigations into Climate Change 
Responses 
To date, the bulk of social psychological inquiry into human responses to climate change 
has focused on individual-level behaviour and attitudes toward climate change, despite the 
potential contribution to understanding that a vast range of disciplinary subfields  in 
psychology promise (Swim et al., 2009, 2011; Uzzell, 2008). Behavioural research has 
typically investigated climate change mitigation efforts at the household level, such as 
reduced energy usage, alternative transportation options, reduced water consumption, and 
barriers to such behavioural changes (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). The effectiveness of 
social norms, prompts, and educational material has received wide attention, with evidence 
that interventions making use of these elements can produce at least short-term behaviour 
change in some areas (e.g., Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008; Parnell, 2005; Steg & 
Vlek, 2009). Further work has identified a range of factors that contribute moderately to 
support for alternative technologies, intended behaviours, and willingness to pay for 
mitigation options, including heightened perceptions of ensuing harm from climate change, 
liberal political preferences, institutional trust, and access to financial resources (Gifford, 
Kormos, & McIntyre, 2011; Lee & Cameron, 2008; Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & 
Hmielowski, 2011; Leiserowitz, 2006; Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2006). 
 
Traditional behavioural research has shed useful light on a range of motivators and barriers 
toward attitudes and behaviours, but (like all research) it has its limitations. A phenomenon 
that has long plagued social psychological research is the modest correlation between 
expressed attitudes and actual behaviour (Gifford et al., 2011; Sheeran, 2002). In research 
focusing on climate change, the relationships between knowledge and attitudes, attitudes 
and intentions, intentions and observed behaviour, and behaviour and environmental 
impact have all been criticised for their weakness (Gifford et al., 2011; Kahan et al., 2012; 
Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Whitmarsh, 2009).  These weak relationships call into question 
the efficacy of research and change programs that simply target increased awareness 
and/or attitude change. Additionally, the often over-simplified, static, or superficial 
behavioural indicators designed to measure responses to climate change provide a 
distorted picture of the true range of responses (Whitmarsh, 2009). Research conclusions 
are further limited by a dearth of longitudinal studies of changes in perceptions and 
attitudes on subsequent behaviour, and theoretical ambiguity about the precise nature of 




Given that professed knowledge, attitudes, and intentions are often a poor predictor of 
behaviour, investigations into the roots of how people connect with their physical 
environment, and how their values and beliefs relevant to this connection are shaped, is 
receiving greater attention. For example, research indicates that individuals construct 
attitudes to new or emergent discoveries about phenomena by evaluating the 
consequences of such discoveries for their pre-existing values and beliefs (Stern, Kalof, & 
Dietz, 1995). These pre-existing values and beliefs drive the formation of new attitudes 
because of an individual’s desire for consistency;1 and it much easier to form a new attitude 
that accords with the beliefs we hold already, than it is to restructure our beliefs to align 
with an attitude undergoing formation. Such approaches address how underlying beliefs 
and values might affect attitudes and behaviours relating to the natural environment. One 
such approach, the Value-Belief-Norm theory of environmentalism (Stern, Dietz, & Abel, 
1999; Stern, 2000), conceives of environmental behaviour as the outcome of a causal chain 
starting from values (categorised as either biospheric, egoistic, or altruistic), which inform 
beliefs about general conditions in the biophysical environment, which in turn inform 
personal norms for pro-environmental action. These values, beliefs, and norms all influence 
one’s behaviour (Stern, 2000). As an example, if a person intrinsically values species other 
than humans (a biospheric value), they are likely to be concerned about conditions that 
threaten these species. This person will in turn form attitudes consistent with the 
protection of the valued object (in this case animals, plants, and so on), which will increase 
the likelihood of engaging in behaviour consistent with the protection of the natural 
environment.  
 
Social Amplification of Risk theory (Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, & Brown, 1988) goes further by 
attempting to incorporate individual psychological perceptions of risk into a broader social 
and cultural framework. With specific reference to climate change, Kasperson et al. 
propose that scientific information regarding climate change risks intermingles with 
cultural, social, and institutional processes, in so doing amplifying or attenuating 
community perceptions of risk. ‘Social amplifiers’ include scientists, the media, cultural 
groups and interpersonal networks. Amplification occurs through the filtering of signals 
accompanying the portrayal of an event, and the cognitive processing of risk information 
(such as using a cognitive heuristic to draw inferences). People attach social values to 
                                                          
1
 The assumption that individuals always strive for consistency in their beliefs, values, and attitudes 
will be revisited in the next chapter. 
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incoming risk information, drawing on cultural and peer groups to interpret and validate 
signals (e.g. Macneil & Sherif, 1976). On the basis of this interpretation and validation 
process, people form behavioural intentions and engage in group or individual actions to 
respond to the risk in question. Behavioural responses can lead to secondary impacts, such 
as the formation of enduring mental attitudes or images (such as anti-technology 
attitudes). These in turn can lead to third-order impacts – that is, impacts may ripple or 
spread to other parties, distant locations, or future generations.  
 
Approaches such as Value-Belief-Norm and Social Amplification are extremely useful in 
explaining how behaviours are influenced by constructs more stable and enduring than 
attitudes, and how social factors can exert influence. But they do not fully account for how 
and why beliefs are constructed in the first place, and what happens when these beliefs are 
challenged. For instance, advocates of Social Amplification theory have trouble accounting 
for how and why one person, or group of people, is more receptive to information from 
one set of social amplifiers, while others are more receptive to different social amplifiers, as 
well as how and why different people draw different conclusions from the same social 
amplifiers (or the same people draw different conclusions on different occasions!). There is 
also an implicit assumption in Value-Belief-Norm theory that people’s underlying 
orientation toward the environment is static; it does not account for the possibility that the 
way we engage with the environment (expressed through our environmental values) might 
be malleable, post-hoc constructions discursively employed to provide support for the 
behaviours we engage in (Verweij et al., 2006).  
 
Recent research suggests that people’s views on climate change itself are not necessarily 
deeply seated at all, but are influenced by superficial, transient factors such as daily 
fluctuations in temperature (Li, Johnson, & Zaval, 2011). Evidence that community views on 
climate change and its causes can shift quite dramatically in relatively brief periods 
(Leviston, Leitch, Greenhill, Leonard, & Walker, 2011) lends further support to the notion 
that climate change views are malleable.  
 
So we are left with an apparent paradox; views about climate change appear malleable, 
with evidence that they depend on superficial influences, while counter-evidence suggests 
that deeply-held, deep-seated beliefs about how the world works drive the formation of 
views about the environment. In attempting to address why attitudes about the role of 
human activity in climate change can fluctuate with relative rapidity, when deep-seated 
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values and beliefs are purported to underlie such attitudes, a new wave of climate change 
research has emerged: one that focuses on denial, scepticism, and maladaptation.  
 
1.1.1 Research on Denial, Scepticism and Maladaptation 
The amount of scientific literature available on climate change has risen steadily since the 
mid 1970s. The last decade, and especially the last five years, has witnessed an even 
sharper rise in research focusing on climate change denial and scepticism (as illustrated in 
Figure 1).2 This rise has been at least in part a response to a real or suspected decline of 
acceptance that climate change is primarily driven by human activity. There is certainly 
some recent evidence to suggest such a decline (see Leviston et al., 2011 for a review of 
acceptance levels in Australia, the US, and New Zealand). This avenue of research inquiry is 
characterised by a focus on (usually active) rejection, opposition, or resistance by 
individuals to concepts surrounding the nature and threat of climate change, and the 
mechanisms that might account for this. 
 
 
Figure 1. Scopus search results for number of research articles on climate change 
scepticism or denial, 1975-2012. 
 
                                                          
2
 Note that in discourse surrounding climate change, ‘scepticism’ is almost invariably used to refer to 
the failure to accept that climate change is primarily caused by human activity, rather than its more 




‘Climate change denial’ is often framed in literal terms (Swim et al., 2009), but has also 
been applied in a broadly psychodynamic sense (Maiteny, 2000; Randall, 2009). These latter 
accounts posit that psychological mechanisms (such as splitting and projection) underlie 
people’s reluctance to accept, and therefore act on, anthropogenic climate change. There 
are variations in the usage of these psychological terms though. For instance, ‘splitting’ has 
been used in one sense to refer to the process of compartmentalisation of behaviours and 
attitudes to reduce dissonance arousal (Lertzman, 2010). In another sense, ‘splitting’ and 
‘projection’ have been used to denote a dual process, whereby we split off climate change 
information, which embodies our connection with Earth’s ecosystems, to prevent losses 
associated with climate change impacts from entering our conscious awareness, and to 
project the anticipated losses and consequences of climate change to the distant future 
(Lertzman, 2010; Randall, 2009). 
 
More nuanced accounts of denial have recently been put forward that account for varying 
degrees and types of scepticism and inaction (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2012; Norgaard, 2011; 
Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011). In her 
research on the characteristics of climate change denial among Norwegians, Kari Marie 
Norgaard (2006) invokes Stanley Cohen’s tripartite conception of denial: literal denial, 
which involves clear and outright rejection of the facts; interpretive denial, where the 
essentials of the facts are not disputed, but the meaning of the facts is disputed and re-
allocated to another class of event; and implicatory denial, where there is no dispute about 
the facts or their meaning, but there is denial of “the psychological, political or moral 
implications that conventionally follow” (Cohen, 2001, p. 8). Implicatory denial covers 
justifications, rationalisations, and evasions for failure to act when the actor knows what 
can be done and has the resources to do something. With relation to climate change, this 
last type of denial might be observed in those who accept that climate change is human-
induced but employ a host of rationalisations and justifications for not acting…‘I don’t 
consume much anyway’, ‘nothing I can do will make a real difference’, ‘I already do 
enough’, and so on. 
 
The more general phrase, ‘climate change scepticism’, has received similar attention to 
denial. Psychometric measures have been designed (Whitmarsh, 2011), media analyses 
conducted  (Bacon, 2011), and discursive analyses performed (Glasson, 2011), in a bid to 
understand how and why scepticism is created, fostered , and perpetuated. Denial and 
scepticism have also been investigated at the institutional level. These analyses expound 
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how global corporations and think-tanks with vested interests have purposively worked to 
sow the seeds of scepticism and denial among communities and influence climate policy 
(Lahsen, 2008; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). 
     
The last and perhaps most pervasive word in this vein of research is ‘maladaptation’. As 
evidence mounts that at least some impacts of climate change can no longer be avoided, 
research institutions have shifted from an almost exclusive focus on climate change 
mitigation to one of adaptation: how human beings can best anticipate and respond to 
inevitable and predicted shifts in climatic conditions and their associated biophysical 
impacts (Preston & Stafford-Smith, 2009). Concurrent with this shifting focus has been a 
rise in the idea of ‘maladaptive’ responses; that is, faulty or inadequate adaptation to the 
anticipated impacts of climate change.  
 
Maladaptive responses to climate change can be broadly categorised into two types. The 
first involves concrete, behavioural maladaptation to one’s local environment. Maladaptive 
responses in this class might include purchasing a residential property in a zone prone to 
flooding, or failing to have emergency response plans in place in areas vulnerable to natural 
disasters. 3  The second type concerns internal, psychological maladaptations more closely 
aligned with the scepticism and denial literature discussed above. Responses here might 
include wishful thinking or fatalism, which might ultimately result in negative emotional 
consequences such as fear and high anxiety.  
 
Much of the research exploring maladaptive responses of this second type has its roots in 
the stress and coping literature, such as the application of Protection Motivation Theory 
(PMT) to explain climate change responses (Grothmann & Patt, 2005). A derivative of the 
Health Belief Model, PMT (Rogers, 1983) was originally developed to account for people’s 
behavioural and coping responses to stressful situations, such as threats to one’s health. 
PMT has two components: a ‘threat or risk appraisal’, whereby the individual assesses the 
severity of threat to something they value posed by an external stimulus, and their 
vulnerability to the threat; and a ‘coping appraisal’, which refers to the assessment of self 
                                                          
3
 It should be noted that some researchers prefer the term ‘negative adaptation’ (adaptation that 
fails to reduce lasting vulnerability, increases vulnerability, or adaptations that increase CO2 
emission) over ‘maladaptation’ (Davies & Hossain, 1996; Preston & Stafford-Smith, 2009). Others 
make a clear delineation between ‘non-adaptation’ and ‘maladaptation’ (Niemeyer, Petts, & Hobson, 
2005). These alternatives are in my view preferable as they avoid connotations of dysfunctionality 
embedded in the term ‘maladaptive’, as I discuss below. 
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efficacy, response efficacy, and the costs of responding to the threat. One of two general 
response types – ‘adaptation’ or ‘maladaptation’ – is the outcome of these appraisals.  
 
Hamilton and Kasser (2009) categorise climate change coping strategies into three 
sequential classes (Table 1). It is worth presenting here as it synthesises much of the 
climate change literature to date on denial, scepticism, and maladaptation. They suggest 
that coping mechanisms can be grouped into three types: Denial strategies, which are 
primarily designed to suppress anxiety associated with predictions of climate disruption; 
Maladaptive coping strategies, where climate change is acknowledged but downplayed in 
order to blunt unpleasant emotions, and; Adaptive coping strategies, where climate change 
is accepted and actions appropriate to this new reality taken. The authors suggest that 
these three types of responses be considered as sequential stages, in as much as belonging 
to the third type requires that psychological barriers associated with the first and second 
types are overcome. 
 
Table 1. Hamilton and Kasser’s (2009) three coping strategies to deal with climate change. 
Strategy Type Manifestations 
Denial Strategies * Denial of the problem 
* Denial of responsibility 
* Cognitive dissonance 




* Management of unpleasant emotions 
* Reinterpretation of the threat 
* Threat ‘distancing’ 
* Wishful thinking 
* Diverting attention 
* Materialism 
* Blame-shifting 




* Expressing and controlling emotions 
 
* Problem solving 





1.1.2 Some Limitations of the Denial, Scepticism, and Maladaptation 
Focus 
The literature focusing on denial, scepticism, and maladaptation to climate change has 
provided many useful insights into how best to communicate the impacts of climate 
change, and how to shape and frame mitigation and adaptation policies. It does have some 
drawbacks however. First, many accounts of why climate change denial exists are 
concerned with psychological mechanisms (such as the psychoanalytic mechanisms of 
splitting and projection) that are supposedly inherent and universal characteristics of 
human beings. Although different experiences with the effects of climate change might 
mean that some mechanisms are more likely to be activated for some people than for 
others, these accounts do not in themselves explain different and varied responses within 
communities of relative homogeneity. That is, if two people who have the same exposure 
to climate change demonstrate in the one case denial and in the other adaptive coping, the 
accounts tell us little of the life experiences or intra-psychic processes that predict the 
manifestation of denial and repression in one person but not the other. Further, such 
accounts do not explain why the expression of these processes may shift rapidly within an 
individual. 
 
The emphasis on intra-individual processes leads to further limitations, including one that I 
suggest highlights a chief limitation of stress and coping models in their application to 
climate change. Traditionally, these theories have been successfully applied to health 
threats such as cancer and heart disease. In such cases, notions of response efficacy leading 
to threat reduction are relatively untroublesome, as there is presumably a corresponding 
actual decrease in external threat when an individual-level behaviour change occurs (such 
as regulating one’s diet or stopping smoking). In the case of climate change, threat 
reduction depends on not only individual-level behaviour change but on collective 
behaviour change. That is, threat reduction cannot be achieved solely through an 
amendment to one’s own actions; it may help, certainly, but most individuals are aware 
that threat to self, in this case, is mostly contingent on the actions of others. This awareness 
might even lead to a paradoxical outcome: increasing one’s own efforts in the face of 
climate change might lead one to be more conscious of others’ (including governments and 
industry) failings to act similarly, thereby increasing rather than decreasing levels of 
perceived threat. Individual-level threat response might also increase exposure to other 
threats, such as financial insecurity if one invests heavily in protecting one’s own property 
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for instance. Arguably, this could perversely lead the individual to cope less well with their 
immediate environment. If there is no accounting mechanism for these inter-individual and 
social influences in such models, their application is of limited value.4 
 
Segmentation approaches (such as Cohen’s three types of denial) and sequential staging 
approaches (such as in Hamilton and Kasser’s coping strategy typology) fail to account 
adequately for the possibility that people may hold competing, contradictory, and 
inconsistent attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours towards climate change that might manifest 
differentially under changing circumstances.  
 
There is also a more socio-political consideration associated with this vein of enquiry: There 
is a slightly pejorative flavour to some of the research, or at least to the media’s 
dissemination of it (e.g. the reporting of McCright & Dunlap's 2011 "Cool Dudes" paper). 
Research identifying individual, political, and value-orientation predictors of non-
acceptance of anthropogenic climate change (at the expense of explaining acceptance, and 
at the expense of considering how people actually act) runs the risk of further entrenching 
a once non-existent ‘debate’; branding segments of the community as ‘maladaptive’ – 
reminiscent of some kind of evolutionary malfunction, or ‘in denial’ – which has a hint of 
pseudo-psychological name-calling, is of little benefit if it serves only to perpetuate and 
deepen a divide based on ideological differences. Further, the psychoanalytic roots of terms 
such as denial and repression imply that individuals possessing these qualities are 
dysfunctional and unable to cope with major life obstacles; the research tends to ignore (or 
at least obscure) the possibility that non-acceptance of anthropogenic climate change 
might be due to a wide variety of every-day defences regularly employed by healthy, stable, 
well-coping, and well-intentioned individuals.   
 
Finally, there is often an underlying assumption within research on denial, scepticism, and 
maladaptation that there are two forms of responses to climate change: one is the correct, 
logical, and rational response (acceptance, mitigation, and adaptation), and one that is 
faulty, illogical, and irrational (denial, inaction, and maladaptation). One needs only apply a 
commons dilemma approach (as some have, e.g. Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003) to conclude 
that individual action that involves effortful activity (such as installing solar panels, or taking 
public transport to work) is, from a utility-maximising perspective at least, not the logical 
                                                          
4
 This is not to say such models should be ignored altogether, as I discuss in future chapters. 
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and rational thing to do. Other upscaled applications of long-observed phenomena in social 
psychology, such as the bystander effect – whereby people are less inclined to act when the 
experience is shared by many (Fielding & Head, 2012) – also make one question the 
assumption that acting to mitigate climate change is the default option, and whether there 
really is a response that can be considered ‘maladaptive’. Given these considerations, I 
propose that equal weight should be given to understanding what motivates the arguably 
irrational behaviour of actually doing something about climate change, as much as to 
understanding people’s non-responsiveness. 
 
1.1.3 A functional approach to understanding climate change responses 
In this thesis I set out to identify what social and psychological functions different 
responses to climate change serve.  Responses might include a person’s attitudes, beliefs, 
opinions, emotions, associations, and behaviour to information either directly or indirectly 
related to climate change. Responses can be thought of as mediators between the inner 
needs, goals, and desires of an individual, and the external world. Needs and goals might be 
satisfied through opinions and attitudes alone, or by behaviour alone, or it might take a 
blend to satisfy an individual’s needs and goals. 
 
The basic premise of the functional approach is that individuals adaptively strive towards 
personal and social goals (Snyder, 1993). A central feature is that people can perform the 
same behaviours, or hold the same attitudes, opinions, or beliefs, for different 
psychological functions (Clary et al., 1998). Conversely, behaviours, beliefs, opinions, and 
attitudes may vary from individual to individual, while the functions they serve are the 
same (Allport, 1937). Under this rationale, attempts to persuade and change attitudes and 
behaviours will only succeed to the extent that they account for the functions the initial 
opinions, attitudes, and behaviours serve in the first place. 
Functional explanations hinge on “interpreting data by establishing their consequences for 
larger structures in which they are implicated” (Merton, 1957, pp. 56-57). This 
characteristic means that accounts can be established for different levels of analysis: e.g. 
intra-individual, inter-individual, groups, and cultures (Doise & Mapstone, 1986; Keltner & 
Haidt, 1999). By blending the approaches of motivational accounts of personality 
psychology (which focus on how dispositional attributes influence an individual’s 
motivations) and social psychology (which emphasises the role that groups, societies, and 
cultures play in shaping an individual’s motivations), a functional approach avoids some of 
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the limitations of purely intra-individual approaches while allowing deep constructs such as 
values and beliefs to operate. Given the increased politicisation of climate change in public 
discourse (something that will be explored in later chapters), an approach that 
encompasses multi-level processes (intra-personal, inter-personal, and social) is not only 
pertinent, but necessary.      
 
The advantage of a functional approach is that it promises to explain not just ‘maladaptive’ 
attitudes and behaviour, but also attitudes and behaviour that concern doing good for 
others and society. The breadth of the functional approach is perhaps also its most limiting 
quality from an applied perspective. To identify an exhaustive list of the psychological and 
social functions served by climate change responses is practically impossible, not least 
because needs and goals such as self-presentation and avoidance are inherently difficult to 
investigate. This notwithstanding, there is already a good deal of research on climate 
change that is influenced by the functional approach, especially motivational accounts of 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. To date though, climate change responses have not been 
subject to an in-depth systematic functional analysis.  
 
 
In this thesis I have several aims: 
Aim 1: To understand more fully what underlies people’s responses to climate change 
Aim 2: To pursue the above aim by analysing responses in terms of the psychological and 
social functions they serve 
Aim 3: To develop a theoretical framework for understanding climate change responses as 
serving social and psychological functions, which in turn fulfil individual needs and goals  
Aim 4: To construct a conceptual model of how and why people respond to climate change 
as they do. The intention of this model is to provide an account of the antecedents and 
consequences of climate change denial and scepticism, and the broader range of possible 
responses to climate change, including acceptance and action, and how and why these 




1.2 Thesis Structure 
In the next chapter I investigate Motivated Social Cognition accounts of attitudes, beliefs, 
and behaviours that promise to have applicability to climate change responses from a 
functionalist perceptive. I list the functions that responses to climate change may serve, 
mechanisms through which these functions operate, and the theories from which these are 
derived.  
 
A methodological overview follows (Chapter 3). A short history of functional analyses is 
provided, alongside the benefits and limitations of previous approaches. I describe broadly 
the development of two national surveys, and a series of climate change image workshops, 
that provide the data for my investigation of the functions that climate change responses 
might serve. 
 
The cultural context of climate change is provided in Chapter 4, alongside an exploratory 
investigation of the data from two national surveys. The results of these exploratory 
investigations prompt the more focussed investigations occurring in Chapters 5 through to 
7.    
 
Chapters 5 through to 7 are concentrated on specific theory-testing. Drawing on the 
theoretical discussions in Chapter 3, these chapters are organised around the following 
themes: moral responses to climate change; false consensus effects about what others 
think about climate change; and the social-system legitimising functions of climate change 
responses. These chapters contain specific hypotheses and/or research questions, made on 
the basis of the findings in Chapter 4, previous research on how people respond to climate 
change information, and what we know about the functions of these responses from the 
Motivated Social Cognition literature. 
 
In Chapter 8 I look at explicit and implicit associations with climate change, using both 




In the concluding chapter, I bring the lines of evidence together to build a conceptual model 
of the social and psychological functions of responses to climate change.   
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CHAPTER 2. MOTIVATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF FUNCTIONS: A 
THEORETICAL REVIEW 
 
In the first chapter I reviewed the major investigative trends of social and psychological 
responses to climate change. In light of research findings suggesting high response 
differentiation within communities, seemingly driven by different reasons under different 
circumstances, I argued that a functional approach would yield insight into the underlying 
causes of these response differences. In this chapter I discuss some theories and 
perspectives that have functional relevance. These theories have at their heart concepts 
that relate to why people hold the attitudes and beliefs that they do, why people behave 
and respond as they do, and the underlying social and psychological needs and goals that 
these responses ultimately fulfil.   
 
2.1.1 Motivated Social Cognition 
The theories and perspectives I present in this chapter can be grouped under the umbrella 
term Motivated Social Cognition. I use the term here to refer to the assumption that 
people’s values, attitudes, and beliefs have motivational underpinnings, and satisfy certain 
psychological and social needs. These motivations affect the reasoning process and belief 
and attitude formation by biasing how information is processed (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & 
Sulloway, 2003; Kunda, 1990). Motivated Social Cognition blends ‘cold cognition’ 
approaches that emphasise the limits of information-processing as guiding social 
judgements, with ‘hot cognition’ approaches that emphasise the role of affect and emotion 
in influencing perceptions and judgements (Jost et al., 2003). Theories according with 
Motivated Social Cognition may be purely intra-individual accounts, or they might allow for 
collective, social, and cultural influences; alternatively they may blend the two. A Motivated 
Social Cognition approach is highly suited as a theoretical framework for a functional 
analysis of climate change responses, because it is concerned with the underlying drivers of 
why people respond to information as they do, and accounts for potential social and 
cultural influences as well as intra-psychic processes that may lead to response 





The review below starts with theories that have their roots in intra-individual processes; it 
then proceeds to more inter-individual accounts, and on to perspectives that are more 
socio-cultural in their orientation. With the exception of stress and coping models, the 
ordering also roughly reflects the chronological sequence of the development of each of 
the theories and perspectives. While some of these theories and perspectives sit less 
comfortably under the Motivated Social Cognition banner than others, they share a 
common history, with their origins in a motivational account of human behaviour. 
Accordingly, there are numerous overlaps in content, the psychological mechanisms 
involved, and the functions these mechanisms are thought to serve. These overlaps reflect 
the influence these perspectives have had on each other throughout the decades, and 
continue to have. What follows is not an exhaustive list of Motivated Social Cognition 
accounts; rather I select approaches for their relevance to understanding responses to 
climate change in particular. To illustrate this relevance, accompanying the description of 
each theory is a section identifying the underlying functions that each type of motivated 
cognition serves, and why they might be relevant for responses to climate change in 
Australia.  
 
2.2 Stress and Coping Models 
Stress and coping models were developed to explain both avoidant and positive choices in 
relation to threats to an individual’s health.  In the previous chapter I noted how stress and 
coping models such as Protection Motivation Theory have also been used to explain and 
predict responses to climate change. Despite the limitations of applying such intra-
individual theories to collective dilemmas, they are still important. First, they introduce the 
concept that individuals are motivated to act to fulfil certain needs and goals they find 
important. They also provide a framework for conceptualising and understanding other 
theories of motivated cognition, such as system justification (see below). 
 
In addition to Protection Motivation Theory, one of the main stress and coping models is 
the Health Belief Model (HBM; Janz & Becker, 1984). The HBM was developed to explain 
and predict acceptance of health and medical care recommendations, and to understand 
people’s failure to take preventative health measures. HBM posits that behaviour depends 
mainly upon the value placed on a particular goal, and the individual’s estimate that a given 
action will achieve that goal (response efficacy). The dimensions of the model consist of 
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perceived susceptibility to a threat, perceived severity of the threat, perceived benefits of 
acting against the threat, and perceived barriers to acting against the threat. 
 
Recent attempts to overcome the limitations of stress and coping models have embedded 
its original constructs within broader models that account for external social processes such 
as social capital and social networks, the influence of media representations, and one’s 
physical environment (Gifford, Kormos, & McIntyre, 2011). Such holistic models promise 
more meaningful outcomes in relation to understanding climate change responses, though 
to my knowledge they have yet to be empirically tested.   
   
2.2.1 The Functions in Stress & Coping Models 
The functions contained in stress and coping models fulfil several goals: the reduction of 
stress and threat, and the enhancement of coping. These goals are attained through the 
motivating mechanisms of value importance, the perceived efficacy of acting, and the costs 
and benefits of action: that is, a coping appraisal. 
 
It is becoming increasingly evident that climate change will affect people’s health; this is 
particularly so for the more vulnerable in society (Frumkin, Hess, Luber, Malilay, & 
McGeehin, 2008). As such, behaviour motivated to protect individual health, as outlined in 
stress and coping models, may play an important function in adapting to the impacts of a 
changing climate. While climate change mitigation measures such as driving less and green-
purchasing might not assuage threat to an individual’s health, an enhanced perception of 
the efficacy of collective responses to climate change may do. This in turn may promote 
engagement with adaptive health behaviours, such as making preparations for the 
increased prevalence and severity of natural disasters. 
 
2.3 Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
Leon Festinger (1957) coined the term ‘cognitive dissonance’ to describe the psychological 
discomfort that arises when an inconsistency between two cognitions is made salient. The 
inconsistency might be between two attitudes, between two behaviours, or between an 
attitude and a behaviour. This discomfort places the individual in a motivational state that 
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drives them to reduce the discomfort by resolving the inconsistency. The resolution of 
inconsistency is achieved by changing either one’s behaviour, one’s attitudes, or by 
introducing a third cognition that serves to rationalise or justify the discordance. This 
change is the mechanism through which consistency is restored, and the aversive state 
assuaged.  
 
Cognitive Dissonance is one of a family of Consistency and Balance theories popular in the 
1950s and 1960s (see Abelson, 1983, for a review). The underlying assumption of these 
theories is that individuals desire and strive for cognitive consistency. This assumption was 
first challenged in the 1960s, when researchers found that discrepant cognitions only 
aroused dissonance under certain conditions, such as when apprehension at being 
negatively evaluated by others was present (Rosenberg, 1965). These conditions were 
summarised in Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) ‘New Look’ cognitive dissonance, which suggested 
that dissonance arousal occurred, not through cognitive inconsistency per se, but when one 
perceived themselves as responsible for bringing about an unwanted event. Here, the 
acceptance of personal responsibility is a necessary condition for dissonance arousal. 
Personal responsibility is made up of two components: the ability to freely choose a 
behaviour, and the ability to see the adverse consequences of that behaviour. Further, the 
aversive consequences of a behaviour must be reasonably foreseeable. Once these 
conditions are met, the individual is motivated to change behaviour, or to change 
perceptions about the aversive outcomes, or to change perceptions about whether they are 
responsible for the aversive outcomes. If an individual accepts personal responsibility, 
dissonance occurs; if they deny responsibility, the unpleasant state of dissonance is avoided 
(Cooper, 2012). 
 
Both traditional accounts of cognitive dissonance and the New Look approach have been 
criticised for focussing solely on the conditions that give rise to dissonance while neglecting 
the mechanisms that give rise to it in the first place (Kunda, 1990). The newer Self-
Standards model of cognitive dissonance (Stone & Cooper, 2001) sought to address what 
might be underlying the drive-reduction state. Key here was the notion of an ‘aversive 
consequence’. Theorists reason that what is aversive is subjective, and depends on two key 
criteria: what most other people think is aversive (termed the normative standard of 
judgement), and what the individual considers aversive (personal standard of judgement). If 
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a behaviour violates one or both of these standards, dissonance might occur (Stone & 
Cooper, 2001). Whether a normative or personal standard of judgement is applied depends 
on the salience of either, or a chronic disposition to refer to one of these standards over 
the other (Cooper, 2012). 
 
Under these standards of judgement, individuals are motivated to rationalise behaviour 
that could be viewed by others, or by oneself, as somehow immoral, foolish, or 
unintelligent. So discomfort arises not from the inconsistency itself, but from the 
consequent threat to self-esteem and self-identity that an observed inconsistency may 
arouse (Dunning, 1999; Scher & Cooper, 1989). Steele (1988) is one such theorist who 
suggests that people are motivated to rationalise inconsistencies because they threaten 
one’s self-concept. Central to a positive self-concept, Steele argues, is the sense of being 
“adaptively and morally adequate” (p. 30): that is, as a competent, stable, and agentic 
social citizen. Steele goes on to suggest that overcoming discomfort associated with 
dissonance need not have relevance to the dissonant attitudes, beliefs, or behaviours 
themselves; discomfort can be assuaged by taking part in other activities that are valued by 
the individual (or society) for their integrity and worth, such as donating to charities or 
succeeding at work.  
 
2.3.1 The Functions in Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
The functions implied in traditional cognitive dissonance theory fulfil the goal of reduced 
internal psychological discomfort arising from discordant beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. 
The mechanism through which this is achieved is the changing of one’s behaviour or 
attitude, or the rationalisation and justification of the behaviour or attitude so that 
consistency is realised. Under the reconceptualised cognitive dissonance approach, the 
underlying goals and needs become the protection of self-esteem, and the enhancement of 
self-identity. These goals and needs are satisfied through maintaining the perception that 
one is moral, intelligent, in control, and stable. The mechanisms for achieving this include 
abdicating responsibility for aversive outcomes, and changing perceptions about whether 
the outcomes are aversive in the first place. Another goal of dissonance reduction is self-
presentational, whereby appearing moral, intelligent, in control, and stable in the eyes of 
others is achieved by adopting, amending, or rationalising inconsistent behaviours and 
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attitudes observed by other people. Self-esteem and self-presentation can also be achieved 
by taking part in unrelated activities that are valued for their worth and integrity. 
 
Climate change is something we might hold discrepant cognitions about. For instance, we 
might think climate change is an important problem that needs to be addressed, yet we 
might be aware that our own daily actions are inconsistent with our views. Whether or not 
that discrepancy will be sufficient to change our behaviour will depend upon how 
responsible we feel for the impacts of climate change, or whether we think we have any 
control over those impacts. If we answer “yes” to both these questions, we might still 
resolve the discord by introducing third cognitions: justifications and rationalisations aimed 
at excusing (either to ourselves or to others) our inaction. 
  
2.4 Motivated Reasoning  
In her theory on motivated reasoning, Ziva Kunda (1990) suggests that people rely on 
cognitive representations and processes to arrive at a desired conclusion, and motivation 
influences which of these representations and processes will be used on which occasion. 
These biases in turn influence the determination of new beliefs and attitudes, impression-
formation, the evaluation of evidence, and decision-making.  Kunda distinguishes between 
directionally and non-directionally motivated reasoning. Non-directionally motivated 
reasoning is driven by accuracy goals, and therefore requires greater cognitive effort as it is 
processed more deeply and attended by more complex and elaborate reasoning. By 
contrast, directionally motivated reasoning involves searching one’s memory for beliefs and 
rules that support a desired conclusion. This latter type of reasoning is biased by goals that 
determine which subsets of pre-existing beliefs and rules are accessed first (that is, the 
ones that accord best with the desired conclusion). Put simply, people access different 
beliefs and rules on different occasions to achieve desired ends. 
 
A key component of directionally motivated reasoning is that during and after arriving at a 
conclusion, people attempt to construct a rational justification for it, one that would 
persuade a dispassionate observer. As such, the pre-desired conclusion is only upheld 
should the individual muster up enough ‘evidence’ for it; to do so may require selective 
memory searches or an on-the-spot combination of different beliefs and rules. When 
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confronted with strong or irrefutable arguments that run counter to the pre-desired 
conclusion, the individual may be forced to switch to an undesirable or counter-attitudinal 
conclusion (Kunda, 1990).  
 
An important outcome of this biased search for information is that new beliefs and theories 
can be constructed to account for, or justify, the individual’s eventual conclusion. Just as 
importantly, pre-existing beliefs and theories can be bolstered, or reinforced, by repeated 
preferential access. The subset of beliefs and rules people access also depends on external 
contextual cues, such as when politically relevant information is made salient (Redlawsk, 
2002). Subset selection is also influenced by different goals; for instance, different rules and 
beliefs will be accessed when one wants to present well in front of other people, than if one 
wanted to avoid engaging in a behaviour requiring a lot of effort. 
 
In relation to behavioural responses, Bersoff (1999) found that participants were less likely 
to engage in unethical behaviour (in this case, keeping an over-payment) if their ability to 
construct a ‘neutralisation’ for it was impeded. Under a motivated reasoning approach, 
Bersoff argues that people redefine and reconstrue unethical behaviour (a process he calls 
‘neutralisation’), and that this process often precedes and fosters decisions to act in an 
unethical manner. An example of a neutralisation is to deny the material benefits accruing 
from an unethical act, or to deny that it would cause harm to others. This neutralisation, a 
general tendency among the population, allows people to maintain a positive self-image 
and avoid dissonance arousal and its negative corollaries, such as social embarrassment or 
guilt. Reconstrual and redefinition are directional forms of motivated reasoning that allow 
individuals to feel committed to pro-social norms, values, and actions, while allowing them 
to concurrently engage in behaviour that violates these standards. Bersoff’s argument is 
similar to a cognitive dissonance approach, but for an important difference. Under a 
cognitive dissonance approach, dissonance is thought to occur after a person has 
committed a behaviour. By contrast, Bersoff argues that reconstruals and justifications 
happen before a conscious decision is made to undertake the behaviour.  This accounts for 
how people initially decide to perform an action that is contrary to their own attitudes or 




2.4.1 Motivated Reasoning and Emotion Regulation 
For Kunda, arousal is important in motivated reasoning because it can provide the cue that 
conflicting beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours may be in play. The arousal is the “red light” 
that indicates concern about a particular cognition (Kunda, 1990, p.492). Further, arousal is 
more important in cases where the attribution of arousal is uncertain.  
 
More recently, some authors have conceptualised motivated reasoning as a form of implicit 
emotion regulation, whereby people are drawn to judgements that assuage negative affect 
and maximise positive affect (Eldaief, Deckersbach, Carlson, Beucke, & Dougherty, 2012; 
Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006). From this perspective, reasoning is 
governed by approach-and-avoid systems, where judgements are made based on affect or 
anticipated affect. That is, people are motivated to arrive at a certain conclusion based on 
the implicit emotional associations with what is being considered.  Functional neural-
imaging work on political judgement and decision-making suggests that when people are 
engaged in motivated reasoning, the parts of the brain associated with ‘cold’ cognition 
remain inactive, and that people instead engage in implicit emotion regulation and 
psychological defence; however, they stress that this occurs predominantly in emotionally 
relevant situations (Westen et al., 2006). When the situation is not so emotionally relevant, 
explicit conscious processes are used to regulate emotions, such as suppression and 
distraction, or ‘motivated forgetting’ (Anderson et al., 2004). 
 
 An interesting result from Westen et al.’s work is that, when people are evaluating 
negative information about a preferred political candidate that would logically lead them to 
an emotionally aversive conclusion, the parts of the brain activated were those associated 
with self-referencing and sympathy, suggesting that identity-needs partially underpin 
motivated reasoning (these identity-needs are further explored in the next section).    
 
2.4.2 The Functions in Motivated Reasoning 
Taylor and Browne (1988) suggest that motivated reasoning and its attendant biases 
adaptively functions to promote mental health. They point to the outcomes of biased 
motivated cognitions as including positive self-concepts, positive thoughts about the world, 
feeling a sense of control over things, and feeling happy and contented. Similarly, Dunning 
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(1999) sees selective biases involved in directionally motivated reasoning as functioning to 
retain a flattering self-image. Mechanisms include attending to the sets of beliefs and rules 
and referencing associations and representations most likely to produce these outcomes.  
 
Non-directional motivation has a function for those with dispositional needs for accuracy, 
or a strong need for cognition. However, the functions of non-directional motivation go 
beyond providing accurate information about phenomena. Kruglanski (1980) conceives of 
accuracy goals as the fear of invalidity, in some ways mirroring the self-presentational goals 
of wanting to appear consistent to others (in that we want to appear correct and 
knowledgeable to others) (see also Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983). The social function of non-
directional reasoning is further evidenced by experimental findings that non-directional 
reasoning can be induced by telling participants they will have to justify their decisions to 
others (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). 
 
Motivated reasoning may also serve material self-interest. Bersoff’s (1999) empirical work 
on unethical behaviour demonstrates how motivated reasoning to justify unethical 
behaviour before it occurs can translate into direct material benefit for the individual. 
 
Finally, the emotion regulation work suggests that motivated reasoning functions to 
decrease negative emotions (such as guilt and shame), to increase positive emotions, and 
to maintain a positive self-identity.  This last goal may be achieved by activating empathy 
and self-reference systems, and by referring to implicit emotional associations. Mechanisms 
for avoiding negative affect include suppression and distraction. 
 
The idea that people are motivated reasoners, accessing different beliefs and rules on 
different occasions, is a potential explanation for why we witness fluctuations in people’s 
opinions about climate change over time and under different circumstances. Changing 
circumstances might include the coupling of climate change information with different 
stimuli on different occasions, or by framing climate change communication with reference 
to different social information. To reach a pre-desired conclusion, one may base their 
decision-making on different sets of rules and beliefs dependent on which set has been 
activated by the associated stimuli. However, some sets may be more chronically available 
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than others. Recent research suggests that exposure to contentious information, such as 
climate change and emerging technologies, activates political predispositions through the 
motivated reasoning process(Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Mutz, 2006). This, combined with the 
repeated preferential accessing of particular subsets of rules and beliefs, may reinforce and 
entrench opinions and associations, and ultimately lead to issue polarisation. There is also 
evidence that directional goals can bias the evaluation of scientific evidence by biasing the 
selection of beliefs and rules (Kunda, 1990). But if the evidence becomes irrefutable and 
overwhelming, the individual might be forced to concede their pre-desired conclusions, if 
maintaining that climate change is a myth, for instance, becomes too cognitively difficult to 
sustain. Finally, responding behaviourally to climate change entails a sacrifice of material 
benefit; it costs money to install solar panels, and time and effort to take public transport, 
or write to the local member of parliament. If unethical behaviour (or a lack of ethical 
behaviour) can be rationalised away, then one might avoid cost to self while maintaining 
self-esteem.  
 
2.5 Theories of Interpersonal and Social Identity  
Interpersonal and social identity theories explore how our interactions with others 
influence our beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours, and the public expression of these. Other 
individuals, or groups of individuals, can act as ‘referents’ (those to whom we refer) when 
considering how to think, feel, or behave. Referents may be those with whom we 
frequently interact or have a close relationship with, such as a family member or close 
friend. Conversely, referents may be (groups of) people that we have never met, but hold in 
high regard, such as a politician or a scientist (or scientists in general). Referents can also be 
negative; if a person or group of people is particularly disliked, they may serve as indicators 
for precisely how not to think or behave (Granberg, Jefferson, Brent, & King, 1981; 
Rokeach, 1973). Other people also influence the expression of our attitudes and opinions, 
and how we behave. For instance, people are more likely to express an opinion if they think 
it will meet with social approval (Shavitt, 1989; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956). 
 
Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) describes that part of our self-identity 
derived from awareness of being part of a certain social group, and the associated 
emotional significance of being part of that group. When membership of a particular group 
is made salient, we tend to emphasise similarity between in-group members and 
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accentuate differences with people outside our group, or in an opposing group. We also 
make judgements about other people based on their group-membership; people we are 
unfamiliar with become defined by the characteristics of their group. From an SIT 
perspective, being part of a group affords functional value because it allows us to make 
sense of complex and new situations. 
 
 An off-shoot of SIT, Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987) posits that we categorise ourselves into groups at different levels of 
abstraction concurrently (for instance, one might identify as a female, a German, and a 
philosopher, all at once), and that the group that is referred to depends on the specifics of a 
situation. In a given situation, the referent group (German, female, or philosopher) will be 
the one that best emphasises similarity with the in-group and accentuates differences with 
the out-group.   
 
Drawing from SIT, and from SCT in particular, Uncertainty-Identity Theory (UIT; Hogg, 2007) 
posits that a central role of social identification is to reduce uncertainty. When we are 
uncertain about our attitudes, feelings, or behaviours, it can provoke anxiety associated 
with reduced feelings of coping and a lowered sense of control. By identifying with social 
groups, uncertainty is reduced because we are able to draw on the attitudes, feelings, and 
behaviours of that group to infer what our own position should be. That is, people are more 
likely to self-categorise when they are less certain of how to respond.  
 
An underlying assumption of UIT is that people strive for a coherent sense of self (Rokeach, 
1973). Because of this, the more important the cause of the uncertainty is to our central 
concept of self-identity, or the more the cause is something we care about, the stronger the 
drive to reduce the uncertainty through social identification. As with SCT, people have 
many groups on hand under which they can categorise themselves. Some groups are 
‘chronic’ – they are prominent, unchanging, and accessed frequently (e.g. gender), and 
some are ‘situational’ – they are prominent because of a particular situation (e.g. political 
affiliation). When uncertainty about how to think, feel, or behave is made prominent, we 
will unconsciously cycle through the available categories that best fits our existing self-
identity in that particular context. This maintains our coherent sense of self. Once a 
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category is decided on, this triggers social-identity related perceptions, feelings, and 
behaviours. 
 
2.5.1 The Functions in Theories of Interpersonal and Social Identity  
The functions contained in accounts of interpersonal and social identity can be private or 
public. Privately, social identification functions to reduce uncertainty and attendant states 
of anxiety. Social identification may also mean that cognitive effort is reduced (consistent 
with a ‘cognitive miser’ approach) because our referents act as ‘quick guides’ for how to 
think, feel, and behave. Publically, social identification may function to increase social 
approval, and fulfil a need for social support in uncertain circumstances. There is also a 
value-expressive function: identifying with social groups allows us to indicate to others 
what sort of person we are, shaping and reinforcing our own self-identity (Shavitt, 1989).  
 
The scientific complexity of climate change is such that it is beyond most people’s 
knowledge to be certain about its properties, hence uncertainty may be considered a 
default position.  Uncertainty-Identity Theory instructs us that such uncertainty would lead 
individuals to draw heavily on social categories; this should be particularly so for people 
who care about environmental issues, or for whom environmentalism is an important part 
of their self-concept (whether positively or negatively). But exactly which social groups are 
made salient when presented with climate change information, and whether the level of 
group made salient differs from person to person, remains largely unexplored. Motivations 
to express opinions about climate change are also important. If certain referents are primed 
by climate change information, then perceptions of broad community sentiment may 
become distorted if those who think like us on the issue are the ones that repeatedly come 
to mind. A possible consequence of this distortion is that, if people think they will gain 
social support from expressing an opinion they believe the majority of people share, they 
will presumably be more vocal about it than those thinking they hold a minority opinion 
(Noelle-Nuemann, 1993). At a societal level these biases may exert subtle yet cumulative 
influences on public discourse surrounding opinions about climate change. For instance, if 
people perceive the majority opinion about climate change to be that it doesn’t exist, then 
they might be more likely to express this opinion than if they thought the opinion was held 
by very few, in doing so reinforcing the perception that their expressed opinion is the 




2.6 Terror Management Theory 
Terror Management Theory (TMT) (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) builds on 
work by Ernest Becker, who investigated the role of culture and self-esteem in creating a 
sense of meaning, value, and security (Becker, 1973). TMT, which went through a 
resurgence in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, starts with 
the premise that humans can be viewed as distinct from other animals due to intellectual 
abilities that produce three characteristics: the ability to think about reality in terms of 
causality; the ability to conceive of future events; and the ability for self-reflection. The 
ability to apply causality and to conceptualise future events provides us with a basis for 
predicting and controlling future outcomes. Inward reflection, meanwhile, allows us to self-
regulate, and thus allows flexibility in responses to environmental events. These same 
cognitive abilities also allow us to recognise fundamental aspects about the nature of our 
life that are beyond our control; most crucially, the inevitability of our death in an 
uncontrollable and indeterminate universe (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). The 
recognition of future events, it is argued, is a perpetual source of potential anxiety, and 
without an assurance that aversive events can be avoided, this anxiety would become 
paralysing terror (hence the term ‘terror management’). Anything that threatens one’s 
existence is a potential source of ongoing and intense anxiety. Becker believes that humans 
deal with this anxiety through the construction of culture – humanly created constructions 
of meanings shared by groups; a shared symbolic conception of the universe that imbues 
the world with meaning, stability, order, and permanence. The resulting cultural worldview 
is a “symbolic social construction that provides a meaningful context in which relatively 
anxiety-free action is possible” (Solomon et al., 1991, p. 96).  
 
The overriding goal of the individual, it is argued, is self-preservation. This can take direct or 
symbolic forms. Direct forms include basic biological needs such as food, water and shelter. 
Symbolic forms of self-preservation are ways of reducing existential anxiety through the 
‘cultural anxiety buffer’, of which there are two components - worldview and self-esteem. 
Self-esteem, as defined by terror management theorists, is a product of the individual’s 
perception of the extent to which they are meeting cultural standards of value. In relation 
to behaviour, an individual’s self-esteem depends on how that behaviour is viewed in a 
particular cultural context. Cultural standards of behaviour acquire their power because 
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“they are legitimized by the cultural worldview rather than because of any adaptive or 
utilitarian function that they might serve” (Solomon et al., 1991, p. 104). Suppression of the 
inevitability of our own death is facilitated in part by immersion in and preoccupation with 
the ‘cultural drama’; the preoccupation with the everyday functions to keep one’s deeper 
fears out of accessible consciousness. This cultural buffer allows a sense that we are part of 
a meaningful and enduring existence. But the cultural anxiety buffer is fragile, and under 
constant attack from competing beliefs and worldviews. As such, it requires continual 
maintenance and defence. Coupled with frequent reminders of our vulnerability and 
mortality, we are always on the lookout for confirmation of the validity of our worldviews. 
  
Numerous experiments have shown that self-esteem-threatening situations produce 
anxiety that engage defensive reactions to diffuse the threat in order to restore one’s self-
esteem (Hansen, Winzeler, & Topolinski, 2010; Jessop & Wade, 2008). Such diffusion may 
occur through various mechanisms, such as denying the relevance of the threat for one’s 
self-esteem, or by selectively seeking information that supports a self-serving 
interpretation. For instance, Paulhus and Levitt (1987) found that people had a greater 
tendency to rate positive traits as consistent with their own characteristics after being 
exposed to death-related words. Different types of worldview can filter what will be 
perceived as threatening to the cultural anxiety buffer. For example, Greenberg et al. 
(1990) found that high authoritarians derogated dissimilar others while low authoritarians 
did not; as a result  the researchers surmised that liberal bolstering of worldviews may 
include an increased display of tolerance and open-mindedness. There may also be cross-
cultural variations in the operation of the anxiety buffer; for example, protection of self-
esteem may not be as potent in collectively-oriented societies (though the underlying 
dynamics of terror management are thought to apply universally).   
 
Terror Management Theory has received its share of criticism, particularly from 
evolutionary psychologists, who believe that intergroup biases found under mortality 
salience conditions may occur in response to a much wider variety of situations that pose 
adaptive problems where the marshalling of social support is an adaptive response 
(Navarrete, Kurzban, Fessler, & Kirkpatrick, 2004). A related criticism is that the theory falls 
for the fallacy of ‘asserting the consequent’. That is, it is a significant leap to conclude that 
evidence of worldview bolstering in the face of mortality salience supports the notion that 
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worldviews exist to ward off existential anxiety and despair (Koltko-Rivera, 2004).  Despite 
these weaknesses, the theory bands together several strands of social psychology that have 
hitherto been treated separately, and in doing so, provide a parsimonious theoretical 
explanation for a host of empirical data (Solomon et al., 1991). 
 
2.6.1 The Functions in Terror Management Theory 
Terror management functions to reduce existential anxiety. The mechanism through which 
this is achieved is our cultural worldview: our shared symbolic conceptions that imbue the 
world with meaning, stability, order, and permanence. These worldviews are bolstered 
when existential anxieties enter our consciousness. A secondary outcome in TMT is self-
esteem maintenance. This is achieved through mechanisms such as self-serving attribution 
biases, denying the relevance of threats to self-esteem for one’s self, or by selectively 
seeking information that supports a self-serving interpretation. 
 
The threat to existence posed by climate change is arguably of sufficient magnitude and 
scale to trigger existential anxiety. Such a threat should, from a utilitarian point of view, 
result in adaptive behaviours designed to alleviate or negate the threatening situation (e.g., 
by reducing behaviours that result in carbon emissions). However, our capacity to recognise 
future threatening events and the associated inevitable futility (at the individual level) of 
self-preservation efforts may, paradoxically, prevent such actions from occurring, as they 
are admissions of personal vulnerability.  
 
2.7 Theories of Social-System Legitimacy  
By theories of social-system legitimacy I refer to those theories that share the following 
features: first, individuals are motivated to defend prevailing social systems, and to see 
them as moral, just, and fair outcomes of inherent differences in worth between people, or 
groups of people. Second, ideologies, justifications, and myths function to legitimise social 
inequalities, and to sustain dominant groups’ position of power over subordinate groups. 
Third, these ideologies, justifications, and myths are believed by a significant proportion of 
people within a society, whether they are members of  dominant or subordinate groups 




Social-system legitimacy theories explain how individual differences and values interact 
with social institutions. There are numerous theories that have social legitimacy concerns 
as either one of their central or secondary tenets, including conflict theories grounded in 
Marxism and Feminism. Here, I focus on two theories – Social Dominance Theory and 
System Justification Theory – that synthesise many of these traditional conflict theories 
with some of the concepts introduced above, such as those within Self Identity Theory and 
Cognitive Dissonance.    
  
2.7.1 Social Dominance Theory 
Social Dominance Theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) considers societies as organised 
along group-based hierarchies. Members of dominant groups have greater access to 
resources (such as good quality housing, education, and health services) and members of 
subordinate groups less. Hierarchies are maintained through intergroup oppression, 
discrimination, and prejudice. 
 
SDT is a multi-level theory. At the personal level, individual predispositions (principally 
‘social dominance orientation’) and other group orientations make the expression of social 
dominance more or less likely. The result of aggregated individual expression is systemic 
discrimination.5  At the intergroup level, members of dominant groups are more likely to 
act in ways that benefit their own group than are members of subordinate groups: an 
imbalance termed behavioural asymmetry (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).This behavioural 
asymmetry implies that group-based hierarchies are maintained, to some extent, by agency 
on the part of subordinate groups and individuals (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  As with 
Uncertainty-Identity Theory, context is an important consideration in the salience of group 
identities. In situations where the inequality between two groups is a prominent feature of 
a contentious issue, stereotypes and beliefs that separate the identities of the groups are 
made salient, leading to stereotype reinforcement and prejudice. At a system level, group-
based hierarchy is maintained by ‘legitimising myths’, which can be ‘hierarchy-enhancing’ 
or ‘hierarchy-attenuating’. Hierarchy-enhancing myths involve moral and intellectual 
                                                          
5
 Recent cross-national research with 27 nations suggests aggregate levels of social dominance 
orientation depend on the institutional characteristics of societies, suggesting that, in addition to 
individual difference tendencies, high social dominance is at least partly a product of socialisation 




justification of the hierarchy. Hierarchy-attenuating myths, on the other hand, challenge 
existing social structures and promote equality and democracy; they are concerned with 
how people and institutions should behave rather than justifying how people and 
institutions do behave (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012).  There is a constant tension and battle for 
supremacy between these two kinds of myths that keeps systems relatively stable, and 
ultimately determines the amount of hierarchy within a society. The concept of hierarchy-
attenuating myths is an important characteristic of SDT that distinguishes it from other 
theories of social-system legitimacy. That people strive for equality acknowledges that 
there are oppositional and transformative modes of power, as well as oppressive modes. 
 
2.7.2 System Justification Theory 
Stemming from intergroup process perspectives, System Justification Theory’s (SJT; Jost & 
Banaji, 1994) central tenet is that there is a general ideological motive that functions to 
justify the existing social order. Building on social identity and social dominance theories, 
John Jost and his colleagues identify three main motives, or ‘justification tendencies’, 
thought to underlie intergroup conflict: ego justification, or the need to maintain a positive 
self-image and to feel justified, valued, and a legitimate member of society; group 
justification, the need to maintain a favourable image of one’s own group and fellow group 
members; and to these they add system justification, the need to maintain a favourable 
view of the status-quo and to see it as fair, legitimate, desirable, natural, and inevitable 
(Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).  
 
System justification works predominantly at the implicit, non-conscious level, and occurs 
even if this comes at the expense of personal and/or group interests (Jost et al., 2004). 
These points distinguish SJT from classic conflict theories of intergroup relations that 
portray dominant groups as pre-occupied with acting to maintain their superiority over the 
disadvantaged. Jost et al. point to the small correspondence between political ideological 
preferences and indicators of self-interest (such as wealth and class) as an example of how 
a propensity to maintain, justify, and rationalise the status-quo can actively work to 
discriminate against the interests of the individual or group, particularly by those who are 
disadvantaged. Indeed, ideological bolstering and system justification are observed more 
commonly among members of under-privileged groups. System justification tendencies are 




A lack of knowledge or propensity to avoid an issue can lead to the bolstering of system 
justification tendencies. For example, Shepherd and Kay (2011) found that, rather than 
motivating an increased search for information, a lack of knowledge about a specific socio-
political issue fostered feelings of dependence on the government, which in turn increased 
system justification and government trust, which increased desires to avoid learning about 
the relevant issue when the information was negative. 
 
While SJT theorists posit the motivation to defend the status-quo is universal, they point to 
a number of system justifying tendencies (or ‘ideologies’) that predict a person’s propensity 
to defend the status-quo. Such ideologies include right-wing authoritarianism, high belief in 
a just world, endorsing a Protestant work ethic, economic system justification, power 
distance, and social dominance orientation (Jost et al., 2004; Jost & Thompson, 2000). 6 
 
An advantage of SJT is that, like SDT, it accounts for the fact that disadvantaged groups 
often act in a way that is counter to their self-interest. From an SDT perspective, 
behavioural asymmetry is an outcome of power imbalances between dominant and 
subservient groups. SJT also incorporates systemic processes, but adds an intra-psychic 
motivational explanation for this behavioural asymmetry, and the functions these 
motivations serve. 
 
2.7.3 The Functions in Social-System Legitimacy Theories 
Whereas ego and group justifications function to protect the interests and positive image of 
the self and the group, social-system legitimacy provides ideological justifications. These 
justifications are a sense-making mechanism to explain why things are as they are, serving 
to satisfy people’s drive to think the world is just and fair, and increasing satisfaction with 
one’s own situation and life circumstances (Lerner, 1980). In addition, in seeking to 
understand why people engage in system justification, Jost and Hunyady (2003) conclude 
that system-justifying ideologies have a more immediate, palliative function. Specifically, 
these ideologies reduce anxiety, guilt, dissonance, discomfort, and uncertainty for both 
                                                          
6
 From an SJT perspective, these individual difference factors are not thought to be genetically 
mandated but rather are socially constructed (Jost et al., 2004) 
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those who are advantaged by prevailing systems, and those who are disadvantaged by 
them. These goals are achieved by bolstering one’s defence of the status quo, and by 
rationalisations, justifications, and legitimising myths for prevailing social systems and 
inequities.  
 
Jost and Hunyady (2003) also suggest the functions of system justification can be 
understood through the lens of stress and coping models (see above). The set of beliefs and 
assumptions about existing social systems, they argue, serve a stress-prevention function 
by letting the individual believe that the world is predictable, consistent, and meaningful. 
System justification also acts as a coping resource by fostering a sense of control and hope, 
and as a coping response to stressors felt by both low and high status groups as a 
consequence of their unequal positions within the prevailing system. 
 
One of the implications of a system justification tendency is that people favour likely 
outcomes over unlikely ones, regardless of the perceived attractiveness of competing 
outcomes (Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002; McGuire & McGuire, 1991). A possible implication 
for climate change responses is that, as the perceived efficacy of climate change adaptation 
and mitigation strategies increase, so too might support for policies designed to do just this. 
Conversely, any policies that involve the redistribution of goods and resources might be 
interpreted as a threat to the status quo, or prevailing power-based hierarchies – therefore 
under a social legitimacy perspective one might anticipate system legitimising 
rationalisations to increase rather than decrease, even if the individual is a recipient of such 
redistribution policies. Further, we might expect people from both dominant and 
subordinate groups to employ a range of hierarchy-enhancing myths to ensure that 
redistribution policies are met with resistance.   
 
2.8 Moral Disengagement 
The concept of moral disengagement is an extension of Albert Bandura’s (1991) Social 
Cognitive Theory. This agentic theory of human behaviour posits that we exercise control 
over our life through self-regulatory processes, and that this personal agency operates 




An important feature of Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory is the exercise of moral agency.  
As individuals we adopt internal moral standards of right and wrong, which are ‘culturally 
situated’ in our own social context. Internal moral standards guide or deter our conduct, as 
they allow us to anticipate, monitor, and judge our own actions. When we act in opposition 
to these moral standards, self-censure occurs. But moral standards and self-censure do not 
function unwaveringly. Moral self-sanctions can be selectively disengaged, leading us to act 
in ways that belie our ethical standards. Such disengagement is most likely to occur when 
the outcomes of acting immorally are in some way valued or valuable. Moral 
disengagement frees us from our own self-sanctions and therefore from the attendant guilt 
arising from violating our internal moral standards.  
 
Disengagement processes can include cognitive misconstrual of reprehensible behaviour to 
increase its moral acceptability, obscuring or distorting the effects of harmful actions, and 
reducing identification with the targets of harmful acts (Bandura, 1990). 
 
2.8.1 Misconstrual of Reprehensible Behaviour  
Misconstrual of reprehensible behaviour can occur through the act of moral justification, 
where what is culpable is made justifiable, even righteous, through the act of cognitive 
reconstrual. In so doing, detrimental behaviour and attitudes are made personally and 
socially acceptable, justifiable, and morally passable. Cognitive reconstruals can mean that 
moral justifications become a conscious offence mechanism, rather than an unconscious 
defence mechanism (Bandura, 1990). 
 
Sanitising language (or euphemistic labelling) is another mechanism through which 
misconstrual of reprehensible behaviour occurs. Bandura argues that sanitising 
euphemisms, often expressed in the passive form, are a linguistic device for creating the 
appearance that nameless forces, rather than people, are responsible for culpable acts 
(Bandura, 1990). This is similar to Cohen’s notion (discussed in the previous chapter) of 
interpretive denial, where euphemisms are employed to alter the meaning of something 
(e.g. ‘population exchange’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ for genocide, and ‘collateral damage’ for 
the killing of civilians) (Cohen, 2001). Those who engage in sanitising language and 




A third mechanism is advantageous comparisons, which refers to invidious comparisons 
made by presenting two things contiguously. By using as a contrast an immoral act of much 
greater import and social condemnation, one’s own transgression becomes trivial by 
comparison, or even righteous if the comparison is made in opposition.  
 
2.8.2 Obscuring or Distorting Harmful Effects 
Obscuring or distorting harmful effects can occur through the displacement of 
responsibility, which operates by distorting or obscuring the relationship between one’s 
actions and their consequences. This is more likely to occur in circumstances where 
responsibility can be displaced to those in authority (Bandura, 1990). Such a mechanism 
mitigates moral judgements about a situation, thereby preserving one’s integrity in the 
eyes of others. The relinquishment of personal control occurs more easily when there is 
higher perceived social consensus about the morality of an enterprise, and when those who 
authorise the enterprise are seen as legitimate.  
 
Another obscuring mechanism is the diffusion of responsibility. We tend to act more harshly 
when responsibility is attributed to the collective level than when we hold ourselves 
personally accountable for the outcomes of our actions. That is, diffusion of responsibility is 
more likely to occur when the problem is a collective one. Further, the more detrimental 
collectively shared acts are, the less people feel personally responsible for them (Bandura, 
1990).   
 
Finally, minimisation or disputation of harm occurs through processes such as selective 
attention biases and distortion of the consequences of one’s behaviour, including outright 
disbelief in detrimental effects or misrepresentation. Misrepresentation may include active 
efforts to discredit evidence of the harm caused. These processes are easier to maintain 
when detrimental consequences of our actions are not directly visible, or if they are 




2.8.3 Reducing Identification with Targets of Harmful Acts 
Moral disengagement can also occur through the processes of dehumanisation and 
attribution of blame. Self-censure requires a level of empathetic or vicarious emotional 
reactions triggered by some perceived similarity with the victims of harmful acts. These 
emotional reactions are cognitively mediated rather than automatically elicited, therefore 
any dehumanising tendencies or ascriptions of insensateness toward the victims lowers the 
tendency for self-censure to be activated. Bandura points to the mass of literature on 
human atrocities as evidence for the central role that dehumanisation plays in allowing 
people to morally disengage with their actions (Bandura, 1990). 
 
In attribution of blame, the aim is to portray oneself as a faultless victim, compelled by 
forcible provocation or environmental circumstances, to allow our engagement in conduct 
that is morally questionable. In some cases this goes as far as to lay the burden of blame on 
the victims themselves.  Self-exoneration is thus achieved by viewing one’s behaviour as 
forced by circumstances rather than freely chosen.  
 
The mechanisms described above are not thought to act in isolation, but in various 
combinations. Moral disengagement does not act suddenly, but can be thought of as the 
gradual weakening of self-sanctions, a characteristic that helps keep the actor consciously 
unaware of the mechanisms through which it is operating. Moral disengagement occurs in 
extreme circumstances (such as in rape and torture) but also in everyday situations where 
otherwise ethical people routinely engage in activities that have some element of injurious 
effect on others. 
 
2.8.4 The Functions of Moral Disengagement 
Moral disengagement functions to reduce and/or avoid feelings of guilt arising from the 
breach of one’s internal moral standards. The mechanisms through which this occurs are 
moral justification, sanitising and euphemistic language, advantageous comparisons, 
displacement and diffusion of responsibility, minimisation or disputation of harm, 




Climate change is as much as anything a moral issue (as will be discussed in Chapter 5). 
Understanding the ways in which we are able to morally disengage with something of such 
enormity therefore has particular relevance, and raises numerous questions. Is the term 
‘climate change’ itself a form of euphemistic labelling – something that the climate does 
that does not necessarily imply any directionality, causality, and therefore culpability on our 
behalf?  Do we tend to dehumanise those who are hardest hit by climate change, while 
exonerating our own actions?  And do we tend to justify our own inactions by pointing out 
people who are even worse than us? The abdication of individual responsibility and the 
reinterpretation of aversive outcomes are particularly relevant for climate change, as it is a 
collective problem with obvious targets for culpability (oil companies and big-polluting 
industries, governments, and so on). The fact that much of this culpability is real and 
justified perhaps means that disavowal and diffusion of responsibility are appealing and 
accessible ways to avoid action and excuse inaction.  
 
2.9 Toward a Functional Framework  
The common thread of the theories and perspectives outlined above is that they identify 
the possible functions that people’s attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and behaviours might 
serve, and how underlying needs and goals can influence evaluations and judgements. 
Table 2 provides an overview of these needs and goals, the functional mechanisms through 
which these needs and goals might be fulfilled, and the theories from which they are 
derived, sorted by broad functional area. I do not purport that this is an exhaustive list, but 
it nevertheless serves to illustrate the overlap between needs and goals, functional 
mechanisms, and theories. The broad functional areas can be summarised as follows: 
 
The reduction of internal psychological discomfort. This might encompass responses aimed 
at reducing levels of stress associated with some external threat, and an avoidance of 
negative affect (such as that arising from guilt and anxiety). Responses may take the form 
of distraction, disengagement from the issue, or asserting one’s moral credentials as a 
valuable citizen. 
 
Effort reduction. This incorporates responses designed to reduce the need to engage in 
effortful behaviour (such as climate change mitigation behaviours), or effortful cognitions 
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(such as digesting complex scientific information). Responses here might include social 
categorisation, so that opinions and behaviour can be based on referents, and 
rationalisations and justifications to excuse unethical behaviours. 
 
Social-System justification. This area refers to responses aimed at confirming social, 
cultural, and economic systems (and their outcomes) as fair, just, and desirable. Responses 
here might include the belief that the impacts of climate change will only affect those who 
deserve it, or a faith that present governance arrangements will be sufficient (or sufficiently 
rearranged) to combat climate change impacts. 
 
Self-image and self-esteem maintenance. This area might include responses designed to 
make the individual seem and/or feel moral, intelligent, and in control. Here, responses 
may take the form of changing one’s perceptions about the seriousness of climate change 
impacts, or constructing mental representations of climate change in such a way that the 
person feels less obliged to act.  
 
The maximisation of positive affect. This might include responses that preference positive 
information about climate change over negative information. This could include giving 
more weight to information casting doubt on climate science, or conversely, a focus on the 






Table 2. Functions and their mechanisms in motivated social cognition theory. 
FUNCTIONAL AREA 
(needs & goals served) 
FUNCTIONAL RESPONSE 
MECHANISMS & STRATEGIES 
CONTRIBUTING THEORIES 
Reduction of internal 
discomfort, including: 
 Stress and threat         
reduction 
 
 Avoidance of 
negative affect 
 
 Guilt reduction 
 











Positive coping appraisals 
Stress and Coping Models 
System Justification Theory 
Attitude change Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
Behaviour change Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
Cultural worldview buffering Terror Management Theory 
Preoccupation with the cultural 
drama 
Terror Management Theory 
Suppression Motivated Reasoning 
Distraction Motivated Reasoning 
Moral Disengagement 
Social Cognitive Theory of Moral 
Agency 
Rationalisations and Justifications 
Social Cognitive Theory of Moral 
Agency 
Motivated Reasoning 
System justification System Justification Theory 
Status-quo bolstering System Justification Theory 









Rationalisations and Justifications 




Interpersonal and Social Identity 
Theories 
Advantageous comparison 
Social Cognitive Theory of Moral 
Agency 





 Positive concepts 
about the world 
 
 
Cultural worldview buffering Terror Management Theory 
Selective processing Motivated Reasoning 
Directionally motivated reasoning Motivated Reasoning 
Status-quo bolstering System Justification Theory 
Positive coping appraisal System Justification Theory 











 Appearing moral, 
intelligent, in 
control, stable 
 Fear of invalidity 
reduction 
 Need for social 
support 
 Social adjustment 
Moral Disengagement 
Social Cognitive Theory of Moral 
Agency 
Abdication of responsibility for 
averse outcomes 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
Social Cognitive Theory of Moral 
Agency 
Changing perceptions about 
whether outcomes are averse 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
Social Cognitive Theory of Moral 
Agency 
Taking part in other activities of 
worth and integrity 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
Selective processing 
Motivated Reasoning 
Terror Management Theory 
Directionally and non-directionally 
motivated reasoning 
Motivated Reasoning 
Mental representations and 
associations 
Motivated Reasoning 
Accuracy goals Motivated Reasoning 
Activation of empathy and self-
referencing systems 
Motivated Reasoning 
Self-serving attributions Terror Management Theory 
Advantageous comparison 
Social Cognitive Theory of Moral 
Agency 
Perceived False Consensus 
Interpersonal and Social Identity 
Theories 
Denial of issue relevance Terror Management Theory 
Group Identification 




Maximisation of positive 
affect, including: 
 Enhanced coping 
 
 
Positive coping appraisal Stress and Coping Models 
Selective processing Motivated Reasoning 
Directionally motivated reasoning Motivated Reasoning 
Implicit emotional associations Motivated Reasoning 
 
Now we have a broad theoretical framework of individual and social functions that 
responses to climate change might serve (Aim 3). The following chapters present results 
from three studies that test aspects of this framework, beginning with a synopsis of 




CHAPTER 3. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSES AND 
METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
 
The question of how to empirically test social and psychological functions has long plagued 
researchers, and has been proffered as a key reason for functional approaches falling out of 
fashion in psychology (Shavitt, 1989). There is arguably no real way of testing functions 
directly, not least because the mechanisms involved are often unconscious (and therefore 
inaccessible) to the individual (Kruglanski, 1999). A further hindrance is resources. Ideally, 
we might systematically test each function and mechanism in Table 2 independently 
through a series of carefully designed and strictly controlled tests – but this is beyond the 
scope of a single thesis or a short-term research program. What we can do though is infer 
what functions are at play by observing patterns in differential responses to climate change 
with other variables we theoretically suspect responses to relate to.  
 
In this chapter I summarise previous approaches to functional analyses, and some of the 
strengths and limitations of these approaches. I then introduce the methodologies 
employed in this thesis to explore functional responses to climate change, and conclude 
with an overview of the measures incorporated therein.  
 
A few points are worth clarifying before continuing. To date, a functional analysis of 
responses to climate change has not yet been undertaken, so the analysis here must be to 
some extent exploratory. Further, I am attempting to understand responses to a particular 
issue – climate change. I do not seek to understand the full range of social and 
psychological functions that exist in relation to all issues; nor do I (nor would I dare!) set out 
to reconceptualise social and psychological functions as a whole. Rather, I hope to use 
functions as a way of understanding what is driving responses to this particular issue. The 
results will then, I hope, direct future testing of a more systematic nature. 
 
3.1 Previous Functional Analyses 
A functional analysis can be defined as an analysis “concerned with the reasons and 
purposes, the needs and goals, the plans and motives that underlie and generate 
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psychological phenomena; that is, such an analysis is concerned with the psychological [and 
social] functions being served by people’s beliefs and their actions” (Snyder, 1993, p. 253).  
 
The role of functions in psychology dates back to the turn of the 20th century and the works 
of James, Dewey, and Tichener, who were interested in purposive questions of human 
action.  The modern functional approach in social psychology goes back at least to Smith, 
Bruner, and White (1956) and Katz (1960), who posited that attitudes were constructed and 
changed because of the specific psychological functions they served for the individual. Both 
Katz and Smith et al. conceived of attitudes (or in the latter’s case, ‘opinions’) as serving 
several broad functional areas (Table 3). The functions proposed by Katz in particular have 
similar properties to those derived from Motivated Social Cognition accounts (the five 
functional areas I proposed in Table 2).  
 
Table 3. Functional areas identified by Smith et al. (1956) and Katz (1960). 





The categorisation of an attitude object into a class of 
objects (or events) for which a predisposition for 
responses already exists 
Social Adjustment 
The facilitation, disruption, or maintenance of 
relationships with other people 
Externalisation 
The process of transforming an internal, unresolved 




Maximisation of rewards and minimisation of 
punishments, either intrinsic or material 
Ego defensive 
The protection of the ego from acknowledging 
detrimental self-truths and threatening external realities  
Value Expressive 
Satisfaction derived from expressing values symbolic of 
one’s self-identity 
Knowledge 
Attitudes that give meaning to the universe and provide 
clarity and consistency for the individual 
 
Smith, Bruner and White (1956) derived their functional areas from a series of in-depth 
psychological case-studies of Americans and their opinions about Russia and Russians. Their 
choice of topic was based on several criteria: first, the topic was one about which opinions 
were generally crystallised yet controversial (this was 1950s Cold War America); second, 
the topic generated a certain amount of affect and anxiety; finally, the topic was of chronic 
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rather than transitory social and political significance. Smith et al. conceived of people’s 
opinions as an expression (or outcome) of three broad functional categories: object 
appraisal, social adjustment, and externalisation, satisfying reality needs, social needs, and 
psychological needs respectively. They found that for each individual a particular category 
would predominate, and within these categories the needs themselves would differ, 
dependent on the life history, social position, cultural context, and values and attitudes of 
the individual. They concluded that for attitude change to occur, successful communication 
campaigns would be contingent upon appealing to all three categories of needs and the 
different emphases for each individual therein, rather than through simply focusing on one 
category (e.g. how an individual appraises, or categorises, an object).  
 
Katz’s functional areas were derived from motivational accounts at the time (1960), 
especially theories of cognitive consistency, but also blended two competing accounts of 
attitude formation: one account where individuals were conceived of as rational decision-
makers – a discriminating, reasoning, sense-making machine, seeking understanding; and 
the other account where the individual was conceived of as irrational, with a weak capacity 
to discriminate, and capable of only the most primitive self-insight.  
 
More recent functional analyses have included work in the area of volunteerism (Clary et 
al., 1998; Snyder, 1993; Stukas, Worth, Clary, & Snyder, 2007). In their work, Snyder and 
colleagues concluded that people gravitate towards volunteerism when it is conducive to 
their own self-identity, but also when the activities fulfil their own personal motivations 
and psychological functions. Further, people’s choices bolster, reinforce, and perpetuate 
these initial motivations. Other notable work includes Tetlock’s research on the functions of 
attributions, where he found that people were motivated by self-presentational goals and 
to protect and enhance one’s self-worth when making public attributions for their own 
behaviour (Tetlock, 1981). Functional approaches have also been used to investigate how 
moral judgements are made (Prehn & Heekeren, 2009), homophobia and mental illness 
(Herek, 1987), and the communication of emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; van Dijk, van 




3.2 Some Strengths and Limitations of Previous Approaches 
When constructing his functional account, Katz synthesised the existing literature for 
support, including motivational accounts of the day. In the intervening 60 years, empirical 
research has built upon these motivational foundations, not least by incorporating social 
and cultural influences on attitude and belief formation and reasons for their perpetuation. 
These influences introduce a host of additional mechanisms through which underlying 
social and psychological needs and goals might be realised.  
 
In contrast to Katz, Smith et al. based their account on a series of in-depth psychological 
case-studies using various methods drawn mainly from the psychoanalytic tradition. Their 
process was so intensive that only a small participant sample was feasible. Further, as the 
authors themselves acknowledge, the methodology necessitated that only participants with 
strong verbal skills were included.  These restrictions resulted in 10 participants who, while 
differing on dimensions such as socio-economic background, were all married white males 
of above average intelligence. Ground-breaking as their study was, it is arguable that 
important functions might have remained unidentified due to the size and the non-
representativeness of the sample. 
 
Another method used to identify functions is discourse analysis. In this approach, functions 
are uncovered by detecting variability in people’s accounts of their attitudes and opinions 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The construction of accounts (occurring through speech or 
writing) are devices for the underlying function, evidenced by ambivalent and contradictory 
accounts people give about an issue. For discursive analysts, the key point of analytical 
interest is this intra-individual variation. Functions are revealed by analysing the pattern 
and organisation of accounts.  
 
Shavitt (1989), who suggested interest in functional analyses waned due to the difficulties 
of operationalisation, developed a method for measuring attitude functions more directly: 
content analysis of people’s thought-listings toward an attitude-object. Herek’s 
homophobia studies also used content analysis on student essays about homosexuals, 
based on which metrics were designed to directly assess the reasons for holding 
homophobic attitudes. Herek employed an ‘Attitudes Function Inventory’ in a Likert 
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structured format to directly test functions, e.g. “My opinions on homosexuals mainly are 
based on concerns we safeguard civil liberties”. 
 
There are several problems with the more direct assessment of functions, such as through 
content analysis of essays, and Attitude Function Inventories. First, coding procedures used 
in content analyses are time-consuming and complex (Shavitt, 1989). Another problem is 
transparency, especially when the issue under investigation is contentious. These 
techniques are doubtless excellent ways of uncovering rationalisations and justifications for 
thinking or acting in particular ways, and rationalisations are one mechanism (as we saw in 
the preceding chapter) for a number of functions. However it is improbable that such direct 
self-report measures tap into underlying functions like guilt and anxiety reductions. 
Consider the following hypothetical question: “I do not believe in the existence of climate 
change because the thought of it being true is too anxiety-provoking”. Not only would 
respondents be reticent to acknowledge such functions, in many cases they would be 
unable to acknowledge such functions were operating to begin with (Kruglanski, 1999).  
 
An approach such as that used by Smith et al. (1956) arguably overcomes the issue of 
conscious accessibility of functions. But the intensive nature of such methods is too 
restrictive for exploratory purposes. We may assume as a starting point that the functions 
responses serve are as individual as the individuals themselves. Being a product of 
responses to social needs, cultural context, and individual psychological needs, the 
permutations of the exact functions being served by various opinions, behaviours, and so 
forth might be very large indeed. By extension, one might suggest that only a very large 
number of in-depth case studies could give us a proper grip on the range of functions 
responses to climate change serve. Even if the resources were available to attempt in-depth 
case studies en masse, the approach remains problematic for a couple of reasons. First, 
there is little hope of reaching parsimonious conclusions (by saying a lot we end up saying 
nothing). Second, an inferred finding that responses depend on the life-history of a 
particular individual gives little guidance for science communicators, educators, and policy-
makers. Unlike Smith et al., who were not interested in responses to Russia and Russians, 
but in psychological functions, in this thesis I am attempting to understand responses to an 
issue, climate change, not the range of functions within individuals that relate to all issues 
(as Smith et al. were). It is reasonable to assume that responses to climate change serve 
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some particular functions more than others; that is, some functions will be more prevalent 
among a population than others.  
 
 As mentioned at the start of this chapter, a direct testing of functions is probably 
impossible, but functions might be inferred by identifying patterns in differential responses 
and their relationships with other variables. These patterns should reveal themselves if a) 
the sample size is large enough, and b) the sample is a reasonable representation of the 
general sample population (in this case, Australia). While the expression of functions within 
and between individuals may vary, there might be several characteristics of climate change 
that lead to the predominance of particular expressions (or opinions) for particular groups 
within the sample population. Further, categorising these opinions into groups will allow for 
the assessment of within-group fluctuations on other variables of interest (such as 
behaviour), and the investigation of whether third factors can account for any within-group 
variability.7 By identifying these broad patterns, implications for policy implementation at 
the community and national level can feasibly be drawn, while recognising that future in-
depth individual-level research is an essential compliment to such an approach. For the 
reasons outlined above, I employed the following methods. 
 
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 National surveys 
I conducted two online national surveys: one in July-August 2010 (N = 5036), the other in 
July-August 2011 (N = 5030). A total of 1355 respondents completed both surveys. The 
surveys were conducted and funded under the CSIRO’s Climate Adaptation Flagship, whose 
goal it is to equip Australia with practical and effective options to adapt more effectively to 
climate change and variability. The Flagship’s research activities include the Pathways to 
Adaptation theme, established to identify how different types of regions, sectors, and 
communities respond to climate change. The national surveys formed part of a longitudinal 
research program within this theme. I was tasked with the design, implementation, and 
analysis of these surveys under the supervision of Professor Iain Walker, who leads the 
Social & Behavioural Science Group of CSIRO.  
 
                                                          
7
 These third factors may also reveal intra-individual inconsistencies in accounts (see below). 
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Participants were recruited using an online research-only internet panel.8  The online panel 
consists of a group of community members who have agreed to take part in web-based 
surveys occasionally. In return they are offered a small non-cash incentive for completing 
such tasks, such as points towards shopping credits.9 Online panels have several advantages 
over traditional recruitment techniques. First, managers of online panels can control for 
representative factors such as income and age more readily; second, social desirability bias 
is reduced if respondents have no direct contact with an interviewer; and third, selection 
bias (a particular concern for researchers working in environmental domains) is reduced, 
meaning that participant responses will be more representative of the wider society rather 
than over-representing those with a particular interest in environmental issues. Previous 
attitudinal research on climate change has often used undergraduate student populations, 
meaning interpretations are limited to relationships between variables, because 
conclusions about the distribution of responses in the community cannot be drawn. 
 
Performing two surveys had several benefits also: it allowed me to refine measurement 
scales based on factor analyses of data from the first survey; to include further items in 
light of analyses from the first survey, and to discard items that did not appear fruitful; and 
to investigate changes over time for those participants who completed both surveys. This 
last point is important if people present different opinions (or accounts of opinions) over 
time according to the function the opinions (or accounts) serve. For the reasons stated 
above and for reasons of parsimony, the cross-sectional analyses reported in the remaining 
chapters are based on data drawn from the second survey, except where a question only 
appeared in the first survey (i.e. the ‘self-descriptions’ measure, as outlined below) and 
where time series data from both surveys were required to perform longitudinal analyses.  
 
What follows is a brief outline of the measures contained in the surveys, and the reason for 
their inclusion. More detailed discussion about these measures and rationale for their 
inclusion are contained within the relevant data chapters. A table summarising these 
                                                          
8
 The panel used is administered by ORU, an online fieldwork company with QSOAP 'Gold Standard' 
and Global ISO 26362 standard accreditation. The ORU has a database of over 300,000 individuals 
from across Australia (http://www.theoru.com/). A ‘research-only’ panel means that panel members 
complete only surveys intended for legitimate research purposes; this reduces the number of 
‘professional’ survey respondents and increases the representativeness of respondents across 
behavioural, attitudinal, and lifestyle criteria. 
9
 Whether these shopping credits get used to purchase sustainably made essentials or frivolous 
carbon-intensive products is beyond the researcher’s control.  
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measures, and the chapters in which they are employed, is included as Appendix A. Both 
surveys are included in their entirety as Appendix B.10  
 
In Chapter 1 I mentioned that, when I refer to ‘responses’, I am referring to a collection of 
concepts, including beliefs, opinions, attitudes, behaviours, emotions, and associations 
toward climate change. These concepts have been differently conceptualised, 
amalgamated, and differentiated over many decades, so it is best to begin with a 
breakdown of how I conceptualise each of the terms with regards to climate change.   
 
Belief.  An important thing to establish is the amount of variation that exists in people’s 
‘orientation’ toward climate change. This orientation should comprise a basic ontological 
belief: Does climate change exist?  
 
Opinion. As I argue in the next chapter, it is not enough to merely assess people’s 
dichotomous belief about whether climate change exists or not, as discourse about the 
existence or otherwise of climate change as a concept has been reframed in such a way as 
to admit its existence, yet escape its attendant consequences. Therefore I must also 
determine why people think it exists, if they do at all. We can think of this as people’s basic 
‘opinion’ about climate change: the overt manifestation of people’s underlying beliefs 
about the nature and causes of climate change. This ‘opinion-type’ will serve as one of the 
cornerstones of response variation under investigation. In addition to establishing 
participants’ own opinion-type, a measure assessing participants’ estimates of general 
community opinion is included (an Opinion Consensus measure). This latter measure is 
employed to establish whether social support and uncertainty reduction functions might be 
operating.  
 
Attitudes. As climate change is by and large intangible, ‘attitudes’ to climate change do not 
refer to direct evaluations of the attitude object per se. Instead, I use attitudes to refer to a 
                                                          
10
 Not all of the measures contained in the survey are included in the discussion here, nor do they 
appear in the thesis, as the survey was developed in part to satisfy the broader goals of the Climate 
Adaptation Flagship with regards to the monitoring and evaluation of Australian views on climate 
change. Two CSIRO reports have emerged as a result of the national surveys  (Leviston & Walker, 
2010, 2011). All of the measures included in this thesis were developed by myself, except where due 
acknowledgement to past research is given.  
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person’s set of evaluations about the impacts of climate change and responding to climate 
change. Two types of attitudes are included: self-referent attitudes, and social attitudes. 
Self-referent attitudes make specific reference to the individual, and include felt moral and 
ethical responsibility to respond to climate change, the personal relevance of climate 
change, worry, anticipated harm, and certainty that climate change is (or is not) 
anthropogenic. Social attitudes are evaluations of societal-level impacts. These attitudes 
include the perceived efficacy and potential impacts on society of collectively responding to 
climate change. A measure of perceived individual efficacy of responding to climate change 
is also included. Together, these attitudes will help establish whether moral engagement is 
linked to other attitudes and opinions on climate change, how individual and collective 
efficacy relate to one another, and the antecedents and corollaries of the personal 
relevance of climate change.    
 
Behaviours. Traditional functional analyses have focused almost exclusively on attitudes 
and/or opinions (despite the acknowledgement that actions also serve functions). But it is 
ultimately what people do that policy-makers and others are interested in. Without 
behaviour change, there can be no climate change mitigation or adaptation. Hence we 
need a list of behaviours that are relevant to climate change emissions, that most people 
will know are relevant to climate change emissions, and that encompass a range of 
difficulties. Individuals can engage in many behaviours that can reduce or increase 
greenhouse gas emissions, so the most efficient, valid, and reliable way of measuring pro-
environmental behaviours is an ongoing point of discussion (Gifford et al., 2011; Roser-
Renouf & Nisbet, 2008). Roser-Renouf and Nisbet (2008) suggest that any measure of pro-
environmental behaviours include items targeting the following behavioural domains: 
home energy conservation, consumption, transportation choices, and activism. 
 
By incorporating a behaviour score I can investigate whether climate change opinions and 
attitudes might serve the function of excusing one’s engagement in effortful behaviours. 
But, as well as attitudes and opinions serving the avoidance of effortful behaviour, 
behaviours may in themselves serve important functions: for instance, pro-environmental 
behaviour may reinforce self-identity needs or group belongingness, or help us feel we are 
contributing to something that will outlast our own lifetimes. I can also assess the levels of 




Another type of behaviour is policy support. This is currently of particular relevance in 
Australia given the announcement (which has subsequently been introduced) of a carbon 
pricing mechanism during the second national survey.  
 
Ratings of trust in information about climate change are included, in part to establish 
whether authority referents and personal referents differ between opinion-types. 
Differential levels of trust in information sources such as scientific and government 
organisations might indicate important functions associated with social identity and self 
categorisation. 
 
By including ratings of responsibility for causing and responding to climate change allows 
for the identification of contradictions in individual accounts of climate change causation, 
providing clues that certain functions may be driving expressed opinions. Contradictory 
accounts might also indicate ambivalence of beliefs with regards the existence and causes 
of climate change not captured by opinion-type alone.  
 
Ideologies. The ideologies we are interested in concern social-system legitimising 
tendencies. These include Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and 
Economic System Justification.  Voting intentions and voting behaviour are also included. By 
contrasting these attributes with opinion-type, behaviour, and levels of income, we can 
investigate whether status-quo bolstering and system justification are in evidence.  
 
Emotional responses. By testing negative and positive emotions associated with climate 
change we can pursue the idea that certain opinions and attitudes are functioning to 
reduce negative affect and/or maximise positive affect. Of particular interest here is the 
association between guilt (an important outcome factor of moral disengagement, attitude 
change, and system justification) and response variables. 
 
Self-descriptions. Self-descriptions about what people base their responses to climate 
change on may reveal important self-presentational functions, particularly those contained 
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in the Self-Standards account of cognitive dissonance. This account suggests individuals are 
often concerned with appearing moral, intelligent, and in control, both to themselves and 
to others. Dunning (1999) states that people tend to emphasise those attributes that put 
them in a flattering light, and emphasise their lack of undesirable traits, therefore a blend 
of potentially positive, neutral, and negative descriptors are included. 
 
Associations. Because of our tendency to reference pre-existing phenomena to make sense 
of something new, it is important to know what comes to mind for people when they think 
about climate change. Hence, associations with climate change were incorporated into the 
first national survey. The other advantage of investigating associations is that it avoids the 
problem that what people express might be different to what their initial (or actual) 
thoughts are. But because implicit, automatic associations are difficult to test in direct self-
report surveys (where we have little control over how much time people take to respond), I 
also used another method for eliciting associations: implicit association workshops.  
 
3.3.2 Image Association Workshops 
To investigate people’s implicit mental constructions of climate change, four workshops 
with 52 participants in all were conducted. Two workshops were held in December 2010 (n 
= 11; n = 8) and two in March 2011 (n = 14; n = 19). These workshops asked participants to 
rank images of climate change (derived from the first national survey) according to the 
extent to which the images accorded with their own associations with climate change. A 
further task required participants to rate the affective qualities of the images they 
personally associated with climate change. In addition to these exercises, an approximately 
half-hour discussion was held with each group in order to elicit meanings about their 
cognitive representations of climate change, to identify ambiguity and inconsistency in 
associations, to identify which subsets of beliefs and rules might be accessed preferentially, 
and to explore any functional value these associations might hold. 
 
Ethics clearance was granted for the online national surveys and the implicit association 
workshops by both the CSIRO’s Human Research Ethics Committee (reference numbers 





Chapters 4 to 7 investigate the functions of responses to climate change using the data 
from the two national surveys. Chapter 8 investigates climate change image associations. 
Chapter 9 synthesises findings from these chapters and attempts to conceptually represent 




CHAPTER 4. CLIMATE CHANGE IN CONTEXT: AUSTRALIANS’ 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE  
 
“The notion of global warming is a hoax. This is witchcraft. Commonsense will tell you it’s 
rubbish”         
 Alan Jones 
Radio Presenter, 2GB, Sydney 
Anti-carbon tax rally, 2012 
 
If you’re an avid consumer of Australian media, and are particularly attuned to matters 
concerning climate change, chances are you will come across one or both of two themes 
today.11 One theme might run along the following lines: We must act NOW to address 
climate change, what we’re doing is not enough, where’s the urgency people? It’s probably 
too late, but if it isn’t, someone should really do something about it! Another, just as 
vociferous theme might go like this: That whole climate change thing is a sham, it’s a left-
wing conspiratorial beat-up, designed to redistribute wealth from the ‘haves’ to the ‘have 
nots’.    
 
The above is of course a caricature of a complex debate surrounding a complex issue, but it 
reflects the antagonistic nature of current climate change discourse and coverage in 
Australia. The bulk of the social psychological research introduced in Chapter 1 concerns 
the responses of people in northern hemisphere countries to climate change. 
Corresponding Australian research has been sparse. The gap is important, as many of the 
functional responses outlined in previous chapters depend on specific socio-political 
cultures and geographical contexts which may differ from country to country. From a 
functional perspective, the cultural context creates specific sets of normative and non-
normative response patterns to which the individual must adjust. If those cultural cues 
change, individuals might also have to adjust their responses to ensure their needs and 
goals continue to be met. 
 
In this chapter, I summarise the cultural context for climate change responses in Australia. 
Previous attempts at measuring Australian opinions about the causes of climate change are 
                                                          
11
 And assuming your media consumption passes a bare minimum of eclecticism!  
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examined, including an assessment of why these attempts have failed to provide a 
consistent picture of the prevalence of different opinions. I then use the national survey 
data to test the prevalence of different climate change responses, including opinions about 
its causes, personal and social attitudes, pro-environmental behaviours, and the patterns 
within and between each of these. We can then hunt for clues that responses to climate 
change are serving various underlying functions.  
  
4.1.1 Climate Change in Australia 
Chapter 1 opened with an observation that the overall response to climate change has 
been relatively sedate given the enormity of the threat it poses. The discordance between 
threat and response is especially evident in Australia. There is mounting evidence that 
Australia will be more adversely affected by climate change than most countries. 
Forecasted impacts include increased frequency of drought in prime agricultural regions, 
increased pressure due to declining rainfalls on already overstretched metropolitan potable 
water supplies, costly and severe impacts on infrastructure, biodiversity, ecosystems, and 
tourism, and an increase in the intensity and frequency of natural disasters such as floods, 
droughts, bushfires, and cyclones in populated areas (CSIRO, 2011; Garnaut, 2008). 
Strikingly, Australia is the highest per capita emitter of greenhouse gases of any OECD 
country, and the sixth highest emitter per capita in the world (Garnaut, 2008). Australia’s 
emissions, in large part due to a heavy reliance on coal as a domestic power generator and 
key commodity export, are nearly twice the OECD average, and more than four times the 
world average (Garnaut, 2008).  
 
One might expect that the anticipated local consequences of climate change, and 
Australia’s role as a heavy emitter, would see the nation at the forefront of global efforts to 
mitigate climate change.  In the scientific domain, there is evidence for this expectation. 
Australia has a long history of climate research, dating as far back as the late 1940s (Smith, 
Thomsen, & Keys, 2011). The last decade in particular has witnessed an increasing focus on 
adaptation policies and programs through national research programs such as the National 
Climate Change Adaptations Research Facility and the establishment of the Department of 
Climate Change and Energy Efficiency by the Australian Government. But in the same 
period, significant political controversy and pressure exerted by industry has stymied these 




Toward the end of the 1980s, climate change policy initiatives became framed in economic 
terms, with targets to reduce greenhouse emissions contingent upon their neutral effect on 
the domestic economy (Smith et al., 2011). Throughout the 1990s, Australia was 
condemned internationally for refusing to ratify the Kyoto protocol (positioning it alone 
with the United States as the only abstaining countries). Continued pressure domestically 
and abroad to ratify the protocol made climate change a key policy platform and a critical 
point of differentiation between the two major Australian political parties in the 2007 
Federal election.12 The election result delivered a mandate to the incoming Labor 
Government to show active leadership on climate change, the first parliamentary act of 
which was to ratification the Kyoto protocol (Howarth & Foxall, 2010). The new 
Government also sought to bring forward a national Emissions Trading Scheme by two 
years, to 2010, and committed Australia to an emissions reduction target of 60% from 1990 
levels by 2050 (Howarth & Foxall, 2010). The political landscape then changed once more, 
and reasonably abruptly. A proposed Emissions Trading Scheme was defeated by a hostile 
Senate in 2009, and in the aftermath key Federal Liberal opposition leadership positions 
were filled by politicians known for their scepticism of human-induced climate change 
(Howarth & Foxall, 2010; Suri & Lofgren, 2010). In June 2010 the then Labor leader and 
Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, was also defeated in a party leadership spill, his failure to push 
through the Emissions Trading Scheme cited as a key failing. Finally, in 2011, Labor Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard passed weakened, yet still highly politically and publically contentious, 
carbon pricing legislation through Federal parliament. This legislation took effect on 1 July 
2012. 
 
Concurrent with the changing political landscape, arguments opposing the notion of 
human-induced climate change gained prominence in the Australian mainstream media. In 
fact, climate change garnered more media attention than any other topic in 2009 (Bacon, 
2011). One line of thought began to attract significant attention: that any climate variation 
identified by climate scientists could be adequately explained by natural variations (e.g. 
Carter, 2007; Plimer, 2009; Spencer, 2010). Content analyses of Australian media reporting 
of climate change and associated policies concluded that the media showed substantial bias 
                                                          
12
 The incumbent Liberal/National coalition (centre right on the political spectrum) continued to 
voice opposition to the ratification of the Kyoto protocol, although a domestic emissions trading 
scheme was mooted. The then Labor opposition (centre left) favoured ratification of the protocol, as 
well as more stringent pro-environmental policies, including the regulation of carbon emissions.     
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in their reporting, with undue column inches devoted to perspectives casting doubt on the 
anthropogenic contribution to climate change (Bacon, 2011; Manne, 2011).  
 
The reframing of the sceptical position of climate change from outright denial of its 
existence, to something accountable by natural variation, continues to enjoy significant air-
time in public discourse (Phillips, 2012). The ramifications of widespread acceptance of such 
a position might have little bearing on adaptation behaviours; if the climate is changing one 
most adapt independent of its causes. But the position might undermine efforts to mitigate 
climate change if human activity is assumed to have no discernible influence over the 
climate. But as we shall see, the extent to which alternative notions of the causes of climate 
change have gained traction and are influencing, and influenced by, the Australian 
community is far from established.  
 
4.1.2 Australians’ Opinions on the Causes of Climate Change 
There is strong scientific consensus that human activity contributes to climate change and 
observed global increases in temperature through the release of greenhouse gases. For 
instance, in response to the question “Do you think human activity is a significant 
contributing factor in changing mean global temperatures?”, 97.4% of 79 actively 
publishing climatologists responded “yes” (Doran & Zimmerman, 2009; see also Bray, 2010 
for an overview of similar studies). The exact amount that humans contribute to climate 
change (referred to as ‘anthropogenic forcing’) relative to the amount attributable to 
natural fluctuations in climate is subject to greater uncertainty, but not scientific 
controversy. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded in its Fourth 
Assessment Report that contributions from human activity accounted for the majority of 
the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century (IPCC, 
2007), with more recent analyses estimating this contribution to be in the order of 75% 
(Huber & Knutti, 2011).  
 
These points, that climate change is significantly influenced by human activity, and that the 
majority of observed climate change is attributable to human activity, provide scientific 
normative and non-normative opinions to hold about climate change causation. That is, 
scientific consensus has led to a conventional, or ‘correct’, opinion to adopt from a 
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scientific standpoint: that the climate is changing and human activity is the major 
contributing factor. Conversely, the emerging competing claim that climate change can be 
entirely attributed to natural variation, or that climate change is not happening at all, are 
scientifically non-normative opinions, in that these latter categories do not accord with the 
scientifically accepted evidence.    
 
Although there is scientific consensus regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate 
change, it does not necessarily follow that this is the normative opinion among the broader 
community. For instance, the links between support for science in general and attitudes 
towards specific areas of scientific research (including climate change) is poor, regardless of 
scientific knowledge (Evans & Durant, 1995; Kahan et al., 2012). Further, despite the 
technical complexities of climate change, people might not even look to science and 
scientists for our information. People may reference a range of other sources to help guide 
our opinions; so what might seem a normative opinion for one person might be 
diametrically opposed to what seems the normative opinion for another person, dependent 
on the predominant view held by their respective reference groups. Whether normative 
scientific opinions surrounding climate change are, on aggregate, also normative in the 
Australian community is currently a point of contention (see Leviston, Leitch, Greenhill, 
Leonard, & Walker, 2011 for an overview of recent Australian research).   
 
To date, most large surveys of Australians’ responses to climate change have taken the 
form of telephone opinion polling rather than in-depth theoretically-driven research, with a 
few recent exceptions (e.g. Reser, Bradley, Glendon, Ellul, & Callaghan, 2012). A useful 
attribute of opinion polls is their relatively representative large scale datasets, but it is 
beyond the scope of such polls to include the possible drivers of opinions, beyond the 
identification of basic socio-demographic differences. Irrespective, these polls provide a 
base from which we may discern general public sentiment. Table 4 provides a summary of 
recent research in Australia investigating the prevalence of different opinions about the 
causes of climate change. The table demonstrates why it is difficult to reach definitive 
conclusions about absolute levels of different opinions. Responses vary at least in part due 
to differences in response formats, modes of data collection (e.g. whether it was a 
telephone survey or an online survey), and different sample populations (e.g. whether the 
respondents were based in the city or in rural locations).   
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Table 4: Percentage of people who think climate change is human induced* 
Study 2010 2009 2008 
Griffith/Cardiff Universities (Australian sample) 77% - - 
UQ Political Leaders and Climate Change - 55% - 
ARCCANSI survey 58% - - 
Australian Gallup Poll 44% - 52% 
Essential Media survey 45% 53% - 
Ipsos survey 77% - - 
Newspoll 94% - 96% 
Thermometer surveys - 73% 73% 






* Reproduced from the original table in Leviston et al., 2011. 
 
The issue of response format is a particularly thorny one. Appendix C contains the variety of 
response formats from recent climate change surveys in Australia. Looking at Table 46 one 
understands why research has produced inconsistent conclusions about the prevalence of 
different opinions. Some use Likert scale options to measure agreement that humans are 
contributing to climate change, while others are categorical measures of opinions. And all 
formats differ in their introductory statements. Response options might fail to provide an 
adequate range of options (such as those that fail to account for those who do not have an 
opinion one way or the other). Conversely, options might provide too much choice, so that 
post hoc decisions about aggregating response options have to be made by the 
researcher(s) if digestible conclusions are to be drawn; such aggregation can needlessly 
compound the validity issues involved in quantitative categorisation of people’s opinions.  
Perhaps most importantly, if the response options given to participants do not reflect the 
current discourse on climate change, the validity of the measurement might be 
compromised. In short, any measure assessing opinions should try to reflect the language 
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with which climate change is presently discussed in public spheres, yet retain parsimony for 
psychometric utility (De Vaus, 2002).   
 
4.1.3 Research Questions 
In addition to identifying basic patterns in Australians’ responses to climate change, the 
following research questions will be explored, drawn from considerations in the preceding 
discussion: 
RQ1: To what extent are scientifically normative and scientifically non-normative opinions 
held by the broader Australian community? 
RQ2: Can a measure of opinion-type about the causes of climate change meaningfully 
predict engagement in a range of pro-environmental behaviours? 
RQ3: Are individual opinions about the causes of climate change stable over time, or are 
they malleable? 
RQ4: How do other responses to climate change (including emotional responses, attitudes, 
self-descriptions, and political preferences), relate to opinions about the causes of climate 
change and pro-environmental behaviour? 




4.2.1 Surveys and Participants 
Two online surveys were conducted: one in July and August 2010 (N = 5036), the other in 
July and August 2011 (N = 5030).  A total of 1355 respondents completed both surveys. The 
Time 1 (T1) survey was conducted in the six weeks immediately prior to the 2010 Australian 
federal election, and the Time 2 (T2) survey straddled the Federal Government 
announcement of its plan to put a price on high carbon-emitting industries. Therefore it is 
assumed that, during both surveys, climate change was a salient issue for many people due 





The demographic profile of respondents (see Table 5) for the two surveys corresponds 
closely with the known population characteristics of Australians (ABS, 2010). For both the 
T1 and T2 samples, those in lower income brackets were marginally under-represented, 
while those in higher age brackets were marginally over-represented. Males and those in 
higher age brackets were marginally over-represented among the repeat respondents. 
 
Table 5. Basic demographics of survey respondents. 
  T1 
(2010; N = 
5036) 
T2 
(2011; N = 
2011) 
T1/T2 Repeat  





< 24 5.2% 4.5% 0.4% 
25-34 14.0% 12.7% 4.8% 
35-44 16.6% 14.7% 12.3% 
45-54 20.7% 22.6% 18.9% 
55-64 22.1% 21.0% 28.3% 
65-74 17.4% 19.1% 26.6% 
75-84 3.8% 5.0% 8.0% 
> 85 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 
Gender 
Female 48.8% 53.6% 43.5% 





Negative/Nil  4.0% 4.5% 3.2%† 
$1 - $149 3.3% 3.4% 2.9% 
$150 - $249 6.4% 6.2% 6.6% 
$250 - $399 14.3% 15.2% 17.0% 
$400 - $599 13.8% 15.4% 16.6% 
$600 - $799 11.6% 11.1% 9.8% 
$800 - $999 11.3% 11.1% 9.8% 
$1000 - $1299 12.0% 11.8% 11.5% 
$1300 - $1599 9.5% 8.5% 6.9% 
$1600 - $1999 6.3% 6.3% 7.3% 
$2000 or more 7.6% 6.5% 8.4% 
Location 
Capital City 56% 55% 57% 
Regional Town 30% 29% 28% 
Rural Area 14% 14% 14% 





The following section details those measures relevant to the current chapter. The surveys in 
their entirety are included as Appendix B. 
 
Beliefs and opinions about the causes of climate change. To establish people’s basic belief 
concerning the existence of climate change, respondents answered either yes or no to the 
question Is climate change happening?   
 
Opinion about the causes of climate change was assessed with the question Which of the 
following statements best describes your thoughts on climate change? Respondents 
selected one of the following four statements: I don’t think that climate change is 
happening; I have no idea whether climate change is happening or not; I think that climate 
change is happening, but it’s just a natural fluctuation in Earth’s temperatures; I think that 
climate change is happening, and I think that humans are largely causing it. These last two 
statements were designed to distinguish between different perceived causes of climate 
change: ‘natural’ (or non-human-induced) climate change, and anthropogenic (or human-
induced) climate change. These statement categories are referred to as deny, don’t know, 
natural, and human-induced for the remainder of the thesis and comprise the four major 
opinion-types of interest.13  
 
To investigate stability and changes in opinion over time, respondents were also asked Over 
the past year, have you become more or less sure that climate change is happening? 
Responses were recorded on a scale from ‘1 = Much less sure’ to ‘5 = Much more sure’. 
 
                                                          
13
 There is ongoing discussion and research concerning the best way to measure opinions concerning 
the nature of climate change. The measure employed here is a (deliberately) forced-choice measure 
and therefore is not an exhaustive list of the range of more nuanced perspectives it is possible to 
have on climate change (see Reser et al., 2012 for an alternative perspective on measurement). A 
recent experiment assessing the effects of question wording on apparent levels of climate change 
opinion showed this question-framing to have better predictive validity than other measures of 
opinion in relation to five criterion variables commonly used in the climate change literature, 
including pro-environmental behaviour  (Greenhill, Leviston, Leonard, & Walker, in press). The 
results of this experiment also suggested that allowing an option for an equal mix of natural and 
anthropogenic causation results in a discrete group of respondents, although the extent to which 
this represents a ‘middling tendency’ response in unclear.  
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Pro-environmental Behaviour Scale. Sixteen items measured pro-environmental behaviour. 
These items were selected to encompass the following domains: home energy 
conservation, consumption, transportation choices, and activism (e.g., I switch off lights 
around the house whenever possible; I have taken part in a political campaign about an 
environmental issue; see Table 6 for a full list of items).14 Research suggests that if a 
behaviour, such as reducing energy consumption, is motivated primarily for environmental 
reasons, it is more stable over time and is more likely to lead to further pro-environmental 
behaviours than if that same behaviour is motivated by factors like financial self-interest 
(Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009). With this in mind, participants were asked whether their 
engagement was mainly for environmental reasons or mainly for other reasons (e.g. for 
convenience or cost-saving). Those behaviours nominated as ‘mainly for environmental 
reasons’ received a score of ‘2’, those engaged in for other reasons a score of ‘1’, and no 
score was assigned if a behaviour was not performed at all.  
 
One debate concerning the measurement of pro-environmental behaviour is whether all 
behaviours should be aggregated into a single index or whether different factors should be 
extracted and tested separately (Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008). Some researchers favour a 
single index, as long as the index has sufficient validity and reliability (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 
2003). Others (e.g. Stern, Dietz, & Abel, 1999) warn that a single index approach may 
overlook important relationships between dependent variables and different domains of 
behaviour (such as individual consumption and activism). Therefore, a factor analysis was 
performed to identify underlying constructs. In Table 6 there are suggestions of three main 
underlying constructs (based on Eigenvalues and scree plot) in the T2 data: individual 
consumption reduction behaviours, purchasing behaviours, and public behaviours (see 
Table 7 for the factor correlation matrix). However, the single-index aggregated behaviour 
score was retained to identify relationships with other variables, as the alpha for a single-
index aggregated behaviour score was both reliable (alpha = .84) and valid; that is, it 
covered the suggested behavioural domains (Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008), whereas the 
factor solution drops the transport domain in addition to other climate-relevant 
behaviours. Further, the inter-correlations between factors were moderate to strong, and 
                                                          
14
 The measure was amended from the T1 measure (where 17 items were used) by introducing five 
additional items measuring public-sphere behaviours to provide a better balance of behavioural 
domains. To keep the length of the measure reasonable for respondents, the six items that had the 
least amount of variance (i.e. those that were either nominated by a vast majority of respondents or 
a small minority of respondents) at T1 were deleted (see Appendix D for T1 behaviours).  
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responses to an aggregated single-index were distributed normally, enhancing its suitability 
for predictive analyses (see Figure 3). Accordingly, a pro-environmental behaviour score 
was calculated by aggregating the scores for each of the 16 behaviours, the highest possible 




Table 6. Pattern matrix loadings for pro-environmental behaviour items using Maximum 
Likelihood with Direct Oblimin Rotation15 on T2 data (N = 5030). 













I switch lights off around the house whenever 
possible 
   .96† (.91) ‡ .04 (-.52) -.08 (.39) .38 
I have reduced the amount of gas and/or 
electricity I use around the house 
.78 (.80) .01 (-.50) .03 (.42) .29 
I have reduced the amount of water I use 
around the house and garden 
.77 (.79) .03 (-.53) .01 (.38) .18 
I will usually try to fix things rather than 
replace them 
.76 (.76) -.08 (-.45) -.03 (.39) .11 
I am on Green Power electricity .29 (.43) -.07 (-.33) .21 (.38) .27 
I usually walk/cycle/carpool/take public 
transport 
.21 (.34) -.04 (-.26) .21 (.33) .15 
I have switched to products that are more 
environmentally friendly 
.00 (.54) -.91 (-.91) -.02 (.36) .74 
Most of my cleaning products are 
environmentally friendly 
-.04 (.50) -.88 (-.86) .00 (.35) .82 
Where possible, I buy products that are made 
locally 
.29 (.53) -.36 (-.55) .05 (.34) .36 
I have taken part in a political campaign 
about an environmental issue 
-.03 (.32) .08 (-.23) .78 (.74) .32 
I have been a member of an environmental 
group or movement 
-.08 (.22) .05 (-.18) .67 (.61) .63 
I have contacted a government member 
about climate change 
.05 (.29) .07 (-.20) .55 (.56) .55 
I have given money to a group that aims to 
protect the environment 
.06 (.34) -.10 (-.32) .45 (.52) .63 
I have voted in a government election on the 
basis of an environmental issue 
.12 (.38) -.12 (-.35) .37 (.48) .82 
I have taken part in a conservation activity 
(e.g. Landcare, bush regeneration) 
-.03 (.34) -.08 (-.34) .30 (.35) .58 
I have taken part in an environmental event 
(e.g. Earth Hour) 
.13 (.19) -.17 (-.20) .21 (.32) .22 
Eigenvalue 5.53 1.70 1.15  
Variance explained after rotation 34.59% 10.6% 7.12%  
† Pattern coefficients; ‡ Structure coefficients 
Coefficients > .40 appear in bold 
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Table 7. Factor correlation matrix for pro-environmental behaviour factors. 
FACTOR 1. 2. 3. 
1. Consumption Reduction 1 -.60 .50 
2. Purchasing -.60 1 -.42 




Self-referent attitudes to climate change. Ten items measured respondents’ self-referent 
attitudes toward climate change; that is, attitudes framed with reference to the individual 
respondent.  Six attitudinal items and their scales were adapted from the Yale Project on 
Climate Change, a large longitudinal analysis of the American public’s attitude toward 
climate change (Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2010). One item was taken from  
Whitmarsh (2009), and an additional three items were newly constructed for the 
questionnaire s (Table 8). 
 
Social attitudes to climate change. Eight statements were developed to measure 
respondents’ social attitudes to climate change; that is, attitudes framed as evaluations of 
societal-level impacts and responses. These statements were developed by drawing on the 
results of recent discursive analyses of how climate change is discussed in community and 
political spheres in Australia (Glasson, 2011; Kurz, Augoustinos, & Crabb, 2010). Four 
statements concerned potential positive outcomes associated with responding to climate 
change (e.g. Climate change will foster greater community spirit and connectedness), and 
four statements concerned potential negative outcomes associated with responding to 
climate change (e.g. Responding to climate change will cost Australia a lot of money). 
Responses were measured on 5-point Likert scales. 
 
Emotional responses. Emotional responses to climate change were measured by the item 
How does the issue of climate change make you feel?, followed by twelve descriptors: 
angry, ashamed, guilty, fearful, despairing, joyful, excited, irritated, hopeful, confused, 




Table 8. Items measuring self-referent attitudes to climate change. 
Items Scale Source 
How important is the issue of climate change to 
you personally?* 
1 = Extremely important’ to 
‘5 = Not at all important’ 
Yale Project on 
Climate Change 
(Leiserowitz et al., 
2010) † 
How worried are you about climate change?* 
‘1 = Very worried’ to ‘4 = Not 
at all worried’. 
How much have you personally experienced the 
effects of climate change?* 
‘1 = A great deal’ to ‘4 = Not 
at all’ 
How much do you think climate change will 
harm you personally?* 
‘1 = A great deal’ to ‘4 = Not 
at all’ 
Over the past year, have you become more or 
less sure that climate change is happening?* 
 ‘1 = Much more sure’ to ‘5 = 
Much less sure’ 
How sure are you that climate change is 
happening?* 
‘1 = Extremely sure’ to ‘4 = 
Not at all sure’ 
I feel a moral duty to act on climate change 5-point Likert scale Whitmarsh (2009) 
I feel it is my ethical responsibility to change my 
individual behaviour to combat climate change 
5-point Likert scale 
New items 
How personally relevant is climate change to 
you?* 
 ‘1 = Extremely personally 
relevant’ to ‘5 = Not at all 
personally relevant’ 
Move the cursor to the place on the slide which 
best represents how sure you are that humans 
contribute to climate change 
Sliding scale labelled ‘1 = 
Sure that humans don’t’ to 
‘100 = Sure that human do’. 
* Items with an asterisk were reverse-coded prior to analysis 
† In the original study, the words ‘global warming’ appeared for ‘climate change’ 
 
Political preference. Political preference was measured with the statement Which political 
party did you vote for in the last federal election? A list of the major political parties was 
given, as well as the options other, nobody, and prefer not to say.    
 
Self descriptions.  To investigate self descriptions, respondents were asked to describe their 
opinions on climate change using various trait descriptors. Respondents read the following: 
Using the scale below, rate how much each word reflects your view on climate change 
followed by 16 descriptors (uninterested, cautious, considerate, uninformed, undecided, 
passionate, an activist, informed, gullible, I don’t believe everything I hear, moral, sceptical, 
denying, immoral, selfish, and powerless). Responses were recorded on a scale from ‘-5 = 





The results in this section are taken from the T2 survey, except for Section 4.3.2 where only 
the cohort of 1355 participants who took part in both surveys is used to assess changes 
over time, and Section 4.3.9, as the self-attribution measure was only included at T1. An 
analysis of the main results from the T1 survey data is included as Appendix E, and are 
reported in Leviston and Walker (2010).  Because of the high level of consistency of results 
between the two surveys, it was deemed preferable to present T2 data for cross-sectional 
purposes. There were two further considerations guiding this decision: first, T2 responses 
represent the most current data; second, several additional variables were included in the 
T2 survey on the basis of initial T1 findings and to test specific hypotheses derived from the 
literature described in Chapter 2.  
 
4.3.1 Beliefs and Opinions about Climate Change 
Roughly three-quarters of respondents (77.3%) thought that climate change was 
happening, while 22.7% thought it was not happening. Women (78.5%) were more likely 
than men (75.8%) to agree that climate change was happening, but the association was 
small (χ2[1, n = 5030] = 16.48, p = .01, Cramer’s V = .06). Those who lived in regional towns 
were less likely to agree that climate change was happening than those in capital cities or 
rural areas, but this association was very small (η2 = .005).16 Younger people were 
marginally more likely to agree climate change was happening, but again the association 
was very small (‘Yes’ mean date of birth = 1960, SD = 15.68; ‘No’ mean date of birth = 
1956.5, SD = 14.64, t(5028) = 6.82, p < .001, r = -.096). Personal income levels were 
unrelated to belief (χ2 [11, n = 4306] = 15.64, p = .16, Cramer’s V = .06).17 Those from higher 
household income brackets were slightly more likely to believe climate change was 
happening, but the association was small (χ2 [4, n = 3887] = 15.76, p = .003, Cramer’s V = 
.06). Those with higher levels of education were slightly more likely to believe climate 
change was happening, but again the association was small (χ2 [9, n = 5030] = 99.98, p < 
.001, Cramer’s V = .14).  
  
                                                          
16
 This contrasts with findings from the T1 survey where those in rural areas were slightly less likely 




 The sample sizes for personal and household income are reduced as respondents electing the 
option Prefer not to say were excluded from these analyses. 
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Table 9 provides a breakdown of levels of agreement with statements regarding the causes 
of climate change.  
 
Table 9. Prevalence of opinion-type for climate change causation. 
Which of the following statements best describes your 
thoughts on climate change? 
Percentage N = 5030 
I don’t think that climate change is happening (‘Deny’) 7.2 364 
I have no idea whether climate change is happening or not 
(‘Don’t know’) 
4.4 220 
I think that climate change is happening, but it’s just a 
natural fluctuation in Earth’s temperatures (‘Natural’) 
43.8 2201 
I think that climate change is happening, and I think that 
humans are largely causing it (‘Human-induced’) 
44.6 2245 
 
There was a small effect for gender (χ2 [1, n = 5030] = 36.28, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .06), 
with women more likely to select don’t know (women comprised 58.2% of this group) and 
human-induced (women comprised 57.9% of this group). There was also a small effect for 
age, with the mean age of those selecting the deny (mean date of birth = 1957) and natural 
(mean date of birth = 1957) statements slightly older than the mean age of those selecting 
the don’t know (mean date of birth = 1964) or human-induced (mean date of birth = 1961) 
statements: F (3, 5026) = 31.97, p < .001, η2 = .02.   
 
Table 10 provides a breakdown of belief in the existence of climate change with opinions 
about its causation. Almost three-quarters (72.2%) of those who considered climate change 
a solely natural phenomenon selected “yes” to the initial question of whether it was 
happening at all. Nearly two-thirds (64.5%) of people who didn’t know whether climate 
change was happening selected the “no” option when forced to choose a dichotomous 
response. A very small percentage of respondents (3.7%) selected contradictory statements 
(i.e. said “yes” to the dichotomous question and selected the ‘deny’ statement, or selected 





Table 10. Breakdown of agreement that climate change is happening by opinion-type (N = 
5030). 
Opinion-type Is climate change happening? 
No Yes Total 
Deny (7.2%) 356 (97.8%)  8 (2.2%) 364 (100%) 
Don’t know (4.4%) 142 (64.5%) 78 (35.5%) 220 (100%) 
Natural (43.8%) 612 (27.8%) 1589 (72.2%) 2201 (100%) 
Human-Induced (44.6%) 33 (1.5%) 2212 (98.5%) 2245 (100%) 
 
 
4.3.2 Stability of Opinion-Type 
To assess stability of opinions, responses from the 1355 respondents who completed both 
the T1 and T2 surveys were used. Table 11 illustrates the number of people who agreed 
with each opinion statement at both T1 and T2. Boxes shaded in grey represent the number 
of respondents who selected the same statement in both surveys (n = 993; 73.3% of all 
respondents). Boxes shaded in pink represent respondents who agreed in T1 that climate 
change was human-induced, but moved away from that view in T2 (n = 134; 10.6% of all 
respondents). Boxes shaded in green represent respondents who did not agree in T1 that 
climate change was human-induced, but moved towards this view in T2 (n = 92; 6.8% of all 
respondents). 
 
Table 12 displays stability of opinion by original opinion-type (‘consistent’ referring to the 
percentage of people who selected the same opinion in both surveys). Those initially 
selecting deny and don’t know statements showed much lower stability in their opinion 
when compared with those who originally selected the natural or human-induced 
statements. The third row shows the dominant trend of shifting opinion was toward the 





Table 11. Repeat respondents’ opinion-type at T1 and T2 (N = 1355). 




























































88    
(6.5%) 
49      
(3.6%) 
591    
(43.6%) 




Legend: Pink-shaded boxes represent those who moved away from the human-induced opinion at T2. Green-
shaded boxes moved toward the human-induced opinion at T2. Grey-shaded boxes represent consistent 
opinions at T1 and T2.  
 
 
Table 12. Stability of opinion over time and most common directional shift, by original 
opinion-type (N = 1355) 
 




Consistent 44.3% 40.8% 74.6% 78.6% 73.3% 

















Repeat respondents were asked at T2 whether they had become more sure or less sure 
over the last year that climate change was happening. Table 13 shows responses to this 
question broken down by the groups shaded pink, green, and grey in Table 11. Despite 
moving away from the human-induced opinion, about 25% of the pink group indicated 
more certainty that climate change was happening. A further 59% of these respondents 
said they were neither more nor less sure. Only 15% of this group suggested they were less 
certain climate change was happening. Further, 40% of people who shifted their opinion to 
the human-induced statement said they were neither more nor less sure. 
   
Table 13. Ratings of certainty that climate change is happening, grouped by direction of 
opinion-change between the T1 and T2 surveys (N = 1355). 
Over the past year, have 
you become more or less 
sure that climate change 
is happening? (T2 
response) 
Moved away from 
human-induced 
opinion (n = 134) 
Moved toward 
human-induced 
opinion (n = 92) 
Had a consistent 
opinion (n = 993) 
Much less sure 8 (6.0%) 1 (1.1%) 74 (7.5%) 
Somewhat less sure 13 (9.7%) 2 (2.2%) 57 (5.7%) 
Neither more nor less 
sure 
79 (59.0%) 37 (40.2%) 471 (47.4%) 
Somewhat more sure 30 (22.4%) 34 (37%) 224 (22.6%) 
Much more sure 4 (3.0%) 18 (19.6%) 167 (16.8%) 
 
 
4.3.3 Pro-environmental Behaviours 
The mean for the aggregated single-index pro-environmental score was 11.91 (SD = 6.07). 
This result suggests that, on average, respondents reported engaging in five or six 
behaviours predominantly for environmental reasons (alternatively, engaging in, four 
behaviours for environmental reasons and a further four for mainly non-environmental 
reasons would also yield an average score). Figure 2 displays the breakdown of engagement 
in pro-environmental behaviours, and the reasons reported for engaging in them. The 
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figure suggests some behaviours are performed by very few people, while other behaviours 
are performed by nearly everybody. It also suggests that a considerable number of 








The distribution of pro-environmental behaviour scores is shown in Figure 3, and the 
distribution of pro-environmental behaviour scores for each opinion-type is shown in Figure 
4. The distribution of behaviour scores is relatively normal, with a slight positive skew. 
When we look at the breakdown of the distribution by opinion-type (Figure 4), the patterns 
suggest that this skew is imparted by the deny, don’t know, and natural respondents. It is 
also of interest that the behaviour scores of the human-induced opinion-type are normally 





Figure 3. Histogram showing the distribution of single-index aggregated pro-
environmental behaviour scores                                                                                                      







M = 11.91 




















M = 7.58 
SD = 4.22 
M = 8.85 
SD = 4.57 
M = 9.94 
SD = 4.77 
M = 14.85 
SD = 6.25 
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4.3.4 Opinions and Pro-environmental Behaviours 
A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to test for differences in pro-environmental 
behaviour scores based on opinion-type: Welch (3, 5030) = 414.0, p < .001 (Figure 5).18 The 
effect size was large (η2 = .20). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated 
that all four groups differed significantly; those who thought climate change was human-
induced had higher pro-environmental behaviour scores on average than all other groups, 
while those who denied had a lower score on average than all other groups. 
 
* Error bars are standard errors based on 95% CI 
Figure 5. Mean pro-environmental behaviour scores based on opinion about climate 
change causation (N = 5030). 
 
4.3.5 Self-referent Attitudes to Climate Change 
A simultaneous multiple regression was used to assess whether items that measured self-
referent attitudes to climate change predicted engagement in pro-environmental 
behaviour. Table 14 displays the contribution of each item in order of strongest 
contribution to weakest. Together these attitudinal variables predicted 42% of the variance 
in pro-environmental behaviour scores. 
                                                          
18
 The Welch test statistic is reported, as the Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated. The Welch value differed only marginally from F = 414.6. 
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Table 14. Simultaneous multiple regression analysis for attitudinal variables predicting 
pro-environmental behaviour scores (N = 5030). 
Item     M SD r b SE b  
Constant    -.27 .26  
I feel it is my ethical responsibility to 
change my individual behaviour to 
combat climate change 
3.33
†
 1.13 .56** 1.05 .10 .20** 
How important is the issue of climate 
change to you personally? 
2.91
†
 1.21 .58** .97 .11 .19** 




 1.07 .54** .77 .10 .14** 
How personally relevant is climate 
change to you? 
2.58
†
 1.14 .55** .67 .11 .13** 




 0.94 .53** .36 .13 .06** 
How much have you personally 




 0.83 .41** .34 .11 .05** 
How much do you think climate change 
will harm you personally? 
2.21
†
 0.93 .44** -.35 .11 -.05** 




 1.06 .40** .30 .08 .05** 
Move the cursor to the place on the slide 
which best represents how sure you are 




 31.08 .40** .01 .00 .03 
Over the past year, have you become 




 1.07 .46** -.03 .09 -.01 
F (10, 5020) = 363.91, p < .001     R
2
 = .42 
† 
Minimum = 1, maximum = 5; 
†† 
Minimum = 0, maximum = 100 




4.3.6 Political Preference and Climate Change Opinions and Behaviours 
A chi-square test for independence indicated a significant medium strength relationship 
between opinion-type and which political party people voted for in the federal election χ2 
(12, n = 413019) = 774.33, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .25) (Figure 6). Those who voted for Labor 
or the Greens (politically left-wing parties) were more likely to consider climate change as 
human-induced, while those voting Liberal and National (politically right-wing parties) were 
more likely to consider climate change a product of natural variation.  
 
Figure 6. Opinion-type by voting behaviour (n = 4130). 
 
A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to test for differences in pro-environmental 
behaviour scores based on voting behaviour (Figure 7). There were significant differences 
between voting groups: F (4, 4130) = 234.2, p < .001. The effect size was large (η2 = .19). 
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that those who voted for the 
Greens had significantly higher pro-environmental behaviour scores than those who voted 
                                                          
19
 A total of 900 respondents recorded a response of Other, Nobody, or Prefer not to answer. For 
these respondents, opinion-type was as follows: Deny = 7.7%; Don’t know = 6.0%; Natural = 45.3%; 
Human-induced = 41.0% 
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for Labor or for an independent. Those who voted Liberal or National had the lowest 
behaviour scores on average. 
 
* Error bars are standard errors based on 95% CI 
Figure 7. Pro-environmental behaviour scores by voting behaviour (n = 4180). 
 
4.3.7 Emotional Responses 
Average ratings of emotional descriptors are provided in Table 15. The most strongly rated 
emotions were negative (irritated, angry, and confused), but the overall ratings suggest 











Table 15. Mean ratings of felt emotions prompted by climate change (N = 5030). 
Emotion Descriptor  Mean†  SD 
Irritated 3.09 1.12 
Angry 3.07 1.06 
Confused 3.00 1.09 
Powerless 2.93 1.03 
Hopeful 2.83 0.97 
Fearful 2.80 1.09 
Bored 2.78 1.16 
Ashamed 2.63 1.06 
Despairing 2.61 .99 
Guilty 2.55 1.03 
Excited 2.22 1.16 
Joyful 2.17 .86 
† 
Minimum = 1, maximum = 5 
 
An exploratory factor analysis on the emotion descriptors revealed four factors (based on 
those factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1) (Table 16). These factors can be described as: 










Table 16. Rotated Factor Matrix of Emotion items using maximum likelihood extraction 












Ashamed 0.87 0.19 0.17 -0.08 
Guilty 0.80 0.21 0.25 -0.16 
Fearful 0.62 0.08 0.51 -0.20 
Angry 0.41 -0.05 0.12 0.30 
Excited 0.10 0.83 0.06 0.07 
Joyful 0.03 0.83 0.11 0.13 
Hopeful 0.22 0.49 0.16 -0.15 
Powerless 0.16 0.05 0.60 0.07 
Despairing 0.45 0.16 0.58 0.04 
Confused 0.10 0.13 0.56 0.12 
Irritated 0.06 -0.06 0.10 0.85 
Bored -0.21 0.16 0.05 0.66 
Eigenvalue 3.86 1.95 1.67 1.10 
Variance  32.17 16.21 13.91 9.13 
Scale  M = 2.76; 
SD = 0.84; 
α = .80 
M = 2.40; 
SD = 0.75; 
α = .76 
M = 2.85; 
SD = 0.80; 
α = .66 
M = 2.93; 
SD = 1.00;  
α = .71 
 
Figure 8 displays the difference in mean emotion factor scores based on opinion-type. 
There was a large effect size for negative arousal (F[3, 5027] = 338.81, p < .001, η2 = .17): 
those who thought climate change was human-induced gave the highest ratings for 
negative arousal. There was a medium effect size for annoyance (F[3, 5027] = 255.56, p < 
.001, η2 = .13): those who denied climate change was happening gave the highest ratings 
for annoyance, followed by those who didn’t know or thought it was natural. There were 
                                                          
20
 Varimax rotation was selected because it was not theoretically expected the factors be correlated. 
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small effect sizes for positive arousal (F[3, 5027] = 21.26, p < .001, η2 = .01), and the 
depressed factor (F[3, 5027] = 45.34, p < .001, η2 = .03).   
 
 
Figure 8. Ratings on emotion factors by opinion-type (N = 5030). 
 
A simultaneous multiple regression was used to assess whether these emotion factors 
could predict engagement in pro-environmental behaviour (Table 17). All factors made a 
significant contribution to the prediction of behaviour, with high levels of negative arousal 
and low levels of annoyance having the largest influence. Together these factors predicted 











Table 17. Simultaneous multiple regression analysis for emotion factors predicting pro-
environmental behaviour scores (N = 5030). 
Emotion factor M
†
 SD r b SE b  
Constant    9.65 .40  
Negative Arousal 2.76 0.84 .38** 2.77 .11 .38** 
Positive Arousal 2.41 0.75 
.14** .50 .11 .06** 
Depressed 
2.84 0.80 .09** -.66 .11 -.09** 
Annoyed 
2.93 1.00 -.31** -.16 .08 -.27** 
F (4, 5026) = 369.46, p < 
.001  
   R
2
 = .23 
† 
Minimum = 1, maximum = 5 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
 
4.3.8 Social Attitudes to Climate Change  
A simultaneous multiple regression was run to assess the influence of social attitude items 
on levels of engagement in pro-environmental behaviour. Table 18 displays the means and 
standard deviations for each social attitude item, as well as the contribution each item 
made in predicting pro-environmental behaviour, in order of strongest contribution to 
weakest. Items concerning a sense of purpose, and a chance to be part of something 
bigger, most strongly predicted high levels of pro-environmental behaviour, while a 
perceived lack of efficacy most strongly predicted low levels of pro-environmental 











Table 18. Simultaneous multiple regression analysis for social attitude items predicting 
pro-environmental behaviour scores (N = 5030). 
Social Attitude item M
† 
    SD r b SE b  
Constant    8.38 0.55  
Doing something about climate change 
is an opportunity to be part of 
something bigger than ourselves 
3.33 1.12 .49** 1.14 .10 .21* 
There's nothing Australia can do about 
climate change that will make a 
meaningful difference 
2.95 1.35 -.46** -.74 .08 -.16** 
The challenge of climate change will 
provide people with a sense of purpose 
3.08 1.01 .44** .88 .10 .15** 
Trying to do something about climate 
change will mean a lot of people lose 
their jobs 
3.11 1.13 -.39** -.53 .09 -.10** 
Climate change will foster greater 
community spirit and connectedness 
2.72 0.97 .36** .46 .10 .07* 
Climate change may mean that wealth 
and resources end up being distributed 
more fairly 
2.42 0.98 .17** -.20 .08 -.03* 
Climate change will result in financial 
hardship for many people 
3.46 1.03 .09** .15 .08 .03 
Responding to climate change will cost 
Australia a lot of money 
3.81 1.00 -.24** -.13 .09 -.02 
F (8, 5021) = 278.96, p < .001     R
2
 = .31 
† 
Minimum = 1, maximum = 5 





4.3.9 Self Descriptions 
Respondents were presented with several trait descriptors and asked to assess the 
suitability of each for describing their own views on climate change. Table 19 displays the 
mean ratings for each descriptor. Ratings for each descriptor based on opinion-type are 
displayed in Figure 9. 
 
Table 19. Mean ratings of descriptors’ as reflections of views on climate change               




I don’t believe everything I hear 2.08 2.43 
Moral 1.31 2.17 
Considerate 1.19 1.96 
Informed 1.06 2.31 
Cautious 0.40 2.23 
Sceptical 0.24 2.49 
Passionate 0.15 2.39 
Powerless -0.49 2.56 
Uniformed -0.92 2.50 
Undecided -1.13 2.56 
An activist -1.46 2.44 
Uninterested -1.52 2.87 
Selfish -1.80 2.38 
Denying -1.84 2.33 
Immoral -2.02 2.30 
Gullible -2.54 2.49 
† 




* “I don’t believe everything I hear” 





Several key points have emerged in this exploratory phase of responses to climate change. 
First, there appears to be a lack of consensus regarding the causes of climate change, with 
only about half of the respondents reporting the opinion that climate change is largely 
driven by human activity. This result is in sharp contrast to the overwhelming consensus of 
climate scientists that human activity is the main driver (Doran & Zimmerman, 2009; 
Oreskes, 2004). Differences in opinion appear to be only weakly related to socio-
demographic factors. Second, there appears to be large within-group variability 
surrounding what people are personally doing to mitigate climate change, although there 
are significant associations between opinions and actions. Third, moral and ethical duty 
seems to be linked to pro-environmental behaviour, to a greater extent than levels of 
certainty that humans are causing climate change. Fourth, political affiliation is strongly 
linked to opinions and pro-environmental behaviour, suggesting that opinion may be 
shaped in ways other than the accumulation of, or deference to, scientific knowledge. 
Finally, for a significant proportion of people (more than a quarter of repeat respondents), 
opinions about the causes of climate change are not static, but fluid and malleable. But 
what implications do all these results have for a functional understanding of climate change 
responses? 
 
One of the findings that stands out to me is that only a very small proportion of 
respondents (less than 5%) selected the statement I have no idea whether climate change is 
happening or not as best reflecting their opinion on the causes of climate change. Of 
course, aside from specialists who spend decades working in the climate science domain, it 
is beyond the realms of practicality for us to directly know about the causes of climate 
change and have a handle on the sophisticated and complex area of anthropogenic forcing. 
This makes us reliant on external sources for opinion generation. It is reasonable to assume 
that only a small proportion of the population have encountered and digested 
comprehensive scientific accounts of climate change, meaning our opinions are further 
removed from the ‘attitude object’. But over 90% of respondents selected an opinion 
statement other than ‘I don’t know’. Perhaps climate change is something we feel we need 
to have an opinion about; for instance, social pressures might require us to adopt a view on 
something discussed contentiously, or alternatively,  the very state of forming a definitive 
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opinion about an issue we are fundamentally uncertain about may enhance feelings of 
coping and sense of control (Hogg, 2007). 
 
The analysis of opinion stability suggests opinions about climate change are malleable for a 
significant proportion of people, and that shifts in opinion do not necessarily align with 
directional shifts in certainty. For instance, only 15% of people who at first thought climate 
change was human-induced, but nominated something else in the second survey, said they 
had become less certain climate change was happening. That opinions fluctuate so 
emphasises the need to look at what functions these opinions (and shifts in opinion) are 
serving. Is it because climate change is such a salient issue that we feel obligated to 
participate in society through formulating and expressing an opinion, even if we are 
uncertain about it? From a motivated cognition perspective, the contradiction in accounts 
between fluctuations in opinion and certainty of opinion suggests that climate change is an 
issue about which people are directionally motivated, rather than motivated by accuracy 
needs.21  
 
So where are we getting our opinions from? The link between opinion-type and political 
preference is one clue for what our information sources might be, but it doesn’t tell us 
much about functions, other than opinion might serve to reinforce one’s voting choice. 
Political preferences are associated with a whole range of phenomena, including 
dispositional variables, values, worldviews, and the status-quo biases outlined in Chapter 2. 
Hence it would be premature at this point to conclude that political affiliations are the key 
driver of opinions. This area will be pursued in greater depth in Chapters 5 and 7.  
 
Around 40% of respondents selected the statement I think climate change is happening, but 
it’s just a natural fluctuation in Earth’s temperatures as best reflecting their opinion. This 
represents a significant proportion of public opinion, and contrasts with other recent 
estimates about levels of acceptance of human-induced climate change (Leviston, Leitch, et 
al., 2011). Further, shifts in opinion from the first to the second survey were predominantly 
toward this opinion, a trend that was particularly marked for those who had denied climate 
change in the first survey. The prevalence of this opinion-type, and the pattern of shifts 
                                                          
21
 By argument it is directionally motivated as much for those who consider climate change human-
induced as it is for the ‘sceptical’ opinion-types. 
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toward it, indicates that the repositioning of climate change ‘scepticism’ in public discourse 
from ontological denial, to an acknowledgment with a caveat, has gained traction with a 
significant proportion of the community.22 From a functional perspective this is important, 
as the reframing provides a way to admit the existence of climate change, yet (arguably) 
escape the moral and behavioural imperatives that flow from such an admission. The 
relationship between this opinion-type and lower stated levels of pro-environmental 
behaviour suggests that this repositioning might function to excuse failing to perform 
behaviours that are difficult (indeed the relationship between opinion-type and behaviours 
suggests that this group, although distinct from deniers, has more in common with deniers 
than with those who accept that climate change is human-induced). The repositioning 
might also function to ward off an unwanted attribution; as ‘climate change denialist’ has 
become a pejorative term in public discourse, the reinterpretation can be used as a 
‘disclaimer’ to tee up something otherwise socially unacceptable.  This opinion is a way of 
maintaining a positive self-presentation by saying, “I’m not a climate change denier, but…” 
(Chiang, 2010). In the next chapter I explore whether this opinion also functions to reduce 
individual responsibility, and associated levels of negative affect.   
  
The self attributions people made regarding the basis for their opinions further support the 
idea that self-presentational functions are at work. Specifically, the centrality of attributing 
opinions to one’s morality and non-gullibility23 are consistent with Stone and Cooper’s 
(2001) notion that people need to present themselves as intelligent and moral individuals. 
The breakdown of attributions by opinion-type showed people of the deny opinion rating 
strongly on disinterested, but these people also had some of the strongest negative ratings 
for attributions of selfishness, immorality, and gullibility, relative to the other opinion-
types. This slight incongruence could be interpreted as a form of self-presentation 
bolstering, possibly a reaction to negative media portrayals of ‘denialists’, and/or to reduce 
internal discomfort. Also of interest here, is that the rating with the strongest valence of all 
was from the deny group: a negative rating for an activist. This hints at an identity function: 
in this case, those who deny climate change decidedly separate themselves from this social 
reference group.    
 
                                                          
22
 Note also that nearly two-thirds of people with this opinion indicated they thought climate change 
existed when asked the initial belief question, suggesting that a dichotomous response format might 
lead to distorted interpretations of public sentiment. 
23
 As measured here by the phrase “I don’t believe everything I hear”. 
90 
 
When compared with other self-referent attitudes, feeling ethical responsibility and a 
moral duty to act were among the biggest predictors of pro-environmental behaviour, and 
these attitudes predicted pro-environmental behaviour to a greater extent than perceived 
threat, concern, and certainty. This result suggests that the mechanisms of how people 
become morally engaged, and morally disengaged, are particularly important to 
understand. Social attitudes were also clearly linked to behaviour, suggesting that 
perceptions about efficacy (or denial of efficacy) are important, and that positive coping 
appraisals can be made at a group level as well as at the individual level. The finding that 
providing a sense of purpose, and being part of something bigger than ourselves, were two 
of the top three predictors of behaviour is useful for understanding how barriers to climate 
change action might be overcome. These statement ratings have particular relevance to 
Terror Management Theory, which posits that existential anxiety (notionally induced by the 
mortality salience associated with climate change threat) is buffered by striving for meaning 
and purpose in life (Solomon et al., 1991). Meaning-striving does not necessarily take the 
form of environmentally harmful worldview bolstering responses (such as increasing one’s 
consumption), but may also take forms that are beneficial to both communities and the 
environment.24 
 
The emotional response ratings to climate change suggest that negative arousal responses 
differ significantly according to opinion-type, supporting the notion that opinion might 
function both to regulate negative affect and to reduce feelings of guilt, shame, and 
anxiety. Negative arousal ratings were also associated with higher levels of pro-
environmental behaviour, suggesting that these emotions have utility (at least at the level 
these emotions can be consciously accessed and accurately reported on) for behaviour 
change. Alternatively, the associations might suggest that anticipated arousal shapes 
opinions about climate change, which in turn influence the likelihood of engaging in pro-
environmental behaviour. The other set of emotions most strongly predicting pro-
environmental behaviour (this time negatively) were irritation and boredom, which were 
particularly highly rated by those of the deny opinion-type. These high ratings could 
represent a response to media saturation of an issue they view as having little basis in 
reality and therefore little legitimacy. Another, more speculative, possibility is that irritation 
in particular represents a misattribution of an arousal cue (Kunda, 1990). That is, people of 
the deny opinion-type do not consciously see their behaviours (or lack thereof) as 
                                                          
24
 Although beneficial actions could be due to similar worldview bolstering mechanisms. 
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responsible for something that is threatening to the self, hence they misattribute the 
negative arousal induced by exposure to external threat to something else: in this case 
irritation and/or boredom. It is difficult to conclude anything about the causality of 
relationships between negative affect, behaviour, and other variables based on this sort of 
self-report measure though, which relies on cognitively processing accessible information 
about how one feels about climate change. For these reasons we will return to the subject 
of emotions and affect in Chapter 8, where indirect techniques are used to elicit more 
implicit affective responses. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
We now know that normative opinions in the community about the causes of climate 
change substantially differ from scientific norms. These opinions appear to be tied to 
political preferences, suggesting that norms are different for different segments of society. 
But the high levels of behaviour fluctuation within opinion-types also point to high levels of 
heterogeneity within these groups. The fluctuation also suggests that opinions about the 
causes of climate change do not overwhelmingly drive behavioural responses.25 This last 
point is critical for climate science communicators. The traditional (and still dominant) 
deficit model approach argues that, if only people understood the climate science better, 
they would understand human activity is driving the majority of climate change. When 
people understand that, so the deficit model goes, people’s behaviours will change. The 
between-group link between behaviours and opinion-group was large (η2 = .20), but it still 
leaves a lot of variation unaccounted for, and suggests that the functional needs of 
individuals within each opinion-type also vary.  
 
To further uncover what the different needs and goals of the individual are, both within and 
between groups, the factors that relate to opinions and behaviour need to be examined in 




                                                          
25
 It is acknowledged though that this variation may be partly attributable to some ambiguity in the 
question-wording, or ambivalence within the respondents themselves 
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CHAPTER 5. MORAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
 “Climate change is… the great moral challenge of our generation. To delay any longer 
would be reckless and irresponsible for the economy and for our environment” 
 Kevin Rudd on an Emissions Trading Scheme, 2007 
“This is not a political issue. This is a moral issue, one that affects the survival of human 
civilization. It is not a question of left versus right; it is a question of right versus wrong” 
Al Gore, September 2006 
 
In the initial exploration of the data, a sense of moral duty and ethical responsibility to act 
on climate change were among the top predictors of people’s engagement in pro-
environmental behaviour. In this chapter I look more closely at people’s moral responses. 
How might moral responses function to reduce negative affect and guilt, bolster self-image, 
and legitimise the avoidance of behaviours that require effort?  Throughout the 
introduction of this chapter I will present several hypotheses, which I then test with the 
national survey data.  
 
5.1.1 Climate Change as a Moral Issue 
 The challenge of responding to climate change is often framed in moral terms (Seabright, 
2010). When the former Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, failed to pass an Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) in 2009, mainstream conservative media and online blogs latched on 
to his statement above to illustrate what to them was an act of intolerable hypocrisy  (“The 
incredible shrinking man,” 2010; Uhlmann, 2010). The federal opposition, which had 
blocked the ETS’s passage, used Rudd’s words and subsequent (and apparently 
incongruent) act of shelving the ETS to its own political advantage (Howarth & Foxall, 2010). 
Political commentators have attributed Rudd’s 2010 ousting from the Prime Ministership by 
his party colleagues in large part to his apparent moral ‘transgression’ in failing to pass 
climate change legislation (Howarth & Foxall, 2010; Suri & Lofgren, 2010).  
 
In a similar vein, a groundswell of negative press beset Al Gore not long after his release of 
An Inconvenient Truth and his statements about the moral nature of responding to climate 
change. Critics pointed out his relatively lavish lifestyle, juxtaposing it with his ‘moralising’ 




These two examples of ostensibly environmental (in Gore’s case) and political (in Rudd’s 
case) shortcomings share an important characteristic: the most scathing reactions did not 
come from green groups or environmental lobbyists, but from quarters known for their 
scepticism of anthropogenic climate change (e.g. Real World Libertarian, 2009; Wake up 2 
the lies, 2012). 
 
The moral corollaries of anthropogenic climate change might appear obvious to many, yet 
the reactions to Rudd and Gore exemplify how appealing to the moral imperative can 
backfire. One explanation for the intensity of response from climate change sceptics is that 
it serves a rhetorical purpose (e.g., ‘they can’t really believe in climate change if they act 
so’). Another explanation is that the reaction gains political mileage (e.g., the federal 
opposition’s rejection of the ETS in the Senate meant a double dissolution of parliament 
and subsequent election was mooted). Similarly, pointing out hypocrisy might counteract 
any perceived political mileage gained by Gore and Rudd from moralising on climate 
change. But there appears to be something about appeals to the moral imperative that 
produce strong defensive reactions in people, beyond cold political considerations. What 
might underlie such reactions? 
 
5.1.2 The Functions of Morality, Self-identity, and Self-esteem  
Morality is a central component of most people’s self-concept (Allison, Messick, & 
Goethals, 1989).  A sense of ‘being moral’ functions in part at an intra-individual level to 
maintain self-esteem, but there is a social component to it as well; people are keenly aware 
of the social stigma that accompanies having one’s morality questioned (Ybarra, Chan, & 
Park, 2001). Hence we are always on the look-out to maintain at least the appearance of 
being moral. Rudd’s and Gore’s comments challenge people’s morality; if one isn’t acting 
with the utmost urgency to mitigate climate change, the challenge goes, one’s morality is 
questionable. Such implicit reproaches of people’s morality have been demonstrated to 
threaten people’s positive self-images (Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008). 
 
The charge frequently levelled at Rudd and Gore was guilt by ‘moral hypocrisy’.  
Paradoxically, the accusation might extend from our own tendency to judge others more 
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harshly than we judge ourselves (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). That is, we ourselves are 
guilty of moral hypocrisy: the same immoral behaviours are deemed more acceptable when 
performed by the actor than when performed by another. Moral hypocrisy, it is argued, 
arises because we are motivated to protect our own feelings of self-worth and preserve the 
integrity of the self.  
 
Moral hypocrisy is most often operationalised as the discrepancy between what individuals 
perceive as normative and what they actually do, or by the discrepancy between the 
perceived acceptability of one’s own moral transgressions and the acceptability of those 
committed by others (Polman & Ruttan, 2012). Regarding climate change (which is the 
quintessential collective problem), moral hypocrisy may be operationalised as a gap, or 
‘disparity’, between the perceived responsibility of different groups. Moral hypocrisy also 
occurs at the group level; people judge unfair or immoral actions of people associated with 
their in-group as less severe than when performed by a member of an out-group (Valdesolo 
& DeSteno, 2007).  In the case of climate change, we might think of individuals as a 
collective (i.e. members of the public) as an in-group, and out-groups as external agencies 
like governments, corporations, and global organisations. To defend the immorality of 
inaction, we should expect that ratings of individual as a collective for acting is lower than 
responsibility assigned to other entities for acting (e.g. people will place a higher standard 
on external agencies to act than on people like oneself).    
 
Such disparity in ratings of responsibility for action need not be limited to those who 
consider climate change human-induced. From a purely logical position, those who deny 
the existence of climate change should consider nobody responsible for responding to it 
(why respond to something that isn’t there?). But if denial or scepticism serves a 
motivational function, this might be captured by observing disparity between ratings of 
individual-level responsibility versus others’ responsibility for acting on climate change. For 
those who think climate change is happening, but due solely to natural causes, feeling a 
responsibility to respond to climate change might be a logical position to take, as one still 
needs to adapt to the impacts of natural phenomena. For these people then, we might 
capture functional responses through disparities in ratings of responsibility for causing 
climate change (because if it is solely natural, nobody should be more responsible than 




Another possible explanation for the response to the ‘moral transgressions’ of Rudd and 
Gore involves emotions. In the last chapter I suggested that high levels of annoyance 
experienced by those of the deny opinion-type could be due to misattribution of arousal, 
whereby negative arousal induced by exposure to an external threat is attributed to 
something else (irritation and/or boredom), because these people do not consciously see 
their (lack of) behaviours as contributing to the threat. To support this explanation, we 
would expect, for people of the deny opinion, levels of individual responsibility to decrease 
as annoyance increases (Hypothesis 2).  
 
5.1.3 Moral Disengagement 
Bandura’s moral disengagement framework has been applied to numerous social 
phenomena, including decisions to support military action and political violence, 
organisational corruption, and drug addiction (Aquino, Reedii, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; 
Moore, 2007; Newton, Havard, & Teesson, 2012; Paciello, Fida, Tramontano, Lupinetti, & 
Caprara, 2008). It has also recently been applied to ecological sustainability, albeit at the 
conceptual and not the empirical level (Bandura, 2007). But most research to date has 
concentrated on the outcomes of moral disengagement rather than the activation of the 
mechanisms underlying it (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008).  
 
From Chapter 2, moral disengagement can be accomplished through the minimisation or 
disputation of harm. This operates by distorting the consequences of one’s behaviour. One 
such distortion is to proclaim disbelief in detrimental effects. While we are motivated to 
appear moral, when this comes at a personal cost the tendency to give in to self-interest 
increases (Polman & Ruttan, 2012). I argue that we are more likely to discount moral and 
ethical imperatives in situations where the behavioural corollaries are difficult to perform. 
Many pro-environmental behaviours (such as opting for the bicycle instead of taking the car 
to work) require effort, and are counter to everyday self-interest; yet our desire to appear 
moral means we must negotiate a sort of ‘moral gateway’ before we act either way. Our 
opinions might function either to bypass or to distort this gateway, by predicating moral 
disengagement. If you are of the opinion that climate change does not exist, there is no 
moral imperative for you to respond, and no reason to perform behaviours that come at a 
cost to your own self-interest (and no reason to feel guilty about taking the car!). Hence, we 
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should expect moral and ethical duty to mediate the relationship between people’s 
opinions about climate change and their pro-environmental behaviour. This would support 
the argument that opinions function to bypass the (universal) motivation to appear moral 
(Hypothesis 3).  
 
Another way the harm of one’s actions can be disputed is by discounting the cumulative 
impact of one’s own individual actions; a kind of ‘denial of agency’ (e.g. ‘Sure I take my car 
to work, but so do millions of others; if you can’t beat ‘em join ‘em’). To this end we might 
expect pro-environmental behaviour to be associated with a professed lack of efficacy of 
individual action, again mediated by moral disengagement (Hypothesis 4).  
 
According to moral disengagement theory, there is a more direct way to misconstrue 
detrimental behaviour: we can morally justify it. Here, our behaviour is made justifiable and 
even righteous, through the act of cognitive reconstrual. This makes our behaviour and 
attitudes personally and socially acceptable and justifiable. But how could such cognitive 
gymnastics work regarding our decision to take the car over taking the bike? Embedded 
within the sceptics’ criticisms of Rudd and Gore were arguments about the consequences 
of acting under false assumptions. If anthropogenic climate change is a hoax, we risk job-
losses, huge outlays in expenditure, and financial hardships. In the previous chapter we saw 
that attitudes concerning these potentially negative societal-level impacts were moderately 
linked to individuals’ pro-environmental behaviours (although not as strongly as the 
potential positive impacts). We should also expect though, that these social-level attitudes 
are associated with reduced moral and ethical feelings to act. Moreover, if they are 
employed as moral justifications, the association should hold within opinion-types 
(Hypothesis 5).  
 
For those who accept the existence of climate change (whether as natural or human-
induced), a few other mechanisms may help construct the moral bypass:  attributions of 
blame, and displacement and diffusion of responsibility. People tend to act more harshly 
when responsibility for acting is attributed to the collective level than when people hold 
themselves personally accountable for the outcomes of their actions (Bandura, 2007). The 
tendency to diffuse responsibility is more likely when the problem is a collective one, like 
climate change. Further, the more detrimental collectively shared acts are, the less 
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personally responsible people feel for them (Bandura, 1990).  Therefore, we might expect 
disavowal of individual-level responsibility to be linked to low levels of pro-environmental 
behaviour, and for this relationship to be mediated by a reduction in felt moral duty to act, 
regardless of one’s views about climate change (because acceptance of human-induced 
climate change presumably means that the impacts are perceived as more detrimental) 
(Hypothesis 6).  
 
We might also expect that, as those perceived to be responsible for responding to climate 
change (e.g. governments, groups, and organisations) become more psychologically distant, 
the association between ratings of others’ responsibility to act and moral disengagement 
will increase (because responsibility is displaced: a mechanism for moral disengagement) 
(Hypothesis 7). This should be particularly so for those who think climate change is natural, 
or deny it altogether. 
  
It is slightly problematic to test Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement using cross-
sectional data alone. If various strategies (e.g., denying personal responsibility and efficacy) 
result in becoming morally disengaged, then we need to see how changes in opinions relate 
to changes in moral disengagement, and in turn, how changes in moral disengagement 
relate to any of its theorised corollaries. For Bandura, the ultimate function of moral 
disengagement is the reduction of guilt arising from breaches of one’s internal moral 
standards; therefore, we would expect moral disengagement to precede reductions in guilt. 
Of course, the delay between moral disengagement and guilt reduction is unknown, and 
presumably varies from individual to individual. It may be an almost instantaneous process 
for some, whereas for others the change might be slow and incremental. It is reasonable to 
assume that moral disengagement with climate change is a gradual process, with some lag 
in the reduction of guilt, as the breach of moral standards involves the daily behaviours one 
performs (or fails to perform) that are relevant to climate change. Some self-observation 
and reflection is presumably necessary before consistent moral transgression (and 
attendant guilt) is noted by the individual, particularly because of the indirect link of many 
of these behaviours to greenhouse gas emissions. If this is correct, we would expect to 
witness this lag by observing that, over two time periods, initial moral disengagement 
drives subsequent guilt reduction to a greater extent than initial guilt drives subsequent 




With time series data, the impact of changes in opinion-type can also be investigated. A 
change in opinion about the causes of climate change is the equivalent of Bandura’s 
‘cognitive reconstrual’. Theoretically, cognitive reconstruals are another mechanism 
through which moral disengagement occurs. So we should expect to see those who shift 
toward a sceptical opinion become more morally disengaged from climate change, whereas 
those who shift toward an opinion of anthropogenic acceptance should, presumably, start 
to (re)engage with climate change as a moral issue. Again, to test the causality, we would 
expect opinion-change to affect subsequent levels of guilt, but to a lesser extent than moral 
disengagement (Hypothesis 9). 
 
5.1.4 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses will be tested, drawn from the preceding discussion. 
H1: People will rate individuals’ responsibility for causing and acting on climate change as 
lower than other groups’ and organisations’ responsibility for acting. 
H2: Within the deny and natural opinion-types, higher levels of annoyance will be 
associated with lower levels of individual-level responsibility. 
H3: Those who deny climate change will report lower levels of moral engagement than 
those of other opinions. Further, moral engagement will mediate the link between opinion-
type and pro-environmental behaviour. 
H4: Disavowal of efficacy will be associated with lower levels of pro-environmental 
behaviour. This will be mediated by reduced moral engagement. 
H5: Higher agreement with negative social-level impacts of responding to climate change 
will be associated with reduced moral and ethical feelings to act, irrespective of opinion-
type. 
H6: Disavowal of individual-level responsibility will be linked to low levels of pro-
environmental behaviour, and this relationship will be mediated by reduced moral 
engagement, irrespective of one’s views about climate change. 
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H7: The association between ratings of others’ responsibility to act and moral 
disengagement will increase as the group being rated as responsible for responding 
becomes more removed from the individual. 
H8: Changes in moral engagement will drive changes in guilt.  
H9: Changes in opinion-type will drive changes in moral engagement and, to a lesser extent, 
changes in guilt over time.  
 
5.2 Method 
Data were drawn from the T2 survey to test the hypotheses listed above, except for H8 and 
H9, which required time-series data. H8 and H9 were tested with data from both T1 and T2, 
using the 1355 respondents who completed both surveys. 
 
5.2.1 Measures  
In addition to the measures described in the previous chapter, the following measures were 
used. 
 
Ratings of responsibility for causing and responding to climate change. Ratings of 
responsibility for causing climate change were measured by the item Using the scale below, 
how much do you think each of the following groups are responsible for causing about 
climate change? Ratings of responsibility for responding to climate change was measured 
by the item: Using the scale below, how much do you think each of the following groups are 
responsible for doing something about climate change? The following eight groups were 
listed after each item: Multi-National Corporations, State Governments, Local Governments, 
Federal Governments, Big Polluting Countries, Global organisations (such as the UN), 
Wealthy Countries, and Normal individuals. Responses were recorded on a scale from ‘1 = 
Not at all responsible’ to ‘5 = Highly responsible’, with ‘3 = Partly responsible’ at the 
midpoint.  
 
Disparity. Disparity scores (one for causing, one for responding) were calculated by 
combining responsibility ratings for all but Normal individuals. This aggregate was divided 




Moral (Dis)engagement. Moral (Dis)engagement was measured by combining and 
averaging two items: I feel a moral duty to do something about climate change and I feel it 
is my ethical responsibility to change my individual behaviour to combat climate change (α 
= .77). Responses were measured on 5-point Likert scales. For ease of reading, the results 
section refers to ‘Moral Engagement’: higher scores indicate moral engagement, and lower 
scores indicate moral disengagement.  
 
Individual Efficacy. Individual Efficacy was measured by combining and averaging two 
items: There are meaningful things I can do to reduce the impact of climate change and 
Individuals can make a difference to climate change (α = .74). Responses were measured on 
5-point Likert scales. 
 
Negative Social Attitudes to Climate Change Response. Three statements were used to 
measure negative societal-level impacts of responding to climate change: Responding to 
climate change will cost Australia a lot of money; Trying to do something about climate 
change will mean a lot of people lose their jobs, and; Climate change will result in financial 
hardship for many people. Responses were measured on 5-point Likert scales. 
 
Certainty. Certainty that climate change is happening was measured by a sliding scale with 
the instruction Move the cursor to the place on the slide which best represents how sure you 
are that humans contribute to climate change. The scale was labelled ‘1 = Sure that humans 
don’t’ to ‘100 = Sure that humans do’. A reference to the mid-point of this scale was also 
included: ‘Unsure either way’. 
 
Changes in opinion-type. Changes in opinion-type groups were constructed using the 1355 
participants who completed both the T1 and T2 surveys. Those who selected the human-
induced opinion statement at T1, but selected a different opinion statement at T2, were 
categorised as changing Away from acceptance (n = 134; 9.9%). Those who selected the 
human-induced opinion statement at T2, but selected a different opinion statement at T1, 
were categorised as changing Toward acceptance (n = 92; 6.8%). The human-induced 
opinion was selected as a benchmarking statement because it reflects the scientifically 






5.3.1 Ratings of Responsibility 
H1: People will rate individuals’ responsibility for causing and acting on climate change as 
lower than other groups’ and organisations’ responsibility for acting.  
Ratings of responsibility for different groups for both causing and responding to climate 
change are presented in Figure 10. In both cases, the rating of responsibility placed on 
normal individuals was significantly lower than ratings of responsibility placed on all other 
groups. 
 
Figure 10. Mean ratings of responsibility for causing and responding to climate change   
(N = 5030). 
  
Response ratings for all but normal individuals were combined to form average 
responsibility ratings given to ‘groups and organisations’. For all opinion-types, 
responsibility ratings for both causing and responding to climate change were higher when 
rating groups and organisations than when rating individuals (Figure 11). Of interest, and 
apparently revealing a contradiction within people’s sets of responses, the mean 
responsibility rating for groups and organisations for responding to climate change for both 
the deny and natural opinion-type were around the mid-point of the scale (i.e. ‘Partly 
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responsible’).  Ratings of groups and organisations’ responsibility for causing climate 
change also approached the mid-point for the deny group.  
 
A series of paired-samples t-tests tested for significant differences in rating groups and 
organisations versus individuals’ responsibility for the whole sample, and for each opinion-
type (Table 20). In each case the effect size between ratings of individuals’ responsibility 
and groups and organisations’ responsibility was large. The greatest disparity in ratings for 
causing climate change was found for the natural opinion-type, while the biggest disparity 
in ratings for responding to climate change was for the human-induced opinion-type. 
 
 
Figure 11. Ratings of responsibility for causing and responding to climate change by 








Table 20. t-tests for disparity between group and individual responsibility                                           
by opinion-type (N = 5030). 
Responsibility for Causing 
Climate Change 
All respondents t (5029) = 52.67, p < .005, η
2 
= .36 
Deny t (363) = 11.94, p < .005, η
2 
= .28 
Don’t know t (219) = 9.29, p < .005, η
2 
= .28 
Natural t (2200) = 37.92, p < .005, η
2 
= .40 
Human-induced t (2244) = 33.99, p < .005, η
2 
= .34 
Responsibility for Responding 
to Climate Change 
All respondents t (5029) = 39.20, p < .005, η
2 
= .23 
Deny t (363) = 8.09, p < .005, η
2 
= .15 
Don’t know t (219) = 8.04, p < .005, η
2 
= .23 
Natural t (2200) = 23.91, p < .005, η
2 
= .21 





H2: Within the ‘deny’ and ‘natural’ opinion-types, higher levels of annoyance will be 
associated with lower levels of individual-level responsibility. 
Table 21 shows the bivariate correlations between annoyance levels and individual-level 
responsibility ratings. Higher levels of annoyance were weakly to moderately associated 
with lower ratings of individual responsibility within opinion-type, lending moderate 
support to Hypothesis 2.  
 
Table 21. Correlation matrix for annoyance levels and                                                                                  
ratings of individual responsibility (N = 5030). 
  Individual responsibility ratings 
Causing Responding Fisher zobs value 
Annoyance 
All respondents -.32** -.32** 0 
Deny -.21** -.17** 0.62 
Don’t know -.10 -.06 - 
Natural -.20** -.20** 0 
Human-induced -.11** -.18** 2.21† 
† 




5.3.2 Opinion-Types, Moral Disengagement, and Pro-environmental 
Behaviour  
H3: Those who deny climate change will feel lower levels of moral engagement than those 
of other opinions. Further, moral engagement will mediate the link between opinion-type 
and pro-environmental behaviour. 
There were significant differences in moral engagement ratings based on opinion-type: F (3, 
5026) = 812.34, p < .001, η2 = .33. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated 
that those who thought climate change was human-induced rated moral engagement items 
higher than did all other opinion-types. Those of the deny opinion-type rated the items 
lower than did all other opinion-types. There was no statistically significant difference 
between those of the don’t know and natural opinion-types (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12. Levels of Moral Engagement by opinion-type (N = 5030). 
 
To test the mediating influence of moral engagement on opinion-type and pro-
environmental behaviour, it was necessary to substitute a continuous variable for the 
categorical opinion-type measure. Therefore a scale measuring certainty in anthropogenic 
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climate change was used as a proxy for opinion-type. To test the measure’s validity as a 
proxy, a one-way ANOVA was performed to test the association between certainty in 
anthropogenic climate change and opinion-type. There was a large significant difference 
based on opinion-type: F (3, 5026) = 1701.94, p < .001, η2 = .50. Post-hoc comparisons 
showed that all four groups differed, with the human-induced opinion-type having the 
highest certainty (M = 81.60; SD = 15.47), followed by the don’t know opinion-type (M = 
45.06; SD = 23.42), natural (M = 40.58; SD = 26.27), and deny (M = 21.17; SD = 25.39). 
 
The steps suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) to establish mediation were taken.  Firstly, 
the initial variable (certainty) was significantly correlated with the outcome variable (pro-
environmental behaviour) (r  = .49, p < .001), establishing that there is an effect that may be 
mediated. Secondly, the initial variable (certainty) was significantly correlated with the 
mediator (moral engagement) (r = .67, p < .001). A stepwise regression was then performed 
to test the effect of moral engagement on pro-environmental behaviours when holding 
certainty in anthropogenic climate change constant. Table 22 shows that the addition of 
moral engagement led to a significant increase in R2, explaining an additional 12% of the 
variance in pro-environmental behaviour scores. The path coefficient for certainty was 
significantly reduced, though remained significant. This suggests the link between opinions 
about climate change and pro-environmental behaviour is partially mediated by levels of 
moral engagement. 
 
Table 22. Stepwise regression of the effect of Moral Engagement on Pro-environmental 
behaviour (N = 5030). 
Model r b SE b  t 
Step 1 Constant  6.43 .16  40.74** 
Certainty  .10 .00 .49 39.49** 
 R
2
 = .24 
Step 2 Constant  .97 .23  4.28** 
Certainty .49** .04 .00 .18 12.12** 
Moral Engagement .58** 2.73 .09 .47 31.05** 
 R
2
 = .36 
 R
2
 Change = .12, Sig F Change < .0005 
** p < .001 
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H4: Disavowal of efficacy will be associated with lower levels of pro-environmental 
behaviour. This will be mediated by reduced moral engagement. 
Table 23 shows the bivariate correlations between individual efficacy of responding to 
climate change and moral engagement. Of note is the strong association between the two 
variables, not just for respondents as a whole, but also within opinion-type, supporting the 
notion that a reduction in professed efficacy of individual responses is associated with 
moral disengagement. 
 
Table 23. Correlations for Moral Engagement and professed Efficacy of Individual 
Responses         (N = 5030). 
 Opinion-type Individual Efficacy 
Moral 
Engagement 
All respondents .84** 
Deny .77** 
Don’t know .69** 
Natural .80** 
Human-induced .71** 
  ** p < .001 
 
To test the mediating influence of moral disengagement on the relationship between 
efficacy and pro-environmental behaviour, the following steps were taken. First, the initial 
efficacy ratings significantly correlated with pro-environmental behaviour (r = .53, p < .001). 
Second, individual efficacy ratings were correlated significantly with moral engagement (r = 
.84, p < .001). A stepwise regression was then performed to test the effect of moral 
engagement on pro-environmental behaviours when holding individual efficacy ratings 
constant. Table 24 shows the addition of the moral engagement led to a significant increase 
in R2, with ratings of individual efficacy explaining an additional 7% of variance in pro-
environmental behaviour when moral engagement was included. Further, there was a 
significant reduction of the path coefficient for efficacy. This suggests that the link between 
individual efficacy of responding to climate change and pro-environmental behaviour is 




Table 24. Stepwise regression of the effect of moral engagement on pro-environmental 
behaviour. 
Individual Efficacy r b SE b  t 
Step 1 Constant  1.25 .25  4.92** 
Efficacy  3.18 .07 .53 43.78** 
 R
2
 = .28 
Step 2 Constant  .20 .25  .82** 
Efficacy .53 .78 .13 .13 6.02** 
Moral Engagement .58 2.81 .12 .48 23.13** 
 R
2
 = .35 
 R
2
 Change = .07, Sig F Change < .0005 
** p < .001 
 
H5: Higher agreement with negative social-level impacts of responding to climate change 
will be associated with reduced moral and ethical feelings to act, irrespective of opinion-
type. 
Table 25 shows the correlation between levels of moral engagement and agreement with 
statements regarding the negative impacts of responding to climate change. The statement 
relating to job-losses was most strongly associated with a lack of engagement. The financial 
cost to Australia was more moderately associated with a lack of engagement. By contrast, 
and counter to expectations, the statement regarding financial hardship was positively 










Table 25. Correlations for Moral Engagement to act on climate change with evaluations of 







* Responding to climate change will cost   
Australia a lot of money 
-.27** -.10 -.16** -.23** -.12** 
* Trying to do something about climate 
change will mean a lot of people lose 
their jobs 
-.48** -.26** -.29** -.35** -.29** 
* Climate change will result in financial 
hardship for many people 
.23** .28** .24** .25** .09** 
** p < .001 
 
5.3.3 Moral Engagement as Mediator between Responsibility and 
Behaviour  
H6: Disavowal of individual-level responsibility will be linked to low levels of pro-
environmental behaviour, and this relationship will be mediated by reduced moral 
engagement, irrespective of one’s views about climate change. 
Responsibility ratings of individuals for causing climate change and responding to climate 
change were significantly related to levels of pro-environmental behaviour (r = .42, p < .001 
and r = .44, p < .001, respectively). Higher ratings of responsibility accorded to individuals 
were associated with higher behaviour scores. 
 
To test the mediating influence of moral disengagement on reduced levels of responsibility 
and pro-environmental behaviour, the following steps were taken. First, the initial 
responsibility ratings significantly correlated with pro-environmental behaviour (as above). 
Second, responsibility ratings were correlated significantly with moral engagement (for 
causing climate change, r = .63, p < .001; for responding to climate change, r = .63, p < 
.001). A stepwise regression was then performed to test the effect of moral engagement on 
pro-environmental behaviours, when holding responsibility ratings constant. Table 25 
shows the addition of the moral engagement led to a significant increase in R2, with ratings 
of individual responsibility explaining an additional 17% and 15% of variance in pro-
environmental behaviour when moral engagement was included. Further, the path 
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coefficients for individual responsibility dropped significantly with the inclusion. This 
suggests the link between ratings of individual responsibility of causing and responding to 
climate change and pro-environmental behaviour is mediated by moral engagement. 
 
Table 26. Stepwise regression of the effect of moral engagement on pro-environmental 
behaviour (N = 5030). 
Model 1: Individual Responsibility 
for causing 
r b SE b  t 
Step 1 Constant  5.51 .21  25.96** 
Individual 
Responsibility 
 2.37 .07 .42 32.40** 
 R
2
 = .17 
Step 2 Constant  .48 .23  2.06** 
Individual 
Responsibility 
.42 .44 .08 .08 5.27** 
Moral Engagement .58 3.14 .09 .54 36.29** 
 R
2
 = .34 
 R
2
 Change = .17, Sig F Change < .0005 
Model 2: Individual Responsibility 
for responding 
r b SE b  t 
Step 1 Constant  4.35 .23  18.98** 
Individual 
Responsibility 
 2.41 .07 .44 35.04** 
 R
2
 = .19 
Step 2 Constant  .09 .24  .37 
Individual 
Responsibility 
.44 .70 .08 .13 8.78** 
Moral Engagement .58 2.96 .09 .50 34.57** 
 R
2
 = .35 
 R
2
 Change = .15, Sig F Change < .0005 
** p < .001 
 
H7: The association between ratings of others’ responsibility to act and moral 
disengagement will increase as the group being rated as responsible for responding 
becomes more removed from the individual. 
Table 27 presents the bivariate correlations between moral engagement and the rated 
responsibilities for different groups to respond to climate change, in order of strongest to 
weakest. The ordering is generally consistent with the notion that the association between 
moral disengagement and responsibility to act increases as responsibility ratings for 





Table 27. Correlations for Moral Engagement to act on climate change with responsibility 
ratings of different groups to respond to climate change (N = 5030). 
 Moral 
Engagement 
Normal individuals .63** a 
Local Governments .59** b 
State Governments .58** b, c  
Federal Governments .56** c, d 
Wealthy Countries .55** d, e 
Global organisations .53** e 
Multi-National Corporations .49** f  
Big Polluting Countries .43** g 
   ** p  < .001 
Subscript letters denote significant differences between  





5.3.4 Longitudinal Changes 
H8: Changes in moral engagement will drive changes in guilt.  
To test whether changes in moral engagement drove changes in guilt from T1 to T2, a cross-
lagged panel analysis was undertaken in MPlus on the repeat participants from the T1 and 
T2 surveys (Kenny, 2005). Figure 13 suggests that initial levels of guilt significantly 
influenced subsequent levels of moral engagement (Estimate = .16; SE = .02). To a slightly 
greater extent (p = .05), initial levels of moral engagement significantly influenced 
subsequent levels of guilt (with higher initial levels of moral engagement associated with 
higher levels of guilt at T2) (Estimate = .21; SE = .03). This result lends tentative support to 




Figure 13. Cross-lagged panel analysis of guilt and moral engagement at T1 and T2 (N = 
1355). 
 
H9: Changes in opinion-type will drive changes in moral engagement and, to a lesser extent, 
changes in guilt. 
To analyse change in moral engagement as a function of change in acceptance of 
anthropogenic climate change over time, a mixed between-within subjects analysis of 
variance was conducted. The interaction between changes in moral engagement and 
changes in opinion-type was tested as it was expected that a move away from acceptance 
would result in a subsequent decrease in moral engagement, whereas a move towards 
acceptance would result in a subsequent increase in moral engagement. There was a 
significant moderate interaction effect for time and change in opinion, Wilk’s Lambda = .88, 
F (1, 224) = 30.38, p < .001, η2p = .12.
26  The nature of the relationship between moral 
engagement and change in opinion is shown in Figure 14. The red line, indicating those who 
moved away from acceptance between the two surveys, slopes significantly downwards, 
indicating that those who moved away from an accepting position decreased their ratings 
of moral engagement. By contrast, the green line, indicating those who moved towards 
acceptance of human-induced climate change, has a slight (but not significant) upwards 
                                                          
26
 There was a significant moderate main effect for time, Wilk’s Lambda = .93, F = (1, 224) = 15.95, p 
< .001, η
2
p = .07, with those who shifted their opinion away from acceptance having significantly 
reduced moral engagement scores at T2. The main effect comparing the two opinion change groups 
was not significant, F (1, 224) = .37, p > .05, η
2
p = .002. However, due to the significant interaction 
effect, the use of main effects to explore relationships was not appropriate. 
112 
 
slope, indicating that these people’s ratings of moral engagement remained stable.27 
Together, the results support the notion that moral (dis)engagement varies as a function of 
changes in opinion about climate change. 
 
 
Figure 14. Estimated marginal means for moral engagement by change in opinion-type 
over time (n = 226). 
 
To analyse change in levels of guilt as a function of change in opinion-type, another mixed 
between-within subjects analysis of variance was conducted. There was a significant 
moderate interaction between opinion-type and guilt levels, Wilk’s Lambda = .92, F (2, 224) 
= 18.40, p < .001, η2p = .08.
28 In Figure 15, the red line, indicating those who moved away 
from acceptance between the two surveys, slopes significantly downwards, signifying that 
                                                          
27
 Respondents who had a consistent opinion over time are removed for ease of reading, however 
this group of respondents also demonstrated a significant downward shift in moral engagement, but 
to a lesser extent than those who moved away from acceptance. 
28
 There was a significant, small effect for time, Wilk’s Lambda = .97, F (1, 224) = 7.28, p = .01, η
2
p = 
.03. The main effect comparing the two opinion-change groups was not significant, F = (1, 224) = .14, 
p > .05, η
2
p = .001. 
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these people’s ratings of guilt reduced over time. By contrast, the green line, indicating 
those who moved towards acceptance of human-induced climate change, slopes slightly 
(but not significantly) upwards, indicating that these people’s sense of guilt remained 
relatively stable over time. As with moral (dis)engagement, the results support the notion 
that guilt varies as a function of changes in opinion about climate change. The effect size 
was larger for changes in moral engagement than for changes in guilt. 
 
 
Figure 15. Estimated marginal means for Guilt by change in opinion-type over time           






People tend to place more responsibility on groups and organisations than on individuals 
like themselves for both causing and responding to climate change. Further, the results 
suggest that levels of engagement with climate change as a moral issue decrease as 
responsibility becomes more displaced from the individual. Moral disengagement seems to 
play an important mediating role both between opinions about the causes of climate 
change and pro-environmental behaviours, and between perceived individual efficacy and 
behaviours. There was tentative evidence that moral disengagement functions to reduce 
guilt arising from not engaging in effortful pro-environmental behaviours.  
 
The tendency to place greater responsibility on groups and organisations than on 
individuals was evident for all opinion-types, suggesting this group-level version of moral 
hypocrisy is a general tendency for everyone and not limited to sceptical perspectives. In 
fact, the biggest differential rating observed for responding to climate change was for the 
human-induced opinion-type: they accorded greater responsibility to others to respond 
relative to the responsibility accorded to individuals. Why should this discrepancy occur for 
those who hold the scientifically ‘correct’ attitudes to climate change causation? According 
to lay theories of moral judgements, an acknowledgement of both intentionality of one’s 
actions, and recognition of the harmful outcomes of one’s actions, are necessary 
preconditions for moral judgements to occur (Guglielmo, Monroe & Malle, 2009). During 
this deliberation, justifications may be employed to decrease levels of blame toward the 
self. If no intentionality is recognised, justifications are not necessary. We are unlikely to 
search as hard for justifications to legitimise the actions of groups and organisations as we 
are for ourselves.  
 
In a similar vein, if we cast our minds back to the discussion on motivated reasoning in 
Chapter 2, Bersoff argued that people redefine and reconstrue unethical behaviours (a 
process he termed ‘neutralisation’), and that this process often precedes and fosters 
decisions to act in ways counter to one’s attitudes. Reconstrual, a directional form of 
motivated reasoning, allows people to feel committed to pro-social norms, values, and 
actions, while concurrently engaging in behaviour that violates these standards. So it would 
seem that subtle reconstruals occur not just for sceptical people, but for people who accept 
anthropogenic climate change. This might account for some of the substantial variation in 
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pro-environmental behaviour scores within this opinion that we observed in the previous 
chapter. 
 
Cognitive reconstruals are also central to Bandura’s moral disengagement framework, but 
arguably in a less subtle form than Bersoff’s. For Bandura, cognitive reconstruals can take 
the form of an opinion-shift, including outright denial of the harmful consequences of 
actions. Harmful actions (or in this case, a lack of mitigating actions) are thus made socially 
acceptable. The time-series data lend support to the argument that shifts in opinions about 
the causes of climate change function to reduce (i) the need to engage in effortful 
behaviours (or censure against valued behaviours, like driving a car), and (ii) feelings of 
guilt, through the mechanism of moral disengagement. If sceptical opinions are malleable 
and function to reduce guilt, we can think of these opinions as being in a state of tension. 
Stimuli that are unpleasant, disturbing, and result in moral imperatives to act in a way not 
in accordance with our immediate interests, can, in psychoanalytic parlance, result in a 
state of ‘knowing and not knowing’ (Cohen, 2001). Such ‘motivated denial’, as Cohen coins 
it, perhaps explains the paradox of sceptics loudly decrying moral hypocrisy in people 
calling for strong action on climate change. It niggles, especially those who are (either 
consciously or unconsciously) ambivalent towards climate change, because it threatens 
their ‘moral and adaptive adequacy’ (Monin et al., 2008). Arguably, unconscious processes 
manifest through intense levels of irritation and annoyance: we saw how this was 
associated with a lack of individual-level responsibility for acting within the sceptical 
opinion-types.  
 
For some, cognitive reconstrual can be a little more subtle than a shift in opinion, as 
evidenced in the ratings given to other groups for causing and responding to climate 
change. For the natural and the deny groups, surprisingly high ratings of causal 
responsibility were given to some of these other groups (such as big-polluting countries) – 
suggesting logical inconsistencies.  In effect it is a way of saying “it is not my responsibility, 
so I’m in the clear, but it is the fault (and hence the responsibility) of others”. This intra-
individual contradiction of accounts is further evidence that particular functions underlie 
climate change responses. The oddly high levels of rated responsibility of groups and 
organisations from the natural opinion-type in particular, combined with their disparate 
ratings of responsibility at the level of the individual, support the notion that this opinion is 
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a form of euphemistic labelling that serves to legitimise inaction. That others, far removed 
from oneself, are responsible for culpable acts, in combination with natural forces, relieves 
people of personal agency, responsibility, and any attendant guilt. Exaggerating the 
influence other groups have over one’s own goals is also thought to compensate for 
perceptions of reduced control over the environment; for example, research suggests that 
people are more likely to attribute influence to a perceived ‘enemy’ when reminded of the 
risk posed by natural disasters (Sullivan, Landau & Rothschild, 2010).   
 
But what of cognitive reconstruals that act as conscious offence mechanisms? When I 
examined arguments that may be used as moral justifications – the negative social impacts 
of responding to climate change – two of three statements (potential loss of jobs, and the 
financial cost to Australia) were consistently negatively related to moral engagement. But 
the other statement: Climate change will result in financial hardship for many people, was 
positively related to moral engagement for all opinion-types. I suspect the arguments 
embedded in the first two statements have rhetorical purposes, and are used, consciously, 
as moral justifications. And I think the issue embedded in the last statement, financial 
hardship, is a genuine moral issue for people, regardless of their opinion on the causes of 
climate change. It is also possible that the differences observed between the first two items 
and the last item was caused by the difference in question-framing: the financial hardship 
question, unlike the other two statements, does not specifically refer to the impacts of 
climate change responses, but to impacts of climate change itself. We will return to this line 
of thinking in Chapter 7.  
 
The findings in this chapter complement previous work on climate change and morality. For 
instance, Thøgersen (2004) found that consistency in performing pro-environmental 
behaviours depended on the moral importance placed on each of those behaviours. 
Ferguson and Branscombe (2010) found that inducing a sense of collective guilt mediated 
beliefs and willingness to act. Contradictions in reasoning and subsequent attitudes about 
climate change have also been found (Sterman & Sweeney, 2007).  In summarising why 
appealing to the moral imperative is not always effective when motivating people to act to 
mitigate climate change, Seabright (2010) argues that for a dilemma to be treated as a 
moral one, it must have personal relevance. Any moral dilemmas perceived as impersonal 
will fail to be treated morally, and hence cognitive rather than emotive processes are used 
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for decision-making and opinion-formation (and these cognitive processes, as we know, are 
subject to distortions, reconstruals, and biased searching practices). Therefore, Seabright 
argues, resistance to moral appeals about climate change occur because climate change is 
construed as impersonal. This argument is supported by the current finding that climate 
change is above all somebody else’s responsibility, and the more remote from the 
individual, the more responsible that somebody (or group) becomes. How the personal 
relevance of climate change construals interacts with emotion will be further investigated 
in Chapter 8. 
 
There is one mechanism of moral disengagement that was not touched upon in this 
chapter: the notion of advantageous comparison. This notion suggests that, by exploiting 
the contrast principle (juxtaposing one’s own actions with other people’s worse actions), 
detrimental viewpoints and behaviours appear more righteous (Bandura, 2007). For 
example, Aquino, Reed II, Thau and Freeman (2007)  found that the extent to which people 
experienced negative emotions in relation to abuses of Iraqi detainees after the September 
11 attacks was reduced by moral disengagement, as measured by exonerative comparisons 
to the actions of Iraqi’s under Saddam Hussein (e.g. “Compared to the atrocious things 
Saddam Hussein would have done to our troops, the treatment of Iraqi prisoners was very 
mild”). Advantageous comparisons become exonerative comparisons.  
 
Perhaps an exonerative comparison underlies some of the reactions to Rudd and Gore; if 
sceptics are accused of inaction, then at least, they hasten to point out, it is not as bad as 
people who purport to believe in climate change and are still guilty of bad behaviour. Such 
an argument frames the sceptic in not only a better light, but the better light, as the sceptic 
is behaving consistently with their attitudes. After all, there is nothing so important as (the 
appearance of) consistency (Dunning, 1999; Scher & Cooper, 1989). Consistency allows us 
to retain a positive self-concept as competent, stable, and, in this case paradoxically, 
agentic social citizens.  
 
Finally, the displacement of responsibility, so key to moral disengagement, is easier in 
situations where one perceives a high level of social consensus with one’s own view 
(Bandura, 1990). High levels of perceived social consensus also aid in the relinquishment of 
personal control (Bandura, 2007). In the next chapter I explore the role of consensus 
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estimates of climate change opinion to investigate whether perceptions of the prevalence 
of one’s own opinion in the broader community are linked to the displacement of 






CHAPTER 6. CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONSENSUS 
ESTIMATES 
“I will not allow our country to be held to ransom by a few people with extreme views that 
will never be changed”.     
Julia Gillard  
Prime Minister of Australia, March 2010 
“The government is trying to frighten the nation into accepting the need for [a price on 
carbon], but the Australian people are saying ‘no’, they don’t want it”.  
Bronwyn Bishop 
Liberal Party MP, July 2012  
 
Political and media debate on the existence and causes of climate change often rests on 
claims and counter-claims about what the majority of citizens really think. There are several 
well-established phenomena regarding how people perceive the prevalence of different 
opinions. These phenomena include biases such as false consensus (Ross, Greene, & House, 
1977) and pluralistic ignorance (Prentice & Miller, 1996). 
 
The last chapter concluded with the observation that avoiding responsibility for something, 
and the moral disengagement that follows, is easier for people when they perceive high 
levels of social consensus with their opinions (Bandura, 2007). Are people’s opinions about 
climate change related to estimates of social consensus? In this chapter I investigate 
consensus biases and consider why they might be important for understanding people’s 
responses to climate change. I suggest that these biases reduce personal agency and 
responsibility, and function to bolster social support and legitimise inaction on climate 
change. Several hypotheses are formulated during the initial discussion, which are then 
tested using the national survey data. 
 
6.1.1 The False Consensus Effect 
The false consensus effect describes a tendency to over-estimate the prevalence of one’s 
own opinion (Ross et al., 1977). In practice, a false consensus effect operates when 
estimates of consensus with one’s own opinion exceed the estimates of that same opinion 
from those holding an opposing position. As such, it is a ‘relative’ measure of 
overestimation, rather than an ‘absolute’ measure of overestimation (Gross & Miller, 1997). 
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Meta-analyses have shown the effect to be highly reliable and of moderate magnitude 
(Mullen, 1985). The effect is evident across a range of domains, including environmental 
issues (Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chih-tun Cha, 2001), the death penalty and gun 
regulation (Wojcieszak & Price, 2009), and water conservation (Monin & Norton, 2003). 
Recent research suggests the false consensus effect also occurs in online communities, such 
as within politically radical discussion forums (Wojcieszak, 2011).  
 
Several theoretical perspectives can account for false consensus effects. The psychological 
mechanisms proposed in these perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and 
some are thought more likely to be activated under different conditions, or in relation to 
different issues  (Marks & Miller, 1987). Two common accounts focus on cognitive 
availability and motivated social cognition. 
 
From a cognitive availability perspective, we are more likely to recall instances of similarity 
than dissimilarity because we more frequently associate with people who share our 
opinions and attitudes. Friendship groups typically display high rates of internal similarity, 
and friends’ opinions and attitudes are more readily accessed from memory than instances 
of dissimilarity or disagreement (Marks & Miller, 1987). Availability heuristics are thought 
to be activated when one is asked about the viewpoints of non-specific groups – such as the 
student body of a college campus or an entire country. When asked about vague target 
groups like these, we make the abstract more concrete by thinking of immediate friends 
and family (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). We also draw on 
experience from groups, communities and organisations with whom we have the most 
interaction (Wojcieszak & Price, 2009). In this respect, social identity, and authority 
referents are particularly influential in shaping our estimates of plurality sentiment.   
 
An alternative, though related, explanation is that false consensus functions to bolster 
perceptions of social support, to maintain or restore self-esteem or cognitive balance, or to 
reduce tension aroused by dissonant attitudes and behaviours. Such motivated social 
cognition is thought most likely to occur in circumstances where one is less certain about 
the correctness of one’s own position, or when one’s position deviates from a suspected 
norm (Marks & Miller, 1987). Under such conditions, it may be functional to exaggerate 
similarity with others to augment one’s likeability or acceptance. Similarly, in conditions 
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where the viewpoint is highly evaluative or involves a perceived threat to self, false 
consensus may function to maintain self-esteem and increase feelings of social belonging 
(Morrison & Matthes, 2011; Mullen, 1985; Suls, Wan, & Sanders, 1988).   
 
Directional Accuracy. The false consensus paradigm relies on relative estimates rather than 
the accuracy of one’s estimate, but perceived levels of consensus have an interesting 
association with the actual prevalence of attitudes. Sanders and Muller (1983) found that 
when respondents held a minority position (i.e., when fewer than 50% of all other 
respondents held the same viewpoint on a dichotomous view), strong false consensus 
effects emerged. That is, respondents holding a minority position strongly overestimated 
levels of peer-support. However, when respondents held a majority position (i.e., more 
than 50% agreed with the respondents’ own viewpoint), consensus was actually 
underestimated. Importantly, overestimation on the part of the minority was stronger than 
the underestimation by the majority, supporting the motivational perspective that false 
consensus functions to increase social support for unpopular points of view (Marks & 
Miller, 1987). The strength of overestimation relative to underestimation also suggests that 
observed false consensus effects are not merely a statistical by-product of a ‘middling 
tendency’ in people’s prevalence estimates.    
 
False Consensus and Climate Change. In Chapter 1 I discussed how the debate about 
climate change has become increasingly politically divisive. The current salience of the 
topic, alongside the contested nature of community sentiment, makes consensus estimates 
regarding the causes of climate change particularly relevant. In Chapter 4 I argued that 
there is a scientifically normative opinion to adopt: that the climate is changing and human 
activity is contributing to it. By extension the scientifically non-normative approach to take 
is that climate change is not happening. The results in Chapter 4 suggest that the variation 
on this second stance, that climate change is happening, but it is simply a product of natural 
processes, seems to have gained significant support in the Australian community, despite 
its being at odds with the scientific consensus. As climate change poses a threat to self, we 
might expect false consensus levels for scientifically non-normative positions – those that 
deny and those who consider climate change natural – to be related to a number of 
discounting arguments. These arguments might include discounting the individual efficacy 
of acting (“I can’t make a difference anyway”), and refuting personal responsibility to act 
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(“it’s somebody else’s problem”).  These arguments may function to assuage discomfort 
(such as guilt) arising from failure to engage in pro-environmental behaviours.  
 
The false consensus effect has also been found to influence actual and intended behaviour 
(Botvin, Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury, & Goldberg, 1992). Our opinions about the existence 
and drivers of climate change are related to what we actually do; we know this from both 
Chapter 4 and from other research (e.g. Gifford, Kormos, & McIntyre, 2011; Roser-Renouf & 
Nisbet, 2008). How consensus estimates relate to opinions about climate change and pro-
environmental behaviour should therefore be explored. Further, if views about the causes 
of climate change are an important driver of pro-environmental behaviour, it is important 
to assess how, if, and why these views fluctuate over time. High levels of false consensus 
may mean that views are more resistant to change. 
 
6.1.2 Pluralistic Ignorance 
Pluralistic ignorance describes a situation where a majority of group members privately 
reject an opinion, but assume incorrectly that most others accept it. This, in turn, provides 
support for an opinion or a norm that may be actually disliked or disavowed by most 
people. In short, each individual makes an error in judging the sentiments of the plurality 
(Prentice & Miller, 1996). As with false consensus, pluralistic ignorance is about the 
misperception of the modal opinion, and not with the overall accuracy of people’s 
estimates. But the focus of pluralistic ignorance as a concept is on how privately unpopular 
(or unpalatable) opinions are perpetuated as being popular in society. Empirical studies of 
pluralistic ignorance have typically been limited to cases where a minority position is 
misperceived as being the majority position, or vice-versa – a form of ‘absolute pluralistic 
ignorance’. A more subtle form, ‘relative pluralistic ignorance’, exists where there is a 
marked and significant misperception of opinion distribution, though not to the point of 
misconstruing the mode (Shamir & Shamir, 1997).  
 
An important element of pluralistic ignorance is the notion of shared false ideas: generally 
socially accepted but erroneous propositions about the world (O’Gorman, 1986). So, in 
contrast to false consensus, we would expect erroneous opinions about what other people 
think to act relatively independently of one’s own opinion. As with false consensus, 
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pluralistic ignorance can be understood as arising from individual biases in information-
processing, but social and cultural processes are also critical. Error-prone messages in the 
environment provide misleading or false information cues, serving as invalid indicators on 
which to base estimates of public sentiment (Shamir & Shamir, 1997).  For instance, 
systematic biases in media reporting can lead to collective distortions about the popularity 
of certain opinions (Noelle-Nuemann, 1993).  
 
Pluralistic ignorance and climate change. A key reason to investigate consensus estimates 
is the central role the media has played in the reporting of climate change. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, much has been made of a perceived bias in media reporting of climate change. 
Some claim the traditions of journalism dictating ‘both sides of a story’ be given equal 
weight, and therefore equal coverage, has led to a false impression among the community 
regarding the number of people who deny climate change , or that it has helped promote 
the notion that the scientific evidence surrounding climate change is unclear at best 
(Boykoff, 2007; Corbett & Durfee, 2004). Indeed, research has demonstrated that media 
bias predicts community attitudes towards prejudice-related issues, and that this in turn 
enhances consensus effects for undesirable viewpoints (Watt & Larkin, 2010). If such an 
effect operates in the case of climate change, we would expect to see estimated 
percentages of people who deny that climate change is happening exceed actual 
percentages. Further, we would expect this overestimation to apply across all opinions 
(pluralistic ignorance), but for the overestimation to be most marked for those who 
themselves deny climate change is happening (false consensus).  
 
6.1.3 Hypotheses 
This chapter tests the following hypotheses, drawn from the preceding discussion: 
H1: People will estimate their own opinions regarding the causes of climate change to be 
more common than will people holding different opinions (false consensus).  
H2: Same-opinion consensus will be overestimated by minority positions and 
underestimated by majority positions (directional accuracy). 




H4: Levels of false consensus will be higher for those who place greater levels of trust in 
friends and family for information on climate change (availability heuristic). 
H5: For those with scientifically non-normative opinions, higher levels of false consensus 
will be associated with less engagement in pro-environmental behaviour, lower perceived 
individual efficacy and responsibility for responding to climate change, moral 
disengagement, and lower levels of guilt. 
H6: People with high levels of false consensus will be less likely to change their opinions 
about climate change. 
 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 National Surveys 
Data were drawn from the T2 survey to test the hypotheses listed above, except for H6, 
which required time-series data. H6 was tested with data from both T1 and T2, using the 
1355 respondents who completed both surveys 
 
6.2.2 Measures 
Opinion-type about the causes of climate change. As previously, opinion-type about the 
causation of climate change was assessed with the question Which of the following 
statements best describes your thoughts on climate change? Respondents selected one of 
the following four statements: I don’t think that climate change is happening; I have no idea 
whether climate change is happening or not; I think that climate change is happening, but 
it’s just a natural fluctuation in Earth’s temperatures; I think that climate change is 
happening, and I think that humans are largely causing it. These statements are referred to 
as deny, don’t know, natural, and human-induced.29  
 
                                                          
29
 It is conventional practice to measure consensus effects dichotomously: whether it is a behaviour 
(engage vs not engage), or an attitude or opinion (pro - capital punishment vs anti- capital 
punishment). Unfortunately the case of opinions about climate change is not so straight forward. 
Simply asking whether one believes in climate change or not fails to capture an important argument 
in the ‘debate’ – that climate change is happening, but due solely to natural fluctuations. By failing to 
capture this argument the predictive capacity of views on climate change is compromised – hence, I 
deemed it necessary to examine consensus on a categorical measure. The trade-off for validity is a 
slightly more complex reading of results. 
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In addition to the measures described in previous chapters, the following measures were 
used. 
 
False consensus levels and actual opinions. Directly after selecting an opinion statement, 
respondents were asked to estimate the percentage of Australians they thought would 
agree with each of the opinion-types. Response estimates to the four statements were 
required to total 100% before respondents were able to proceed to the next section of the 
survey.30  False consensus was measured by the percentage of community consensus 
estimated for the respondent’s own opinion-type. In accordance with the method 
prescribed by de la Haye (2000), the response set to the initial opinion-type question was 
used as a proxy for the ‘actual’ opinion level of the Australian community.  
 
Trust in friends and family. Trust in friends and family was measured by the question How 
much do you trust the following to provide you truthful information on climate change? 
Friends and family measured on a scale from ‘1 = Distrust a lot’ to ‘5 = Trust a lot’. Four 
other information groups were included for comparative purposes: environmental 
organisations, university scientists, government scientists, and the community. 
 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Climate Change Opinion-Type and False Consensus Effects 
Figure 16 reveals that actual climate change opinions differ markedly from estimated 
percentages. On average, people overestimated the proportion of people who were of the 
opinion that climate change was not happening (deny) or didn’t know, and underestimated 
the proportion of people who believed climate change was either natural or human-
induced.  
 
                                                          
30
 Where estimates did not total exactly 100%, the screen was refreshed with the following prompt 




Figure 16. Actual versus estimated percentages of climate change opinion-type for all 
respondents (N = 5030). 
 
H1: People will estimate their own opinion regarding the causes of climate change to be 
more common than will people holding different opinions (false consensus).  
Actual and estimated levels of opinion were analysed by each opinion-type. These are 
displayed in Figure 17. Here, the horizontal axis is ordered by the actual opinion-type of the 
respondents. The bars indicate the average in-group estimates of how prevalent they 
thought each opinion would be. The dotted lines indicate the actual prevalence. For 
example, the deny group estimated (on average) that 49% of the rest of the community 
would agree with their opinion, while they estimated only 14% of the community would 
agree that climate change was human-induced. Every group displayed the false consensus 
effect. That is, each group’s average estimation of their own opinion-type exceeded the 
estimation made by other groups. Further, each group estimated their own opinion-type as 
the most common opinion in the community. Table 28 presents an analysis of variance for 
each prevalence estimate by opinion-type.31 There were large effects for own opinion on 
                                                          
31
 It was deemed inappropriate to group opinion-type into own opinion versus all other opinions as 
this implies the resulting groups are in diametric opposition. As the relative positioning of all four 
opinions was unclear, they were kept separate for the analysis of variance.  
127 
 
estimating general levels of denial, natural, and human-induced opinions. There was a small 
effect of own opinion on estimating levels of people who would reply don’t know. 
 
* error bars denote within-opinion-type standard errors 
Figure 17. Estimated percentages of climate change causation for each opinion-type        














Table 28. Mean (standard deviation) estimated prevalence of each opinion by 
respondents’ own opinion-type (N = 5030). 










1 Estimates of 
‘deny’ 




28.44%         
(19.80) b 
20.38%     
(15.20) c 
20.87%     
(15.53) c 
334.20, p < 
.001, η
2
 = .17 
2 Estimates of 
‘don’t know’ 
17.27%          
(15.26) a 
32.65%     
(20.92) b 
19.38%      
(14.32) c 
19.49%       
(13.54) c 
63.09, p < 
.001, η
2
 = .04 
3 Estimates of 
‘natural’ 
19.03%         
(18.33) a 
19.82%    
(13.41) a 
35.15%       
(21.25) b 
19.88%       
(10.77) a 
347.32, p < 
.001, η
2
 = .17 
4 Estimates of 
‘human 
induced’ 
14.35%         
(13.92) a 
19.09%     
(13.20) b 
25.09%      
(15.44) c 
39.76%          
(21.17) d 
389.03, p < 
.001, η
2 
 = .19 
† 
Mean scores with different subscripts are significantly different on the basis of Tukey’s HSD test 
 
H2: Same-opinion consensus will be overestimated by minority positions and 
underestimated by majority positions (directional accuracy). 
H3: Levels of climate change denial will be overestimated by all groups (pluralistic 
ignorance). 
A one-way analysis of variance was performed to test the accuracy and direction of 
estimated consensus for each opinion-type. The first line in Table 29 shows a strong effect 
for directional accuracy based on respondents’ own opinion-type. Those in minority 
positions (deny and don’t know) overestimated the amount of actual agreement with their 
own opinion, while those in majority positions underestimated agreement with their own 
opinion (but still gave a higher estimate of their own opinion than other groups did). The 
overestimation of minority opinions was greater than the underestimation of majority 
opinions. The second line in Table 29 indicates that all groups overestimated the levels of 
people denying climate change is happening; and that the amount of overestimation of 
denial differed according to opinion-type. Those who themselves denied climate change 
had the greatest level of overestimation of denial, followed by those who didn’t know. 
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Those who thought climate change natural or human-induced had similar overestimations 
of denial to each other. 
 
Table 29. Mean (standard deviation) directional accuracy and pluralistic ignorance effects 
of estimates of climate change opinion (N = 5030). 
 Respondents’ own Opinion-Type 
















- 8.65%      
(21.25) c 
- 4.83%     
(21.17) d 
719.48, p < 
.001,   η
2
 = .30 
2. Deviation of 
estimated 











334.20, p < 
.001,  η
2
 = .17 
† 
Across rows, mean scores with different subscripts are significantly different on the basis of Tukey’s HSD test 
 
6.3.2 False Consensus and Trust 
H4: Levels of false consensus will be higher for those who place greater levels of trust in 
friends and family for information on climate change (availability heuristic). 
Overall, trust in friends and family to provide accurate information on climate change had 
the highest correlation with levels of false consensus: higher levels of trust were associated 
with higher perceived consensus (Table 30). The relationships were weak however, and 
were non-existent for the deny and don’t know opinion-types. The breakdown of opinion-
type indicates that the strongest relationships occurred for the scientifically non-normative 
opinion-types (deny and natural), where lower levels of trust in information from university 
scientists were associated with higher false consensus. For the happening, but natural 
opinion-type, lower levels of trust in government scientists and environmental 




Table 30. Correlations between trust in information sources and levels of false consensus 






































.09** -.01 .11 .10** .09** 
** p < .001 
 
6.3.3 False Consensus Effects and Motivated Social Cognition 
H5: For those with scientifically non-normative opinions, higher levels of false consensus will 
be associated with less engagement in pro-environmental behaviour, lower perceived 
individual efficacy and responsibility for responding to climate change, moral 
disengagement, and lower levels of guilt. 
Bivariate correlations were calculated for all respondents and for each of the opinion-types. 
Table 31 shows that, for the deny and natural groups, high false consensus was significantly 
but weakly associated with lower ratings of individual efficacy and responsibility for 
responding to climate change. There were no significant correlations between consensus 
estimates and responsibility for the other two opinion-types. For the natural group, there 
were also significant, though weak, associations between high false consensus and low 
levels of moral engagement and guilt. The only significant association between high false 
consensus and pro-environmental behaviour was for the natural opinion-type, although the 




Table 31. Correlations for false consensus, behaviour, efficacy and responsibility by 
opinion-type (N = 5030). 
 
Respondents’ own Opinion-Type 
All 
respondents 





-.06** -.15** .02 -.13** .01 
Individual Efficacy -.05** -.10* .04 -.14** .02 
Moral Engagement -.05** -.09 -.01 -.15** .01 
Guilt -.00  -.02 .06 -.10** .06** 
Pro-environmental 
Behaviour  
-.01 -.02 .08 -.06** .00 
* p < .01 
** p < .001  
 
 
6.3.4 False Consensus Effects and Stability of Opinions 
For this section, the responses of the 1355 people who participated in both surveys were 
used. Figure 18 shows that differences in the overestimation of deny and underestimation 
of natural were relatively stable between the two time periods, with slight changes in 




Figure 18. Actual and estimated levels of agreement with each opinion-type, grouped by 
respondents’ own opinion-type (N = 1355). 
 
 
Changes in estimated levels of community denial over time were further explored by 
grouping T1 and T2 denial estimates by opinion-type at T2. While Figure 18 suggests 
consensus estimates were relatively stable, Figure 19 suggests that there was a sharp 






Figure 19. Estimated levels of community ‘denial’ at T1 and T2 based on respondents’ 
own opinion-type at T2 (N = 1355). 
 
H6: People with high levels of false consensus will be less inclined to change their opinions 
about climate change. 
To test for stability of individual opinions, a quartile split was performed to identify two 
groups: respondents with high levels of initial false consensus (in-group estimate of greater 
than 50% for the T1 survey, n = 374), and respondents with low levels of initial false 
consensus (in-group estimate of less than 20% for the T1 survey, n = 421); group sizes 
differed due to a difference in the number of respondents with values on the quartile cut-
off boundaries.32 A chi-square comparison showed that high false consensus respondents 
were significantly more likely to select the same opinion statement in the T2 survey than 
were low consensus respondents χ2 (1, n = 795) = 16.2, p < .001, phi = -.14) (Table 32). The 
analysis was repeated using false consensus as a continuous variable. On average, the initial 
same-opinion estimate of those who did not change their opinion (M = 36.77; SD = 20.94) 
                                                          
32
 The two middle quartile groups were excluded from the analysis. A quartile split was deemed ideal 
as it meant those in the high false consensus group estimated the amount of in-group consensus as 
50% or higher. In this respect this group represents something not captured by a continuous 




was higher than those who shifted their opinion (M = 33.27; SD = 21.80; t(1353) = 2.69; p < 
.01). 
 
The same analysis was conducted for only those respondents who initially denied that 
climate change was happening. A chi-square comparison suggests that those who denied 
climate change and had high false consensus scores were less likely to change their opinion 
in the T2 survey than were those who denied climate change with initially low false 
consensus scores, though the significance was marginal: χ2 (1, n = 68) = 3.47, p = .05, phi = -
.23) (Table 32). In other words, those who initially denied were less likely to change their 
opinion if they perceived high consensus with their own opinion. 
 
Table 32. False consensus and stability of opinions for all respondents (N = 1355), and for 
those who initially thought climate change was not happening (n = 68). 
 











n = 278 
48.5%* 
66.0%**  
n = 295 
51.5% 
78.9% 
n = 9 
29.0% 
32.1% 





n = 143 
64.4% 
34.0% 
n = 79 
35.6% 
21.1% 
n = 19 
51.4% 
67.9% 
n = 18 
48.6% 
45.0% 
 * Within consistency type 





6.4 Discussion  
The results presented in this chapter demonstrate that estimates about what the Australian 
community thinks about climate change differ markedly from actual opinions. People tend 
to believe their own opinion about climate change is more common than people holding 
other opinions believe it is.  Climate change denial is generally overestimated, regardless of 
people’s own opinions. This faulty estimation of community attitudes appears to be stable 
across time, with slight increases in false consensus for those think climate change is not 
happening. Further, those who displayed high initial levels of false consensus were more 
resistant to changing their opinions about the causes of climate change than those 
exhibiting low false consensus. 
 
People from the two ‘majority positions’ – natural and human-induced – generally 
underestimated the prevalence of their own opinion.  Those in the two minority positions – 
deny, and those who don’t know – tended to overestimate the prevalence of their own 
view. That the projected consensus of people who denied climate change or didn’t know 
deviated so far from actual estimates is consistent with a motivational account of false 
consensus functioning as a social support mechanism for minority views. Under this 
perspective, need for social support increases when one’s position deviates negatively from 
the actual consensus, and when people are uncertain about their own opinions. Further, 
the overestimation by those in minority positions outweighed the underestimation by 
those in majority positions, suggesting that erroneous estimations for those of the deny 
opinion in particular cannot be attributed to a conservatism bias (or the tendency to 
decrease judgement error by distributing allocations in a roughly equal manner) alone.  
 
The notion that ‘equal weight to each side’ media broadcasting may have given rise to a 
national level ‘pluralistic ignorance’ was supported by the observation that, while privately 
most people held the view that the climate is changing, all groups overestimated the 
prevalence of outright climate change denial.33 The overestimation of levels of denial 
persisted over time, suggesting that the role of the media in the intervening 12 months, 
prominently featuring climate change sceptics and public anti-carbon tax campaigns, 
                                                          
33
 Note that what was observed was relative rather than absolute pluralistic ignorance – for the 
latter to occur estimates of denial would have to exceed 50% (Shamir & Shamir, 1997).  
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seemingly counteracted coverage touting the existence of majority community support for 
action on climate change (Gillard, 2011).  
 
Interestingly, the increase in denial estimates over time was limited to those who 
themselves denied climate change. I suggest two interpretations: First, deniers selectively 
process information that accords with their opinion, now that there is more of the 
information to be processed. And second, as the ‘debate’ has become more salient and 
more value-laden in the Australian media (and therefore in the minds of many Australians), 
those who deny climate change feel a greater need to legitimise their viewpoint, a greater 
need for social support, or a greater need to maintain self-esteem (Mullen, 1985).  
Whatever the reason, previous research indicates that people who believe there is more 
support for their own opinion are more likely to express that opinion (Noelle-Nuemann, 
1993; Watt & Larkin, 2010). This might provide another clue to why those on the ‘denial’ 
side of the debate have gained a disproportionate share of media coverage.  Further 
research, including experiments where people’s privately held opinions differ from their 
publicly expressed sentiments in the face of perceived group pressure, would lend greater 
support to these inferences. 
 
For the scientifically non-normative groups, high levels of false consensus were significantly 
associated with lower individual responsibility to act and low levels of response efficacy. 
For the natural group, moral disengagement, high false consensus was also associated with 
lower levels of guilt, and slightly lower levels of pro-environmental behaviour. This again 
supports the notion that the expressed opinion that climate change is occurring but due 
solely to natural processes represents a reinterpretation of climate change that functions 
partly to divest personal responsibility and legitimise inaction in the face of conclusive 
scientific evidence. Such a mental manipulation brings about a need to legitimise such a 
reinterpretation by bolstering perceived levels of support.  
 
The case for family and friends bolstering false consensus was not convincing, although 
more targeted measures might shed more light on this issue. Of interest here were the 
stronger relationships between high levels of false consensus and distrust in scientific 
sources of information and environmental organisations for those holding scientifically non-
normative opinions. These trust agents can be considered (high-consensus) proponents of 
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climate change, and thus represent those holding an opposing opinion to the deny and 
natural groups. But the same associations were not found for high trust in scientific sources 
and high levels of false consensus for the human-induced group. Overestimation of 
consensus for the human-induced group appears instead to be linked to ‘people like them’ 
(friends and family, and the community), suggesting that these people make more use of 
the availability heuristic to make estimates than those in scientifically non-normative 
groups, while a process of motivated social cognition (discounting scientific and 
environmental sources of information) might underlie non-normative estimates to a 
greater extent.   
 
In Chapter 2 I introduced Uncertainty-Identity Theory (UIT; Hogg, 2007), which posits that a 
central role of social identification is to reduce uncertainty. By identifying with social 
groups, uncertainty is reduced because we are able to draw on the attitudes, feelings, and 
behaviours of that group to infer what our own position should be. The results here suggest 
that uncertainty also occurs for people holding scientifically normative positions, and when 
this uncertainty is present we tend to draw on close others to guide our thinking. 
Meanwhile, negative authority referents (‘those who we do not wish to identify ourselves 
with’, in this case scientific and academic sources) seem more important in shaping, 
informing, and bolstering the opinions of those sceptical about climate change. 
 
Another avenue for future investigations relates to the different media outlets through 
which climate change information is disseminated. There is evidence from communications 
research suggesting exposure to heterogeneous social networks aids in accurate 
perceptions of community opinion (O’Gorman 1979, cited in Wojcieszak & Price, 2009). 
Wojcieszak and Price (2009) found that exposure to dissimilar opinions mitigated the link 
between individual opinion and perceived public opinion on contentious socio-political 
issues. They concluded that both offline and online communities served as a filter that 
exposed or isolated people from broader opinion-climates. There is also evidence that the 
way we project views onto the public is influenced by perceived media bias (Gunther et al., 
2001). Given the rise in usage and influence of social media around contentious issues like 
climate change, the role of media in shaping and disseminating climate change opinion 
should be explored. Experimentally manipulating exposure to similar and dissimilar 
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opinions and assessing the influence on consensus estimates while accounting for climate 
change knowledge might shed further light still. 
 
The results presented in this chapter highlight the importance of presenting people with 
accurate information about actual levels of consensus, not just with regards to the scientific 
community but throughout the community itself. Leaving estimates of levels of climate 
change denial unchallenged risks allowing the notion of widespread denial to effectively 
self-perpetuate, with ramifications for individual behaviours, policy-makers, and those 
seeking to communicate factual information about the science of climate change.        
 
Social and cultural processes are critical to the perpetuation of pluralistic ignorance (Shamir 
& Shamir, 1997). Social and political groups, economic structure, cultural values, and 
especially the media all provide indicators on which to base estimates of public sentiment. 
Just like opinions about the causes of climate change, there are competing claims about 
support and opposition toward climate change policy interventions. These claims are 
doubtless influenced by similar biases to those we have just explored. In the next chapter, I 
explore how factors influencing policy support are embedded in social and cultural 






CHAPTER 7. THE SYSTEM-LEGITIMISING FUNCTIONS OF 
RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
One of the notable outcomes in Chapter 4 was the strong link between political voting 
behaviour and opinion-type. Those voting Greens or Labor were much more likely to accept 
human-induced climate change; those voting Liberal and National much less likely. This 
political link extended to pro-environmental behaviours, with those voting for parties with 
stronger, more proactive policy positions on climate change action (the Greens and Labor), 
engaging in more pro-environmental behaviours than other respondents. This is in keeping 
with recent research in the US indicating that Democrats are much more likely than 
Republicans to endorse the concept of anthropogenic climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 
2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011b; Scruggs & Benegal, 2012). On face value these results 
suggest that people’s opinions about climate change and their subsequent behaviours are 
drawn directly from the opinions and policy positions of the political parties people identify 
with. Conversely, we could argue that people’s opinion on climate change drives their 
voting behaviour. But people vote for political parties for a myriad of reasons; rarely are 
decisions based on a single issue like climate change. Using a System Justification Theory 
approach, in this chapter I explore the extent to which underlying ideological drivers are 
behind these political party relationships with climate change responses. I also investigate 
whether these drivers are related to support for policy action on climate change. In doing 
so, I attempt to integrate some of the concepts of moral disengagement into this system 
justification approach. Throughout the introduction I will pose several research questions, 
which are subsequently tested with the national survey data. 
 
7.1.1 System Justification 
Numerous personality traits and values purportedly underlie people’s overt political 
preferences and inform their voting behaviour. These include tolerance of diversity, 
ambiguity, and change, and the way tradition, hierarchy, and equality are valued (Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). But there is 
often discrepancy between the ‘official’ political ideologies of a person (as denoted through 
their party-political preferences) and their actual politically-relevant personal ideologies 
(Adorno et al., 1950). Further, for many individuals, political preferences change from 
election to election, suggesting the link between underlying drivers and political affiliation 
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is malleable, or that the drivers themselves are malleable, or that these drivers (or 
tendencies) exert more or less influence under different conditions. This last possibility is 
posited in system justification theory.  
 
System justification refers to a psychological motive to defend the status quo, so that 
existing political and economic arrangements are perceived as fair and legitimate (Jost & 
Banaji, 1994). System-justifying ideologies (or tendencies) take many forms; they include 
preferences toward a Protestant work ethic, meritocratic ideology, fair market ideology, 
belief in a just world, power distance, opposition to inequality, economic system 
justification, social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and political 
conservatism (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). These ideologies, while distinct from each other, are 
typically interrelated, suggesting they serve the same broad ideological function: to justify 
the existing social and economic arrangements of the State. 
 
System justification may function to increase self-esteem and well-being, particularly for 
groups that are privileged by existing systems. System justification also functions to reduce 
negative affect, such as that produced by guilt and anxiety, by maintaining the illusion that 
systemic inequities are fair. This works for people of privileged groups – who might 
experience guilt if illegitimate system inequalities are acknowledged. Importantly, it also 
works for people of under-privileged groups – who risk experiencing anxiety, anger, and 
helplessness if system inequalities are acknowledged.  As such, an outcome of system 
justification is that disadvantaged groups can (and often do) work against their own self-
interest, opposing policies designed to benefit those with access to fewer resources. 
System-justification also influences levels of moral engagement; for instance, Wakslak et al. 
(2007) found that high system-justifying tendencies undercut support for wealth 
redistribution policies, and that this was mediated by a reduction in moral outrage. This 
mediation effect is cited as a key determinant of one of the outcomes of system-
justification: as moral outrage is a critical driver of efforts to alleviate the impacts of 
inequitable systems, a reduction in moral outrage results in  withdrawal of support for 
social change (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). System justification has also been linked to a 




7.1.2 System Justification and Climate Change 
A motivated social cognition approach to ideologies such as right-wing authoritarianism 
differs from traditional psychological accounts. While personality theorists typically think of 
such constructs as stable individual differences, a motivated social cognition approach 
assumes that various directional and non-directional motives influence the extent to which 
system-justifying tendencies are expressed.  Motives might be based on dispositional 
antecedents such as need for closure, or discomfort with ambiguity (Jost & Hunyady, 2005), 
and variation in these dispositions leads to substantial differences in the expression of 
system-justifying ideologies. Situational factors, including threats to existing political, social, 
and economic systems, and mortality salience, can also increase the expression of system-
justifying tendencies.  
 
These situational factors arguably make system-justification tendencies particularly 
relevant to climate change responses. First, responding effectively to climate change 
necessitates moving to a more sustainable, steady state economy, away from the prevailing 
Western economic system predicated on continuous economic growth (Jackson, 2009). 
Acknowledgement that climate change is a serious issue may also entail the recognition and 
acceptance that a fundamental shift in existing systems must occur. Second, 
acknowledgement of climate change as a serious threat might entail the recognition that 
life is fragile, prompting mortality salience. As both situations threaten the status quo, we 
might reasonably expect individuals with greater system-justifying tendencies to be 
motivated to disavow the role that humans play in changing the climate.  Indeed, Feygina, 
Jost and Goldsmith (2010) found that general system-justifying tendencies were linked to 
environmental denial and less commitment to pro-environmental behaviour in the United 
States. 
 
Because we know that opinions about the causes of climate change are strongly linked to 
political preferences (which in turn we expect to be related to system-justifying 
tendencies), we need to establish whether opinions and system justification are related 
independent of political preferences (Hypothesis 1).  Further, if system justification 
functions to reduce negative affect and moral outrage, we should observe associations 
between high system-justifying tendencies and low levels of negative affect (Hypothesis 2) 




7.1.3 System Justification, Climate Change, and Policy Support 
So far in this thesis, I have focused on the outcomes and antecedents of two aspects of 
climate change response in particular: opinion-type and pro-environmental behaviour. But 
there is another climate change response that is particularly relevant in Australia and many 
other countries at the moment: responses to policies designed to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change. Levels of policy support among the general community are obviously 
important: they provide an indicator for political parties to know how far to push things. 
Politicians judge whether policies accord with the wishes, values, and priorities of their 
constituents, or whether they risk defeat at the next election by introducing broadly 
unpopular measures.  
 
At the time of writing, considerable debate ensues over the introduction and 
implementation of a carbon pricing scheme (popularly referred to as ‘the carbon tax’) by 
the (centre-left) Federal Labor Government. The carbon pricing scheme is a market-based 
mechanism in which the top 500 greenhouse gas-emitting companies in Australia are 
charged on a ‘per tonne of carbon-equivalent emissions’ basis. A central characteristic of 
the scheme is financial compensation for low- and middle-income households, designed to 
negate the financial impact of anticipated price-rises to energy-intensive products such as 
petrol and electricity.  This characteristic has led some commentators to suggest that the 
scheme represents a covert way to undermine free-market systems by redirecting wealth 
away from the private sector to the State (Riley, 2011). Others suggest that, because the 
scheme relies on a market-based mechanism, it represents a departure from the centre-left 
tradition of State intervention (e.g. "Did you know Gillard and Abbott agree on climate 
change?", 2012). Such discourse is arguably a strong situational factor under which system-
justifying tendencies are made salient. Therefore, we should expect support for carbon 
policy to be influenced by system-justifying tendencies, again above and beyond political 
voting intentions (Hypothesis 4). A further way to disentangle system-justifying tendencies 
with political preferences is by observing the influence of the message-bearer on policy 
support. That is, would levels of policy support for an equivalent carbon price policy vary if 




One other determinant of policy support is relevant in light of System Justification Theory. 
The compensation component to households was devised so that people on lower income 
levels in particular would be slightly better off even when factoring in anticipated price-
rises in the cost of living, whereas those on higher incomes would receive no compensation 
to combat price-rises. If system justification occurs as much for disadvantaged groups as it 
does for advantaged groups, we should expect levels of personal and household income to 
be unrelated to policy support, despite those on lower-incomes receiving greater assistance 
(Hypothesis 6).   
 
7.1.4 Social Dominance Theory, Climate Change, and Policy Support 
The compensation characteristic of Australia’s carbon pricing scheme is also relevant to 
Social Dominance Theory, introduced in Chapter 2. Under this approach, power hierarchies 
are maintained at a system level by ‘legitimising myths’: moral and intellectual justifications 
of the hierarchy. In Chapter 5, I argued that two attitudinal statements about the impacts 
of collective action on climate change (one concerning Australian job losses, and the other 
financial cost to Australia) were ‘moral justifications’ for inaction. A third (concerning 
hardship to individuals) I argued to reflect a genuine moral concern. If the former are 
indeed types of moral justifications, they can be thought of as synonymous with the 
hierarchy-enhancing legitimising myths proposed by Social Dominance Theory. If people 
perceive the carbon price compensation mechanism as a means to (covertly or otherwise) 
redistribute wealth, in that it compensates under-privileged groups to a greater extent than 
privileged groups, then we might expect to see the link between system-justifying 
tendencies mediated by these ‘moral justifications’ surrounding the supposed impacts of 
collective responses to climate change. While Bandura’s concept of moral justifications is 
used in an exclusively negative sense, Social Dominance Theory posits that there are also 
hierarchy-attenuating myths: those that promote equality and democracy, not in what is, 
but in what should be. If this is so, we might expect system-justification tendencies and 
policy support to be mediated by evaluations of the potential positive corollaries of climate 
change policy action (Hypothesis 7). 
 
 To further test the idea that legitimising myths are synonymous with moral justifications, 
we should see system-legitimising tendencies influence support for policy via a reduction in 
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moral engagement (Hypothesis 8). The same mediating influence of moral engagement 
should apply for negative affect (Hypothesis 9). 
 
I select three system-justification ideologies for investigation: economic system 
justification, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. The second and 
third are selected because they are well-established constructs that relate to concepts of 
fairness, equality, morality, and inter-group tolerance, all of which have theoretical 
corollaries for climate change responses. The first is selected because of the ramifications 
to the overarching economic system that climate change policy in particular represents. 
Each ideology can be summarised as follows: 
 
Economic System Justification (ESJ). ESJ can be summarised as a tendency to view 
economic inequality as natural, inevitable, and legitimate, and to view economic outcomes 
as fair and deserved (Jost & Thompson, 2000).  
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). RWA is an endorsement of conventional traditions 
and established authorities. It can be thought of as a continuum from extreme 
authoritarianism on the high end, where the preference is for uniformity and group 
authority, to extreme libertarianism on the low end, where the preference is for diversity 
and individual autonomy (Altemeyer, 1988; Stenner, 2009). High RWA individuals value 
traditional beliefs, morality, and lifestyles, while those low in RWA value change and 
innovation.  
 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). SDO refers to the preference for relationships to be 
hierarchical rather than equal, and for advocating the right of more powerful groups to 
dominate weaker groups. Social dominance relies on the systematic distribution of 
resources (which may be cultural, financial, or environmental) to favour dominant groups at 
the expense of subordinate groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Despite its apparent 
similarities with RWA, the two are conceptually and empirically distinct (Duckitt & Sibley, 




7.1.5 Research Questions 
For the following research questions, ‘system-justifying tendencies’ are indicated by higher 
levels of RWA, SDO, and ESJ. 
H1: System-justifying tendencies will predict opinion-type above and beyond political voting 
intentions. 
H2: System-justifying tendencies will be associated with reduced negative affect, even 
when controlling for opinion-type. 
H3: System-justifying tendencies will be associated with reduced moral engagement, even 
when controlling for opinion-type. 
H4: System-justifying tendencies will predict support for carbon policy, above and beyond 
political voting intentions. 
H5: Question-framing will influence levels of support for a carbon policy. 
H6: Personal and household levels of income will be unrelated to policy support. 
H7: System-justifying tendencies will influence support for policy through moral 
justifications (legitimising myths).  
H8: System-justifying tendencies will influence support for policy through reduction in 
moral engagement. 




Data were drawn exclusively from the T2 survey. As noted in Chapter 3, the data collection 
period of the T2 survey straddled the official announcement of the Federal Government’s 
carbon pricing scheme, although the details of the carbon tax were made public 11 days 
prior to the questionnaire through the unveiling of the Federal Government’s Clean Energy 
Future policy (Australian Government, 2011). Therefore it is assumed the carbon pricing 





Items measuring system-justifying tendencies were asked at the beginning of the survey, 
before questions specific to climate change, so that responses would not be subject to 
priming effects (refer to Appendix B).34  
 
Economic System Justification (ESJ). ESJ was measured by the 17 items of Jost and 
Thompson’s (2000) Economic System Justification Scale (e.g. Economic positions are 
legitimate reflections of people’s achievements). Responses were measured on 9-point 
Likert scales from “1 = Strongly disagree” to “9 = Strongly agree” (alpha = .78). 
 
Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA). RWA was measured by six items based on Heaven’s  
(1984) short-form Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (e.g. Our customs and national 
heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to 
show greater respect for them).  Responses were measured on 5-point Likert scales from “1 
= Strongly disagree” to “5 = Strongly agree” (alpha = .74). 
 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO).  SDO was measured by eight items based on Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle’s (1994) Social Dominance Orientation scale (e.g. Some 
groups of people are simply inferior to others). Respondents were asked whether they had a 
positive or negative feeling toward each statement. Responses were measured on 7-point 
scales from “1 = Very negative” to “7 = Very positive” (alpha = .87).35   
 
Policy Support. A split-sample design was incorporated to test for the effects of question-
framing on support for climate change policy. Approximately half of respondents were 
asked a question with direct reference to the Federal Government: How much do you 
support or oppose the Government's plan to reduce Australia's carbon emissions by putting 
a price on carbon emitted by industry? The other half of respondents were asked a 
generically worded question designed to reflect the characteristics of the Federal 
                                                          
34
 In this respect what we are measuring are individual system-justifying tendencies independent of 
situational variables (i.e. climate change) that might bolster system-justifying tendencies. See 
Discussion for further implications.    
35
 Response formats vary between the three system-justifying tendencies as the original 
measurement scales were retained. 
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Government’s carbon policy, but without direct reference to the Government:  Would you 
support or oppose putting a price on carbon emitted by industry if the money raised was 
used to ensure low and middle income households are fully compensated for energy price 
rises? Responses were recorded on a scale from “1 = Strongly oppose” to “7 = Strongly 
support”. 
 
Voting Intentions. Voting intentions were measured in preference to previous voting 
behaviour to account for the possibility that the proposed carbon price announcement had 
influenced respondents’ party political preferences. Respondents were asked Which 
political party do you intend to vote for in the next Federal election? A list of the major 
parties followed, along with the options Other, Prefer not to say, and I have no idea. 
Respondents selecting one of these three options were excluded from analyses broken 
down by voting intentions.  
 
The major Federal Australian political parties represent a range of positions in relation to 
policy action of climate change (Tranter, 2011). The stance of each political party over the 
2010-2011 time period can be summarised as follows: 
 Labor party: Moderate market-based action on climate change 
Greens party: Strong market-based and government intervention action on climate 
 change 
Liberal party: Cautious, market-based action, but with notable scepticism within the 
party, and strong opposition to Labor’s carbon pricing mechanism 
National party: Cautious, market-based action, but with notable scepticism within 
the party, and strong opposition to Labor’s carbon pricing mechanism  
 
Household and Personal Income. Household and personal income were measured by 
asking people to select the category which corresponded to (i) their personal income level 
per week, and (ii) their household income per year. Categories were based on those used 
for reporting purposes by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. A Prefer not to say option was 
also given. Respondents selecting this category were excluded from only those analyses 




Negative Affect. Negative affect was measured by combining responses to four descriptors 
to the item How does the issue of climate change make you feel? Angry, ashamed, guilty 
and fearful. This combination was based on the outcome of the factor analysis to emotional 
descriptors detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Moral Engagement. Moral engagement was measured by combining and averaging two 
items: I feel a moral duty to do something about climate change and I feel it is my ethical 
responsibility to change my individual behaviour to combat climate change (α = .77). 
Responses were measured on 5-point Likert scales.  
 
Moral Justifications and Legitimising Myths. Based on the results in Chapter 5, I suggested 
that the following statements, originally termed ‘social attitudes to climate change’, also 
function as ‘moral justifications’: Responding to climate change will cost Australia a lot of 
money and Trying to do something about climate change will mean a lot of people lose their 
jobs. A further statement was hypothesised to represent a moral attitude: Climate change 
will result in financial hardship for many people. A further social attitude that could serve as 
a moral justification was also added: There’s nothing Australia can do about climate change 
that will make a meaningful difference. Three positive social attitude statements were 
included to test for their relevance as hierarchy-attenuating myths: Doing something about 
climate change is an opportunity to be part of something bigger than ourselves, The 
challenge of climate change will provide people with a sense of purpose, Climate change will 
foster greater community spirit and connectedness, and Climate change may mean that 
wealth and resources end up being distributed more fairly. Responses were measured on 5-
point Likert scales from “1 = Strongly disagree” to “5 = Strongly agree”.  
 
Certainty. Certainty was used as a proxy for opinion-type when a continuous measure was 
needed (see Chapter 5). Certainty that climate change is happening was measured by a 
sliding scale with the instruction Move the cursor to the place on the slide which best 
represents how sure you are that humans contribute to climate change. The scale was 
labelled “1 = Sure that humans don’t” to “100 = Sure that human do”. A reference to the 





The correlations between the system justification variables of right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), and economic system justification (ESJ) (Table 
33) indicate they are related, but separate constructs. As such they were kept separate for 
the remaining analyses. Responses to individual scale items for SDO, RWA, and ESJ are 
included as Appendix G. 
Table 33. Correlations between system-justifying tendency scales (N = 5030). 
 ESJ RWA SDO 
ESJ 1   
RWA .39** 1  
SDO .57** .19** 1 
* p < .01 
** p < .001 
 
H1: System-justifying tendencies will predict opinion-type above and beyond political voting 
intentions. 
All opinion-types, on average, rated above the midpoint for RWA, but below the midpoint 
on SDO. Average ratings for ESJ were around the midpoint for all opinion-types (Figure 20 
to Figure 22). There were significant differences of moderate effect for each of the system-
justifying tendencies across opinion-type, with slight variations in how the groups differed 
across each (F statistics are included within figures). The human-induced opinion-type had 
significantly lower levels of RWA, SDO, and ESJ than all other opinion-types. There were no 
significant differences in mean ESJ scores for the deny, don’t know, and natural groups. The 
deny group had significantly higher RWA scores than all other groups, followed by the 
natural group, and the don’t know group. The deny and don’t know groups had the highest 












Figure 22. Social Dominance Orientation by opinion-type (N = 5030). 
 
The relationships between system-justifying tendencies and opinion-type were assessed by 
political party support (as measured by party political voting intentions), as it was expected 
that system-justifying tendencies would be related to voting intentions. Certainty in 
anthropogenic climate change was used as a proxy for opinion-type. As Table 34 shows, 
system-justifying tendencies were negatively and moderately related to certainty in 
anthropogenic climate change. When these correlations are broken down by voting 
intentions, the relationships drop, but remain significant. This suggests two things: first, 
system-justifying tendencies are related to party political preferences; second, the 
influence of system-justifying tendencies on climate change opinion also operates 










Table 34. Correlations between certainty that climate change is anthropogenic and 
system-justifying tendencies, grouped by voting intention (N = 5030). 
 All 
respondents 
Labor             
(n = 1031) 
Liberal            
(n = 1759) 
Nationals        
(n = 176) 
Greens           
(n = 438) 
Certainty M = 58.27 
SD = 29.19 
M = 69.69 
SD = 28.65 
M = 42.05 
SD = 30.47 
M = 21.51 
SD = 22.49 
M = 80.12 
SD = 26.75 
ESJ -.32** -.21** -.17** -.18* -.20** 
RWA -.31** -.15** -.17** -.26** -.21** 
SDO -.29** -.26** -.19** -.21** -.16** 
** p < .001 
 
     
 
7.3.1 System-justifying Tendencies, Negative Affect, and Moral 
Engagement 
H2: System-justifying tendencies will be associated with reduced negative affect, even when 
controlling for opinion-type. 
H3: System-justifying tendencies will be associated with reduced moral engagement, even 
when controlling for opinion-type. 
To assess whether system-justifying tendencies reduce both negative affect and moral 
engagement, the associations between system-justifying variables, negative affect, and 
moral engagement were broken down by opinion-type (Table 35).    
System-justifying tendencies were negatively related to negative affect, as one would 
expect given the association between opinion-type and negative affect found in Chapter 3. 
When these associations are broken down by opinion-type, the results are mixed. There are 
some weak to moderate associations for the deny, natural and human-induced opinion-
types, but most striking is the associations between high levels of RWA and low levels of 
negative affect, particularly for those of the don’t know opinion-type.  For moral 
engagement, again there are moderate negative relationships with system-justifying 
tendencies. When this is broken down by opinion-type, most relationships remain 
significant, particularly for levels of SDO and ESJ for the human-induced opinion-type, and 




Table 35. Correlations between climate change system-justifying tendencies, negative 




M = 2.79     
SD = 0.82 
Deny 
M = 2.43     
SD = 0.86 
Don’t know 
M = 2.64     
SD = 0.66 
Natural 
M = 2.56     
SD = 0.79 
Human-
Induced 
M = 3.12     
SD = 0.74 
ESJ -.25** -.08 -.07 -.15** -.17** 
RWA -.23** -.22** -.39** -.18** -.08** 




M = 3.23     
SD = 0.95 
Deny 
M = 2.39     
SD = 0.95 
Don’t know 
M = 2.84 
SD = 0.58 
Natural 
M = 2.94     
SD = 0.89 
Human-
Induced 
M = 3.78     
SD = 0.75 
ESJ -.35** -.15** -.08 -.22** -.29** 
RWA -.27** -.25** -.19** -.16** -.13** 
SDO -.35** -.08   -.14* -.22** -.34** 
* p < .01 





7.3.2 System-justifying Tendencies and Policy Support 
H4: System-justifying tendencies will predict support for carbon policy, above and beyond 
political voting intentions. 
H5: Question-framing will influence levels of support for a carbon policy. 
H6: Personal and household levels of income will be unrelated to policy support. 
Figure 23 shows responses for the two climate change policy questions. There was a 
significant difference in support based on question framing, with the question phrased 
generically, and explicitly mentioning compensation to households, garnering slightly more 
support than when the question was phrased with relation to the Federal Government. 
Figure 23 also shows significant differences in support based on voting intention, with 
people intending to vote Greens and Labor offering stronger support than those intending 
to vote Liberal or National. The effect size was very large for the generically framed 
question (F (3, 1685) = 380.62, p < .001, η2 =.40), and amplified when the question was 
framed with reference to the Government (F (3, 1711) = 719.33, p < .001, η2 = .56). 
 
 
Figure 23. Effects of question framing on support for climate change policy, grouped by 




Table 36 shows that system-justifying tendencies were negatively and moderately related 
to policy support, regardless of framing. Levels of household and personal income had little 
influence over either policy support or system-justifying tendencies.  
 
Table 36. Correlations between climate change policy support, income levels, and system-
justifying tendencies (N = 5030). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Government Carbon 
Price 
      
2. Generic Carbon Price       
3. Household Income -.03 -.05*     
4. Personal Income -.05* -.07** .60**    
5. ESJ -.35** -.35** .08** .07**   
6. RWA -.34** -.27** -.08** -.05* .39**  
7. SDO -.29** -.33** .01 .05* .57** .20** 
* p < .01 




Table 37 shows that, when correlations between policy support and system-justifying 
tendencies are broken down by voting intentions, the relationships drop but remain 
significant in all but a few cases. This suggests that, for the most part, system-justifying 
tendencies predict support for climate change independently of party political preference. 
Of note however, is the effect of question framing on associations between system-
justifying tendencies and policy support for those intending to vote for the National party; 






Table 37. Correlations between climate change policy support and system-justifying 
tendencies, grouped by voting intention (N = 5030). 
 Government Carbon Price 
(Generic Carbon Price)  
Labor          
(n = 1031) 
Liberal      
(n = 1759) 
Nationals 
(n = 176) 
Greens     
(n = 438) 
ESJ -.28**          
(-.24**) 
-.16**         
(-.18**) 
-.39**      
(-.11) † 
-.15**     
(-.29**)† 
RWA -.12**          
(-.08) 
-.22**        
(-.08**)† 
-.39**      
(-.05) † 
-.21**     
(-.15**) 
SDO -.25**         
(-.31**) 
-.11**        
(-.19**)† 
-.27**      
(-.07) † 
-.19**     
(-.30**) 
* p < .01 
** p < .001 
† Significant differences between correlations due to question wording, based on zobs 
values (see Appendix H) 
  
 
7.3.3 The Mediating Influence of Moral Justifications and Moral 
Engagement on Policy Support 
H7: System-justifying tendencies will influence support for policy through moral 
justifications (legitimising myths).  
To test the mediating influence of moral justifications on the relationship between system-
justifying tendencies and policy support, the two policy questions were combined into one 
variable. The steps suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) to establish mediation were 
taken. Firstly, the system-justification variables were all significantly correlated with policy 
support (Table 36), establishing that there is an effect that may be mediated. Secondly, the 
system-justification variables were significantly correlated with the mediators (moral 
justifications) (as indicated by the bivariate r values in Table 38). A regression was then 
performed to test the effects of moral justifications on policy support, when holding the 
system-justification variables constant. Table 38 shows the addition of the moral 
justification variables led to a significant increase in R2, explaining an additional 28% of 
variance in policy support. Further, the coefficients for the system-justification variables 
were reduced at Step 2. While higher levels of agreement with the statements relating to 
money and jobs predicted reduced policy support, agreement with the statement regarding 
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individual hardship did not reach significance. By contrast, higher levels of agreement with 
statements about being part of something bigger, providing purpose, fairer wealth 
distribution and sense of community predicted higher policy support. This result supports a 
hypothesis that the link between system-justifying tendencies and policy support is partially 
mediated by moral justifications and legitimising myths. 
 
Table 38. Hierarchical regression of the effect of moral justifications on Policy support (N 
= 5030). 
Model r   
Step 1 ESJ  -.18**  
RWA  -.20**  
SDO  -.15**  
R2 = .16 
Step 2 ESJ -.34** -.07**  
RWA -.29** -.05**  
SDO -.29** -.02  
Nothing Australia Can Do -.41** -.25**  
Cost Australia Money -.34** -.03*  
Job Losses -51** -.17**  
Financial Hardship .06** .01    
Sense of Community .37** .03*  
Part of Something Bigger .55** .20**  
Fairer Wealth Distribution .26** .06**  
Sense of Purpose .44** .05*  
R2 = .44 
R2 Change = .28, Sig F Change < .0005 
* p < .01 







H8: System-justifying tendencies will influence support for policy through reduction in moral 
engagement. 
The process was repeated to test the mediating influence of moral engagement on system-
justifying tendencies and policy support. The system-justification variables were all 
significantly correlated with policy support (refer Table 36), establishing that there is an 
effect that may be mediated. The system-justification variables were significantly 
correlated with the mediator (moral engagement) (Table 39). A regression was then 
performed to test the effect of moral engagement on policy support, when holding the 
system-justification variables constant. Table 39 shows the addition of moral engagement 
led to a significant increase in R2, explaining an additional 15% of variance in policy support. 
Further, the coefficients for the system-justification variables were reduced at Step 2. This 
supports a hypothesis that the link between system-justifying tendencies and policy 
support is partially mediated by levels of moral engagement. 
 
Table 39. Hierarchical regression of the effect of Moral Engagement on Policy support (N 
= 5030). 
Model      r        
Step 1 ESJ  -.18**  
RWA  -.20**  
SDO  -.15**  
R2 = .16 
Step 2 ESJ -.34** -.12**  
RWA -.29** -.13**  
SDO -.29** -.05*  
Moral Engagement .52** .43**  
R2 = .31 
R2 Change = .15, Sig F Change < .0005 
* p < .01 







H9: System-justifying tendencies will reduce negative affect through a reduction in moral 
engagement. 
The process was once more repeated to test the mediating influence of moral engagement 
on system-justifying tendencies and negative affect (Table 40). The addition of moral 
engagement led to a significant increase in R2, explaining an additional 8% of variance in 
levels of negative affect. The coefficients for system-justifying variables were reduced at 
Step 2, with the exception of SDO. This lends tentative support to a hypothesis that the link 




Table 40. Hierarchical regression of the effect of Moral Engagement on negative affect (N 
= 5030).† 
Model              r   
Step 1 ESJ  -.15**  
RWA  -.16**  
SDO  -.06*  
R2 = .09 
Step 2 ESJ -.25** -.08**  
RWA -.23** -.09**  
SDO -.17** .05**  
Moral Engagement .49** .46**  
R2 = .17 
R2 Change = .08, Sig F Change < .0005 
† 
All Constants were significant 
* p < .01 






The results presented in this chapter suggest that underlying ideological drivers are behind 
the observed relationships between political preference and climate change responses. 
Further, support for policy action on climate change is derived not only from the 
orientation and policy positions of the political parties people identify with, but are 
influenced by people’s underlying ideologies. System-justifying tendencies influence 
opinion-type and pro-environmental behaviour independently of voting intentions, though 
voting intentions remain important. Further, system-justifying tendencies are associated 
with reduced negative affect and moral engagement, the latter of which also reduces 
support for policy action on climate change.    
 
The influence of voting intention alone on policy support was strong, suggesting that policy 
responses serve political identification functions. But there were also appreciable effects 
independent of voting intention, indicating that system-justification functions also operate. 
It is tempting to deduce from this that political identification is simply the expression of 
underlying system-justification tendencies, but the effects found for question framing 
suggest that both operate independently.  One explanation is that party political 
identification is activated when who is delivering the message is made salient, whereas 
system-justification tendencies are accessed when deliberating on the content of the 
message. There was one curious exception to this; for those who intended to vote for the 
National party, the influence of system-justifying tendencies on policy support was much 
greater when the policy question was framed with specific reference to the Government. 
This suggests that system-justifying tendencies are triggered for these people when the 
Government is mentioned. Why should this occur for this voting group and not others? The 
National Party has its historical roots in country Australia, and is still considered the party 
that represents the needs of rural citizens. There is considerable distrust of Government 
(especially Labor governments) in rural Australia (Leviston, Price, & Bates, 2011). Further, 
recent Australian research suggests that, while most rural Australians accept climate 
change as a reality, there are high levels of distrust in the Government when it comes to 
how to address it (Buys, Aird, Van Megen, Miller, & Sommerfeld, 2012).  It is possible that 
the effects for question framing reflect dissatisfaction with and even suspicion of the 
government and its perceived vested interests, which may make system-justifying 




A perplexing issue for the Federal Government in defending the announcement of their 
carbon pricing scheme was why people reacted so negatively to it when repeated attempts 
were made to communicate its financial compensation component. This was coupled with 
assurances to the electorate that most people, and especially those on low incomes, would 
be financially better off as a result (Australian Government, 2011). In the current analysis, 
opposition to the policy question framed in relation to the Government can be explained 
with reference to people’s views on the Government (as a whole) at the time; but it is less 
evident why there was such opposition to the generically framed policy question.  Policy 
support was largely unrelated to personal and household income, suggesting that financial 
self-interest had little influence over support for redistribution policies. This is consistent 
with a system-justification approach that people do not necessarily act in accordance with 
their own best interests, especially when tendencies towards system legitimacy are high.36  
 
The system-justifying ideologies tested here had clear relationships with opinion-type and 
policy support. But the patterns varied between ideologies (i.e. between SDO, RWA, and 
ESJ) and between opinion-type, which makes specific interpretations tricky. What does 
emerge clearly however is that there are two general sets of responses: one relating to high 
system-justifying tendencies, the other to low system-justifying tendencies.  
 
High system-justification appears to be related to the following confluence of 
characteristics: preferences for right-of-centre political parties, lower levels of negative 
affect, moral disengagement, and strong opposition to climate change policy. Traditionally, 
the characteristics of RWA include trust in authorities and nationalism, patriotism, and 
intolerance of difference. Foreigners, outgroups, and minorities in general are less favoured 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988).  Climate change is of course impervious to national 
boundaries, indifferent to patriotism, and refuses to yield to authority. But action on 
climate change is also explicitly (and perhaps implicitly, as is addressed in the next chapter) 
associated with Green political parties and the Green movement in general. The Green 
movement arguably epitomises ‘difference’ within Western societies (Crompton & Kasser, 
                                                          
36
 It should be noted that there is significant confusion over the compensation mechanism contained 
in the carbon pricing scheme, and my analysis does not preclude the perception that compensation 
will inadequately absorb projected rises in the cost of living. Nevertheless, the associations between 
system-justification variables and income variables were also negligible. 
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2009). Further, if the victims of climate change are anticipated to be not us but others, in 
far away non-Western countries (as previous research suggests, e.g. O’Neill & Nicholson-
Cole, 2009), then individuals high in RWA are unlikely to become morally engaged in the 
plight of these people. Even more, if these groups are disproportionately disadvantaged by 
the impacts of climate change, then legitimising myths can be employed to rationalise that 
these victims are deserving of the consequences. High SDO has also been found to correlate 
with prejudice based on nationalism (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).   
 
Taking this line of argument further, another characteristic of individuals high in RWA is a 
tendency toward ‘anti-introspection’, including a tendency to avoid the imaginative, and a 
higher propensity to believe in the mystical determinants of fate (Adorno et al., 1950). 
Perhaps individuals high in RWA find it more difficult to imagine and/or anticipate 
alternative future scenarios arising from climate change, and hence are less prone to 
negative emotions about it. Further, they may see anthropogenic climate change as an 
affront to the notion that humans are not ultimately in control of the planet’s destiny. It is 
of interest that RWA was particularly high for those of the don’t know opinion-type (r = -
.39), perhaps reflecting a tendency to avoid cogitating on climate change in order to avoid 
negative affect. This supports previous findings linking increased system justification to 
increased desires to avoid learning about relevant issues when the information is negative 
(Shepherd & Kay, 2012). Those high in RWA and SDO are also behaviourally less flexible, 
and are more resistant to change (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), meaning that policy designed to 
foster less reliance on traditional energy sources might be resisted.  
 
Low system-justification appears to be related to a different confluence of characteristics:  
preferences for left-of-centre political parties, higher levels of negative affect, moral 
engagement, and strong support for climate change policy. Of particular interest for this 
last point was the importance of system-legitimising tendencies within the human-induced 
group. Also, the highest correlation between system-justifying tendencies and moral 
engagement was for the human-induced opinion-type with social dominance orientation (r 
= -.34). Previous research tells us that a reduction in moral outrage results in withdrawal of 
support for social change (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Consequently, we should expect moral 
engagement to have the correspondingly opposite effect: to drive social change in order to 
ameliorate inequitable systems. System-justifying tendencies are overcome when the 
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threats and costs of maintaining the status quo become too great (Jost & Hunyady). It is at 
this point that support for alternative systems gathers momentum. If enough support is 
gained, a new system becomes inevitable, because it is endorsed by enough people to 
make it normative. Previous research suggests that when people think a new system is 
inevitable, they immediately begin to justify and rationalise the new system at the expense 
of the old one (Kay et al., 2002). It could be argued that those of the human-induced 
opinion, who generally have low system-justifying dispositions to begin with, and who 
identify politically with parties associated with progressive economic and social systems 
(such as the Greens), have begun to modify their behaviour, and are driving the shift to a 
new norm. 
 
How might such a shift work at a system level? Opinions about climate change, influenced 
by system-justifying tendencies, may be perpetuated and entrenched through legitimising 
myths. As previously noted, such myths are employed not only by those with high system-
justifying tendencies, but also for those who wish to promote equality and democracy. The 
results suggest that two social attitudes to the perceived consequences of climate change 
action: that there is nothing Australia can do to make a meaningful difference, and that it 
will cost a lot of people their jobs, mediated the link between high system-justification 
tendencies and low policy support. We can think of these two attitudes as potential 
hierarchy-enhancing myths.37 There was no such mediation for the attitude that action on 
climate change would mean financial hardship to people, suggesting that this argument is 
not deployed for the same legitimising function (this is perhaps not surprising, given that 
financial hardship might be something that people low in system justification would be 
particularly attuned to, and policies containing low-income compensation looked upon 
favourably). By contrast, the attitude that responding to climate change provides people an 
opportunity to be part of something bigger, mediated the link between low system-
justifying tendencies and high policy support. To a lesser extent, the same was true for the 
attitudes that responding would provide people with a sense of purpose and community 
connectedness, and result in fairer wealth distribution. These can be thought of as potential 
hierarchy-attenuating legitimising myths. 
 
                                                          
37
 A third social attitude: that it will cost Australia a lot of money, was marginally significant. 
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If we consider system-justifying tendencies as ideological justifications that are inherent 
within individuals to a greater or lesser extent, I propose that these ideologies are 
expressed through social attitudes about the impacts of climate change action. These 
attitudes function to morally excuse inaction (e.g. ‘we can’t rush into this carbon tax, it will 
cost jobs, think of the suffering’) or provide a justification for action (e.g. ‘moving to a green 
economy will mean everyone gets to be a part of a fairer society’). As these attitudes are 
repeated and refined within societal discourse (where they are subject to false consensus 
and pluralistic ignorance effects) they compete to become ‘true’ legitimising myths: 
generally accepted beliefs about the world, whether objectively true or not (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999). The extent to which enhancing or attenuating myths prevail should in turn 




A motivated social cognition account of system-justification tendencies allows for the 
possibility that social influences external to the self can lead to substantial variations in the 
expression of system-justifying ideologies within individuals on different occasions (Jost et 
al., 2003). The system justification lens is useful, as it allows us to theorise about 
anticipated consequences of system justification on an issue such as climate change. It also 
helps explain the increasing polarisation on climate change evidenced in countries like 
Australia that has not occurred in other Western democracies, such as the UK and 
Germany. Nevertheless the results presented here are static rather than dynamic,38 
therefore it can only be concluded with certainty that differences in system-legitimising 
tendencies between individuals are important; it is still possible that the relationships are 
due to stable individual trait differences. As such it is important to test whether exposure to 
climate change information enhances system-justifying tendencies in certain individuals, 
and the specific conditions under which this occurs. Similarly, it would be interesting to test 
mindset priming techniques that make system-justifying tendencies salient, to investigate 
subsequent variations in moral responses. Such tests would lend weight for the palliative 
functions of system-legitimising tendencies. Further, future research should incorporate 
system justification ideologies beyond the three examined here. 
 
                                                          
38
 System-justification measures were not included in the T1 survey. 
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In conclusion, system-justifying ideologies appear to influence responses to climate change. 
But party political preferences and identification are also important, as evidenced by the 
influence of question framing on policy support, and the large correspondence between 
voting behaviour, voting intention, and opinion-type. A motivated cognition approach 
posits that people form opinions about new information by accessing pre-existing sub-sets 
of knowledge, rules, and beliefs. In the next chapter I explore whether system-justifying 





CHAPTER 8. CLIMATE CHANGE ASSOCIATIONS  
 
So far, I have established that people’s responses to climate change are linked to a myriad 
of other factors, such as political preferences, ideological variables, moral engagement, 
consensus estimates, and so on. Many of these factors are ostensibly unrelated to climate 
change. I have argued that these links exist because responses serve important social and 
psychological functions for individuals (such as to reduce guilt and other negative feelings, 
and bolster social support and self-esteem). These functions shape our reasoning process, 
and this reasoning process can be partially revealed by responses to self-report survey 
items. But the functions served by our responses often lie outside our conscious awareness 
(Kruglanski, 1999). Responses to particular items in a survey can be carefully considered, 
reconsidered, and revised, perhaps to make sure the answer is consistent with previous 
answers, or to cast ourselves in a good light (a self-presentational function in itself!). As 
such, direct self-reporting methods cannot fully capture more immediate, implicit, and 
automatic processes that occur when presented with a stimulus such as climate change.  To 
overcome these issues, a more indirect method of analysing people’s responses to climate 
change is required.  One such method is to examine the associations people make with 
climate change. 
  
In this chapter I investigate associations with climate change in order to (i) explore the 
types of prior knowledge people draw on to make sense of climate change, (ii) test the 
extent to which these associations are personal or impersonal in nature, (iii) test whether 
proximal and distal defences are in evidence, and (iv) investigate affective responses 
surrounding these associations. The chapter is comprised of two parts. The first part 
presents results from a word-elicitation task from the first national survey.  The second part 
details a workshop where actual images based on the common associations from the word-
elicitation task were presented to participants. A thematic analysis of workshop group 
discussions elucidates how these associations shape people’s responses to climate change.  
 
8.1.1 Associations and Climate Change 
Several characteristics of climate change make association testing pertinent. Along with the 
scale, magnitude, and uncertainty surrounding the effects of climate change, among the 
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most defining characteristic of climate change is its intangibility. Climate change cannot be 
directly seen, smelt, heard, or touched. In this respect it exists in the realm of the 
conceptual, as its existence is beyond the resources of the majority to be verified by 
‘everyday’ means (O’Neill & Hulme, 2009). Perhaps because of this intangibility, people find 
it difficult to conceptualise the risks involved with climate change (Budescu, Broomell, & 
Por, 2009; Whitmarsh, 2009), and thinking about climate change consequently depends on 
value-laden judgements about the nature and distribution of the perceived risks it poses 
(Baer & Risbey, 2009). While humans are not accustomed to dealing with threats of such 
scale, magnitude, uncertainty, and intangibility, we have a range of heuristic devices at our 
disposal that can be deployed when trying to make sense of something unfamiliar. One 
such device is to think about new things by making reference to what is already known, or 
what has already been experienced. Association, or the pairing of two discrete stimuli, 
objects, or thoughts (so that thinking, observing, or being exposed to one will lead to 
thoughts about the other), captures this historical reference sense-making process 
(Deutsch & Strack, 2010).  
 
8.1.2 Associations and Motivated Social Cognition 
From a motivated reasoning perspective, prior knowledge is important in determining what 
beliefs and rules people access in the face of new information. This prior knowledge is 
called upon to form cognitive representations (Kunda, 1990). Rules and beliefs can also 
constrain motivated shifts in opinions and attitudes (Kunda, 1990). In the case of climate 
change, if we want to, say, avoid performing the difficult and inconvenient behaviours 
needed to combat a large problem, or if we want to avoid feeling guilty, we might be 
motivated (albeit unconsciously) to draw upon a sub-set of pre-existing knowledge that 
disavows the personal relevance of climate change, and to favour information consistent 
with the notion that it is “somebody else’s problem”, or that it doesn’t exist at all. Similarly, 
if we take motivated reasoning as a form of implicit emotion regulation, we might expect 
people to be drawn to associations that assuage negative affect and maximise positive 
affect (Westen et al., 2006). Again, we might expect people to search their prior knowledge 
selectively for associations that are less troubling, or less threatening to the self. Westen et 
al. (2006) argue that people may implicitly approach or avoid judgements based on their 
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emotional associations, but explicit processes, notably suppression and distraction, may 
also be employed.39   
 
From a moral agency perspective, one of the ways we morally disengage is by reducing 
identification with the targets of harmful acts (Bandura, 1990). This can occur through a 
process of blaming and/or dehumanising victims. If the target of a harmful act is 
dehumanised, vicariously aroused personal distress and self-censure is avoided. The more 
that victims are perceived to be dissimilar to self, the less chance that empathetic 
emotional distress will be felt (Bandura, 1991).  With climate change, moral disengagement 
might be accomplished by displacing the harmful impacts of climate change onto people 
who are less similar to us: for example, to those in countries remote to our own. Or the 
perceived victims might not be human at all, but insensate and/or remote elements of the 
natural environment.  
 
Displacing the impacts of climate change onto remote locations also accords with terror 
management perspectives of proximal and distal defence mechanisms.  Working from such 
a perspective, Dickinson (2009) theorises that thinking about climate change is enough to 
make our mortality salient, and consequently we employ a host of distal and proximal 
defences that serve to assuage anxieties associated with this mortality salience. Such 
defences aren’t necessarily consciously accessible to the individual, but may work at an 
automatic, sub-conscious level. Proximal defences involve both cognitive distortions and 
active suppression that push the immediate problem to a distant future. With relation to 
climate change, this may manifest in a tendency to project the impacts of climate change 
into the far distant future so it no longer represents a personal danger, or to actively deny 
the existence of the problem altogether (Dickinson, 2009). Distal defences, by contrast, are 
thought to occur in the absence of negative affect or physiological arousal. Such defences 
include self-esteem bolstering, increased antagonism towards out-groups, increased 
support for strong political leaders, and even increases in consumption (Kasser & Sheldon, 
                                                          
39
 Whether associations are the product of explicit or implicit processes is a point of some 
contention. Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Poweu and Kardes (1986) conceptualise attitudes as based on 
object-evaluation associations in memory, which are often activated automatically, or unconsciously, 
when an attitude object is perceived.  Such ‘automaticity’ implies that associations may be ‘implicit’ 
in the sense that they are very fast, often unintentional, uncontrollable, impulsive and unconscious. 
However, diverging empirical evidence exists regarding the extent to which automatic evaluative 
judgements and influences can be recognised and controlled (Deutsch & Strack, 2010).    
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2000; Solomon et al., 1991). With regards to climate change, Dickinson suggests that such 
defences might manifest as, for example, a devaluation and marginalisation of 
environmental groups, an increase in conspicuous consumption, and enhanced support for 
politicians with similar worldviews to those of the individual. 
 
The following two studies test whether these motivated social cognition processes are 
revealed in people’s associations with climate change. Specifically, I want to examine the 
prior knowledge people draw on to make sense of climate change, to examine how 
personally relevant these associations are, and to investigate what sort of emotions attend 
these associations. 
 
8.2 Part 1: Word-elicitation Task: Images and People 
Associated with Climate Change  
Part 1 of this chapter details the word-elicitation task incorporated into the T1 national 
survey. The purpose of the task was to explore the types of prior knowledge people access 
to form cognitive representations of climate change, to see if these representations were 
personal in nature, and to investigate levels of affect surrounding these associations. It also 
investigated whether (and which) associations with climate change are unique to 
Australians. 
 
8.2.1 Previous Work on Associations with Climate Change 
The most comprehensive research to date on associations with and representations of 
climate change comes from the US and the UK. Leiserowitz (2006) conducted a survey of 
673 people in the US where people were asked to provide the first thought or word that 
came to mind when they heard the words “global warming”. The top eight categories, 
accounting for 97% of responses, were ‘melting ice’, ‘heat’, ‘nature’, ‘ozone’, ‘alarmists’ 
(images of devastation), ‘floods/sea-level rise’, ‘climate change’, and ‘naysayers’. 
Leiserowitz concluded that 61% of Americans provided associations that represented 
geographically and psychologically distant climate change impacts, and that vivid, concrete, 




In a cross-national comparison of people’s image associations with the words “climate 
change” (UK) and “global warming” (US), Lorenzoni, Leiserowitz and Doria (2006) found 
both differences and similarities between UK and US respondents. Images of ‘weather’ 
were more frequently cited by UK respondents, whereas imagery surrounding ‘ice melting’, 
‘natural disasters’, and ‘scepticism’ were more common among US respondents. UK 
respondents also had a higher proportion of respondents for whom an image did not come 
to mind. Across both countries, there was a prevalence of negative, psychologically distant 
associations, with personally relevant impacts and solutions rarely mentioned.  
 
Finally, a survey with Portuguese respondents (Cabecinhas, Lazaro, & Carvalho, 2008) on 
the social representations of climate change found that free-association mental images 
with climate change were rated emotionally negatively, and that news media were the 
main sources of climate change information for people. 
 
A systematic quantitative investigation of image associations with climate change with 
people in Australia was yet to be conducted at the time of writing. To my knowledge, no 
previous studies anywhere have asked people to describe the people they think of when 
they think of climate change (although this does not preclude the possibility that images 
and words could incorporate people). This is a critical oversight in light of the importance of 
personal relevance in promoting engagement and pro-environmental behaviour. 
 
8.2.2  Method 
Data were drawn from the word-elicitation task included in the T1 survey. To avoid priming, 
the word-elicitation task items appeared before all other questions in the survey. 
 
Associations. To test for image associations, half the respondents from the national survey 
were asked the following question: Who are the first 3 images that come to mind when you 
think about climate change?40 Up to three responses were recorded for each respondent. 
                                                          
40
   The other half of respondents was asked to select the first three words that came to mind. Image 
associations were deemed more suitable for implicit association testing than word associations given 
their valency had a stronger relationship with pro-environmental behaviour than image associations 
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To test for people associations, all respondents were then asked What are the first 3 people 
that come to mind when you think about climate change?  Up to three responses were 
recorded for each respondent.  
 
Affective Evaluation. To assess the affective evaluations of each association, respondents 
were asked the following: Using the following scale, how would you rate each of these 
images in relation to climate change? Responses were measured on a scale from ‘-5 = very 




Image Associations. Responses were coded by me and one other researcher. Semantically 
and thematically similar words, plurals, singular words, and misspellings were categorised 
under the most frequently occurring response (see Appendix I for an example of how 
different responses were combined). Ambiguous responses were put aside and later 
categorised in consultation with the other coder. After coding, a total of 215 distinct image 
categories emerged. Figure 24 shows the 15 most frequently nominated image categories 
(a list of all image categories is included as Appendix J).  The most commonly nominated 
image associations were ‘rising sea levels’, ‘drought’, and ‘melting ice caps’. The ‘ozone 
layer’ was the 15th most commonly nominated image.  
 
The seven most common images were similar across capital city respondents, regional 
respondents, and rurally located respondents, though there were some minor differences 
in rank orders for ‘pollution’, ‘hot weather’, and ‘don’t know’. Males were more likely to 
nominate ‘don’t know’, while women were more likely than men to nominate ‘hot weather’ 
(Table 41). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(see Table 43 further down). The results of the word association task with the other half of 




Figure 24. Most frequently nominated image associations (N = 2502). 
 
 
Table 41. Most frequently nominated image associations by location and gender              
(N = 2502). 
IMAGE Capital City 
(n = 1360) 
Regional Town 
(n = 735) 
Rural Town 
(n = 343) 
Male 
(n = 1307) 
Female 
(n = 1198) 
Rising sea 
levels 
209 (15.4%*) 128 (17.4%) 61 (17.8%) 237 (18.1%) 174 (14.5%) 
Drought 174 (12.8%) 92 (12.5%) 50 (14.6%) 159 (12.2%) 169 (14.1%) 
Melting ice 
caps 
147 (10.8%) 79 (10.7%) 25 (7.3%) 121 (9.3%) 135 (11.3%) 
Floods 121 (8.9%) 51 (6.9%) 25 (7.3%) 107 (8.2%) 93 (7.8%) 
Pollution 118 (8.7%) 48 (6.5%) 24 (7.0%) 103 (7.9%) 90 (7.5%) 
Hot weather 94 (6.9%) 50 (6.8%) 22 (6.4%) 72 (5.5%) 95 (7.9%) 
Don’t know 85 (6.3%) 46 (6.3%) 23 (6.7%) 99 (7.6%) 55 (4.6%) 




Figure 25 to Figure 28 provide breakdowns of the most commonly nominated images for 
each opinion-type.  
 
Figure 25. Most frequently nominated image associations for the ‘happening and human-
induced’ opinion-type (n = 1286). 
 
Figure 26. Most frequently nominated image associations for the ‘happening, but natural’ 




Figure 27. Most frequently nominated image associations for the ‘don’t know’ opinion-
type  (n = 89). 
 
 
Figure 28. Most frequently nominated image associations for the ‘deny’ opinion-type       
(n = 137). 
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Cross-National Comparisons. Table 42 provides a comparison of the top associations found 
in the current study with those found in recent studies from the UK and the US (Lorenzoni 
et al., 2006). While amalgamation of categories differed slightly, and there were several 
years separating the surveys, the main categories identified are comparable. Table 42 
shows both consistencies and differences across the three countries, with ‘drought’ being 
notably higher among Australian respondents than respondents from either the US or the 
UK. 
 
Table 42. Cross-national comparison of most commonly elicited associations with climate 
change in descending order. 
Australia (2010) US (2002)* UK (2003)* 
Rising sea levels Other Don't know 
Drought Don't know Other 
Melting ice caps Melting ice Weather 
Floods Heat Ozone 
Pollution Nature Global warming 
Hot weather Disaster Flood /sea level 
Don't know Flood/sea level Changing climate 
Water shortage Ozone Pollution 
Global warming Changing climate Disaster 
Vegetation Weather Rain 
Hot sun Pollution Ice melting 
Waterways Dry / desert Heat 
Rising temperatures Sceptic Nature 
Ozone layer Places Greenhouse 






People Associations. Figure 29 lists the most frequently occurring responses when asked to 
nominate people associated with climate change. ‘Nobody’ occupied the top spot, 
indicating that a significant proportion of respondents were unable to list at least three 
people they associated with climate change.41 Individual politicians occupied the seven 




Figure 29. Most commonly nominated person associations (N = 5036). 
 
All responses to people associations were grouped into one of four categories: ‘Politicians’, 
‘scientists’, ‘self/family’, and ‘other’. A breakdown of responses is shown in Figure 30. The 
majority of respondents (55%) nominated a politician (or politicians in general) as one of 
the three first people that came to mind when they thought of climate change. By contrast, 
only 5% selected a scientist (or science communicator). Only 8% nominated themselves or 
someone close to them (family member or friend). A chi-square test for independence 
indicated a small, significant association between opinion-type and people associations: 2 
(9, n=4384) = 72.3, p < .005, Cramer’s V = .07. Post-hoc comparisons showed those of the 
                                                          
41
 Blank fields were coded as ‘don’t know’s’. 
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deny and don’t know opinion-types were less likely to nominate a scientist, and more likely 
to nominate nobody. 
 
 
Figure 30. Person Associations by category based on all three responses (N = 5036). 
 
8.2.4 Affective Evaluations of Associations 
Table 43 shows the average affective valuations for image, word, and people associations, 
broken down by opinion-type. On average, images associated with climate change were 
negatively evaluated, while people and word associations were rated relatively neutrally 
overall (although the standard deviations suggest a mixture of moderately negatively and 
positively evaluated associations occurred within each category). Those of the human-
induced opinion-type had the most negative affect responses, with moderately negative 
affective evaluations given to image associations as a whole. The same opinion-type gave 











Deny Don’t know Natural 
Human-
induced 
Image Rating -1.60 (3.11) -0.60 (3.42) -1.02 (2.66) -0.88 (2.98) -2.31 (3.04) 
Person Rating 0.28 (2.74) -1.00 (3.20) -0.38 (2.39) -0.14 (2.67) 0.81 (2.64) 
Word Rating 0.32 (2.80) -0.80 (3.44) -0.62 (2.37) -0.19 (2.76) 0.94 (2.62) 
 
Figure 31 displays the average affective evaluations for the most commonly nominated 
image associations. ‘Melting ice caps’, ‘desert’, and ‘smoke stacks’ were given the most 









Figure 32 shows the mean affective rating for the 10 most commonly selected people, 
broken down by opinion-type. In general, affective ratings for Labor/Green politicians 
(Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, Penny Wong, Bob Brown, and Peter Garrett) were positive for the 
human-induced group and negative for the deny and natural groups. This pattern is 
reversed for Tony Abbott, leader of the Liberal/National party. Affective ratings for 
Malcolm Turnbull (Liberal party politician and former Liberal leader) are against the trend, 
with medium to strong affective ratings from all groups who selected him. Similarly, Barack 




Figure 32. Affective ratings of most common people associations by opinion-type             









Figure 33 displays the average affective evaluations for each type of people association. 
Both ‘scientists’ and ‘self/family’ groups were given positive evaluations on average, while 




Figure 33. Mean affective evaluations of each type of people association (N = 5036). 
 
When these affective ratings are broken down by opinion-type (Figure 34), there are 
differences in affective ratings, notably of ‘scientists’, who are rated most positively by 
those of the human-induced opinion-type (in fact, scientists are rated more favourably than 
self-family by this group), and ‘politicians’, who are most negatively rated by the deny 




Figure 34. Affect ratings of people groups by opinion-type (N = 5036). 
 
8.2.5 Discussion of the Word Elicitation Task 
The most frequently nominated image associations with climate change were ‘rising sea 
levels’, ‘drought’, ‘melting ice caps’, and ‘floods’. Other common image associations suggest 
that national weather events and climate are implicitly associated with climate change, 
though these associations differed according to opinion-type. By far the most frequently 
nominated type of people association was politicians, with some small differences based on 
opinion-type. Images were, in general, evaluated negatively, while scientists, and self and 
family were evaluated positively.  
  
 A comparison with UK and US association studies revealed many similarities across the 
three countries, with some notable exceptions. Australian respondents were more likely to 
be able to nominate an image association compared with UK and US respondents. It is 
unclear whether this is a product of the survey timing (the Australian survey was conducted 
seven years after the UK survey, and eight years after the US survey), the outcome of some 
national difference (i.e. Australians can more readily conjure up images about climate 
change), or the result of question-framing (i.e. people more readily produce associations 
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when asked specifically about images, rather than when asked simply to write down 
words).  
 
The other clear difference between countries was that drought featured prominently 
among Australian respondents. This high rating was consistent across location, suggesting 
that issues of climate-related drought are salient in the minds of all Australians, not just 
those from regional and rural areas. Australia has a long history of drought, including a 
widespread and severe drought throughout most of the 1990s. Other associations that 
figured prominently among Australian respondents were ‘hot sun’ and ‘hot weather’, 
possibly reflecting Australia’s warmer climate more generally (note that ‘heat’ appears in 
the US example, but is noticeably absent from the UK sample, where ‘rain’ appears tenth 
on the list!). ‘Floods’ was also prominent in the Australian sample, as were associations 
relating to water shortages. This perhaps reflects the (highly publicised) increasing 
pressures on potable water supplies in many areas of Australia, including urban centres. 
Other associations, including ‘rising sea levels’ and ‘melting ice caps’, were more remote, 
but reflect impacts more specifically associated with climate change.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, for many of those of the deny opinion-type, the association task 
presented an opportunity to dispute climate change’s existence (e.g. ‘scam’, ‘no such thing’, 
‘crap / rubbish’). Whether there was mental imagery accompanying these responses one 
can only speculate. Notwithstanding, associations like ‘hot sun’, ‘drought’, and ‘rising sea 
levels’ were also offered, possibly in response to media portrayals of climate change.  For 
those of the natural opinion-type, specific climate change impacts occurred more 
frequently, again suggesting that this opinion is distinct from those who dispute outright 
the existence of climate change. ‘Natural phenomenon’ figured highly, once more 
supporting the notion that, for this group, it is not necessarily the impacts of climate 
change which are under dispute, but the cause.  
 
The inability to nominate an association was common (as designated by ‘don’t know’ 
responses), suggesting that, for many, it is difficult to construct mental representations of 
climate change. Those who think of climate change as human-induced were more often 
able to nominate an association. It does not necessarily follow that these representations 
were accurate however.  The prevalence of people nominating the ozone layer, for 
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instance, suggests that significant conflation of the two issues persists, and it is interesting 
that the ozone layer was most prevalent among those accepting of human-induced climate 
change.42 These findings reflect research findings in other countries where climate change 
is frequently confused with both ozone depletion and air pollution (Lorenzoni et al., 2006; 
Stamm, Clark, & Eblacas, 2009).  
 
Overall, while image associations were not clearly associated with phenomena that were 
personally relevant, there was some suggestion that common associations had national-
level relevance. The prevalence of drought, water shortages, and flood, for instance, is 
consistent with the notion that people’s associations with climate change reflect the 
specific historical and cultural climatic context of the respondent (Nicholls, 2005). 
 
Clearer evidence that associations lack personal relevance emerged when respondents 
were asked to provide their associations with particular people. Eleven of the top 18 
associations referenced particular politicians, or politicians and the government in general. 
Seven of the top nine responses were for individual politicians at the federal level, again 
suggesting that associations have national-level relevance. Politicians accounted for over 
half of all responses, whereas reference to the self or close others accounted for just 8%. 
Only 5% of respondents selected scientists. This 5% incorporated responses about scientists 
in general, not just specific scientists, so it is unlikely that lack of awareness of individual 
scientists was behind the low figure. Taken together, these results reinforce the notion that 
people now see climate change more as a political issue than a scientific issue.  
 
Affective ratings for individual politicians suggest politicians function as both negative and 
positive referents for people. For those sceptical of human-induced climate change, when 
left-wing politicians were brought to mind, the association was negative, while right-wing 
politicians were positively evaluated. The reverse pattern was true for those accepting of 
human-induced climate change. There was one exception to this rule: Malcolm Turnbull. 
The deposed leader of the conservative Liberal party, Turnbull has been a vocal advocator 
for market-based policy to curb climate change emissions. Yet he was rated positively 
                                                          
42
 However, a counter-argument is that an association between the two does not represent a 
scientific inaccuracy. Perhaps for some the association occurs because the ozone layer represented a 
large, global environmental challenge, in the same way that climate change does. 
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independent of opinion-type; he was a positive referent for all people. One might speculate 
that the landscape of climate change opinion in Australia might have been different had 
Turnbull remained leader, and federal climate change policy retained bipartisan support.  
 
The tendency to think of politicians when we think of climate change goes some way to 
explaining the strong associations between opinion-type and voting behaviour found in 
Chapter 4. But it suggests a further possibility: these associations with politics and 
politicians are the trigger for a motivated search of rules, beliefs, and opinions. The sub-set 
of rules, beliefs, and opinions that are accessed are those upon which political partisanship 
itself is based, including some of the deep-seated values and dispositions surrounding the 
way the world should operate that were identified in the previous chapter. These deep-
seated dispositions may drive our categorisation process: as we mentally sift through the 
group membership categories available to us, our political affiliations become the most 
salient. Politicians and politics then act as our ‘quick guides’ to instruct our opinions, 
thoughts, and actions, which in turn alleviate our anxieties provoked by uncertainty (Hogg, 
2007). The data suggest that this categorisation process might not be the same for 
everyone; in some instances other categories (e.g. mother, scientist, Australian) might be 
the most salient, in which cases our thoughts and actions are presumably directed 
differently.   
 
Scientists, for the 5% who did nominate them, were in general evaluated positively, 
suggesting that linking climate change with the right scientists (or science communicators) 
could be beneficial for engaging people with the issue. However, it is likely that positive 
associations with scientists and the scientific community reflects other underlying values 
that resonate only for a subset of the community. Perhaps science and scientists 
themselves are now viewed by many in the community as politically partisan advocates. 
Indeed, research from the US suggests that trust in science falls along party lines 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2011). As such, science communication that fails to recognise how 
climate change opinions may be influenced by social identification and political partisanship 




8.3 Part 2: Imagery Associations Workshops  
In Part 1 of this chapter, associations were measured by asking people to write down the 
first three images and people that came to mind when they thought about climate change, 
consistent with traditional ways of eliciting associations. This method reduces biases 
introduced by closed questions, and responses are relatively spontaneous and 
unconstrained (Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Szalay, 1978). Yet it is also possible that respondents 
will engage in a considered deliberative process when responding, particularly when they 
are responding in private with no externally imposed time constraints. One way to 
overcome this is to present people with visual stimuli in a controlled setting and direct 
them to make spontaneous evaluations.   
 
In Part 2 of this chapter, I investigate whether people’s associations with climate change 
imagery differ when presented with images of climate change from those given when asked 
to generate associations. Of particular interest is whether content differs in relation to 
personal relevance, and whether there is evidence of proximal and distal defences. Follow-
up discussions with participants provide an opportunity to identify how these mental 
representations are constructed, and whether rationalisations and justifications are linked 
to common image associations. 
 
8.3.1 Previous Work on Climate Change and Imagery 
How is presenting people with climate change images different from asking people to 
generate imagery? Given the intangibility of climate change, and the intense media 
coverage of it, it is likely that our associations are heavily influenced by the imagery that 
accompanies climate change commentary. The most prevalent type of climate change 
iconography employed by the media is negative and often fear-laden (Manzo, 2010; O’Neill 
& Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Doyle (2007) discusses the problem of climate change imagery in 
the context of the intangibility of climate change. Because the current and future impacts 
of climate change are mostly invisible, communicating climate change through visual 
imagery becomes problematic as, she argues, photographs can only convey the outcomes 
of what has gone before. This poses a problem to scientific circles and Western cultures in 
general, where sight is the sense most emphasised (Dennett, 1991). The ontological and 
epistemological privileging of vision, Doyle argues, undermines the legitimacy of climate 
change science, as climate change cannot be adequately expressed pictorially. Can people’s 
186 
 
cognitive representations overcome such ‘sense privileging’ by evoking a more complex 
multi-faceted construction of climate change? Or is, on being presented with images, the 
complexity of one’s mental constructions overridden, replaced by a sub-set of mental 
constructions that are cued by particular images?   
 
The most detailed research to date of responses to climate change imagery comes from 
O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009), who used Q-methodology and icon representation to 
conduct their investigations. Imagery included both negative imagery such as smoke stacks, 
and positive imagery such as solar panels. They found that, while highly affective images 
that provoked fear also grabbed people’s attention, these images were also likely to 
distance and disengage people, suggesting that certain visual and mental imagery can 
provoke counter-productive responses. Specifically, negative and distant representations 
led to issue-avoidance, disempowerment and feelings that climate change issues were too 
overwhelming for individual responses to be efficacious.  
 
There is current debate about whether negative or positive emotions are more conducive 
to adaptive behavioural responses to climate change. On the one side of the debate it is 
argued that presenting people with a positive picture of an alternative future and stressing 
the positives about what can be done will motivate people to change their lifestyle and 
consumption behaviours (Manzo, 2010). Further, there is empirical evidence that dire 
messaging in climate change communication can bolster scepticism in those with strong 
just-world beliefs (Feinberg & Willer, 2011). But there is also evidence that fear appeals 
work to enhance both environmental attitudes and behaviours (Hine & Gifford, 1991; 
Meijnders, Midden, & Wilke, 2001). In Chapter 4 we saw that some feelings of negative 
affect (fear, anger, guilt, and shame) predicted higher levels of engagement with pro-
environmental behaviour. Regressing emotion factors onto pro-environmental behaviours 
also showed that other negative emotions (powerlessness, despair, and confusion) had a 
negative relationship with behaviour. I suggest the key difference between these two sets 
of negative affect is arousal. Fear, anger, guilt, and shame can be considered moderate to 
high arousal states, while powerlessness, despair, and confusion are all low arousal states. 
These conflicting findings suggest that, in measuring responses to climate change, it is 
important to take into account levels of activation in affective experiences in addition to 




8.3.2 Measuring Affective and Emotional Responses 
In Part 1 of this chapter we found that people’s associations with climate change were, for 
the most part, negatively evaluated. But this evaluative component of affect is only part of 
the picture. The measurement of affect has been variously described as uni- or multi-
dimensional, and within these dimensions as uni- or bipolar. This dimensional 
conceptualisation of emotion has prompted researchers to identify which emotions 
influence different cognitive processes (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). The emotion of anger, for 
instance, when coupled with high levels of activation, is thought to facilitate approach-
related behaviour (Harmon-Jones, Sigelman, Bohlig, & Harmon-Jones, 2003). Another 
important element in research on emotions concerns the extent to which emotions are 
automatic. Automatic appraisals, it is suggested, give rise to basic evaluations of good or 
bad, in turn motivating approach or avoid responses (Zajonc, 1980). From a functional 
perspective, these automatic appraisals inform individuals of potential problems or 
opportunities, and prepare the individual for action (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). 
   
 In a review of empirical work on affective experiences, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1999) 
concluded that affect is best conceptualised as comprised of two bipolar independent 
dimensions: degree of pleasantness (or evaluation) and degree of activation (or arousal). 
These two dimensions capture the core affective feelings in mood and emotion. This 
second dimension is important, as it can lead to motivating or inhibiting behaviour. To 
measure these two dimensions, Russell and Feldman Barrett developed an ‘emotion 
circumplex’, which conceptualises emotion along the two dimensions of evaluation and 
arousal (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998; Russell, 1980). From a motivated cognition 
perspective, the emotion circumplex allows us to determine whether and what levels of 
anticipated arousal (or cues that cognitions are worrying) accompany associations.  
 
A series of workshops were designed to investigate what sort of imagery was most closely 
associated with climate change. Built into these workshops was a task designed to capture 
people’s affective responses to this imagery, in respect to both evaluation and activation. 
Finally, workshop small group discussions were held to further identify any themes in the 




8.3.3 Workshop Preparation 
A total of 82 images were selected to represent the 215 image association categories 
emerging from the T1 national survey. Several considerations guided this process. First, the 
set of images had to be small enough that participants could sift through the entire set in a 
short timeframe (see workshop procedure below). Second, preference was given to the 
more common association categories in the survey. Third, where multiple images could be 
used to denote the same category, and that category was a common survey association, 
multiple images were selected.  For example, for ‘drought’, imagery might be about 
landscape (say, a barren field), or might involve a human component (a struggling farmer), 
or an animal component (suffering livestock). Fourth, a combination of local (i.e. clearly 
Australian) and remote imagery was selected.  
 
Images were sourced from the internet using Google Image search.43 A typical search-term 
consisted of the word(s) of that category coupled with the phrase “climate change”.  Photos 
and images were validity tested by piloting the images on five people and asking them to 
select a word (or words) that they thought the image best represented. Images that 
produced too varied a response, or responses too removed from the original word-
elicitations, were discarded and replaced by another image until consensus was 
established. Appendix K presents the images used in the workshop, and the source of each. 
Sets of images were printed on 10cm x 15cm photo paper. Each image had a reference 
number printed on its back.  
 
8.3.4 Workshop Procedure 
Four workshops with a total of 52 participants were conducted. Two workshops were held 
in December 2010 (11 and 8 participants) and two in March 2011 (14 and 19 participants). 
All workshops were conducted in Perth, Western Australia.  Participants for the first two 
workshops were recruited by telephone, using randomised telephone lists of households in 
suburbs local to the workshop venue. Participants for the final two workshops were 
recruited through university notice boards and email lists targeting post-graduate students 
from the University of Western Australia. Post-graduate students were chosen instead of 
undergraduate students so that a broader range of age, backgrounds, and life experiences 
                                                          
43
  Only those images labelled for reuse were used, to avoid copyright infringement. 
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would be represented. Participants received shopping vouchers to the value of $50 as 
recompense for their time and associated travel costs, and to reduce selection bias due to 
the climate change issue.  
 
Each participant was given a complete set of the 82 images. These sets were randomised to 
reduce any order effects. Participants were asked to scan through all 82 images and 
“quickly and instinctively” sort them into two piles: a pile for images they immediately 
associated with climate change, and a pile for images they did not immediately associate 
with climate change. This direction was given in an effort to maximise the implicitness of 
participants’ responses. Once participants had sorted through all the images, they were 
asked to sort through their pile of associated images and rank and record the ten images 
they most closely associated with climate change in order of strength of association.44   
  
After all participants had ranked their selections, they were asked to place the 
corresponding number of each image on an emotion grid in accordance with the 
instruction: “How does this image make you feel?”. This grid, pictured in Figure 35, was 
taken from Feldman Barrett and Russell’s (1998) emotion circumplex. Once all respondents 
had completed these exercises, they participated in an approximately half-hour discussion 
in groups of four to eight people. In these discussions they were asked to bring along their 
top images and express any thoughts they had regarding them. In addition to exploring 
people’s mental constructions of climate change, the purpose of these discussions was to 
assess which images most resonated with people and why, to identify ambiguity and 
consistency in image meaning, and to explore how people spoke about climate change 
when referring to these images.  
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Figure 35. Emotion grid based on Feldman Barrett and Russell’s emotion circumplex. 
 
 
8.3.5 Preliminary Results 
 











Table 44. Most commonly selected images in participants’ top 10 (n = 52). 
Polar bear (n = 33) 
 
Collapsing ice shelf (n = 28) 
 
Flooded Sydney (n = 25) 
 
Parched earth (n = 22) 
 
Smoke stacks (n = 21) 
 
Coal-powered station (n = 18) 
 
Polar cap (n = 15) 
 
Submerged island (n = 15) 
 
Bushfire (n = 14) 
 
Pollution cars (n = 14) 
 
Windfarm (n = 14) 
 
Solar panel (n = 13) 
 
Tidal wave (n = 13) 
 
China pollution (n = 11) 
 
Coal mining (n = 11) 
 
Deforestation (n = 11) 
 
Earth on fire (n = 11) 
 
Coastal erosion (n = 11) 
 
Al Gore (n = 10) 
 
Extreme heat (n = 10) 
 





Figure 36 illustrates the placement of all image selections on the emotion circumplex. The 
red point represents the average placement of all images. Ratings were most commonly 
located in the high arousal, negative evaluation quadrant; the least populated quadrant 
was the low arousal, positive evaluation quadrant. 
 
 
Figure 36. Affective ratings of all image associations. 
 
 
Figure 37 displays individual affective ratings for the top four images. The average affective 
evaluations of the 12 most frequently selected images are shown in Figure 38, where the 












Figure 37. Individual affective ratings for the four most commonly selected images. 
 
Figure 38. Affective ratings of the top 12 most commonly associated images. 
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8.3.6 Thematic Analysis 
A thematic analysis was performed on written transcripts of workshop discussions in 
conjunction with another researcher.45 Transcripts were corroborated with audio 
recordings of the workshops. Themes were established by identifying similar images and 
discussion-points that frequently co-occurred during workshop discussions (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). That is, I identified patterns in the workshop transcripts (and from my recollections 
of the workshops) of groups of images that were often talked about in close conjunction 
with one another. While there was no formal structure to workshop discussions, I found 
that talk of a particular image prompted other participants to talk about a related image, 
even if this image did not rank particularly highly on their list of top 10 images. While the 
opinion-type of each respondent on the causes of climate change was not formally 
recorded, it was evident during the course of the discussions that a strong majority of 
respondents were of the opinion climate change was happening and human-induced; only 
one respondent made it clear they were of the opinion it was a natural phenomenon. This 
imbalance of opinion relative to the rest of the community doubtlessly influenced some of 
the content of the discussions, however the point of the discussions was not about inter-
individual differences based on opinion-type, but to establish the consensual themes with 
which climate change is represented and thus talked about (Moscovici, 1988).46 The 
following section is organised around the themes identified. Quotations are selected on the 
basis of their utility in representing each theme. Multiple quotations on the same topic are 
employed to indicate the frequency of an elicited sentiment. The first six themes relate 
directly to the images themselves, while the last two reflect two common themes emerging 
from discussions of the set of images as a whole. The identified themes were labelled as 
follows: 
 Icons & ice 
 Positives, politics, and power generation 
 Pollution 
 Disasters 
 Drought & denuded landscapes 
 Personal relevance 
 Missing images 
                                                          
45
 Ms Jennifer Price, a colleague from the CSIRO’s Social & Behavioural Sciences group 
46
 Additionally, rationalisations, justifications, and distal and proximal defences employed by people 
holding the ‘correct’ basic opinion were of particular interest. 
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Icons & ice 
 
Figure 39. Mean affective ratings of images associated with climate change icons and ice. 
 
Among the most commonly selected images of the set were those relating to ice (Figure 
39). These images were consistently negatively evaluated, with moderate to high ratings of 
arousal. 
 
For many participants, the image of the polar bear stranded on a small piece of ice 
represented an iconic image of climate change. “It’s clichéd, but if you see it you think: 
‘climate change’”. Perhaps because of its recognisability, for some the image of the polar 
bear represented more than the endangerment of the species itself, but evoked the 
broader natural world and fauna in general: “It’s about the natural world rather than one 
species. It’s symbolic”; “All of our mega fauna are doomed”. For one participant the image 
had a more metaphorical meaning: “It has a wider reference to ice-caps, but portrays a 
sense of clinging to something not there”. Emotive elements were also expressed: “The 
polar bear is just holding out and it’s very emotional. How the mighty have fallen. It’s a top 
line predator”; “Animals are innocent so it’s an emotive response”.  For another participant, 
the polar bear image was comical: “It made me laugh… ‘well you fucked up then!’. I had to 
196 
 
respond somewhere between content and bored. There was a Monty Python aspect to it”. 
It is perhaps worth noting that this statement was accompanied by nervous laughter from 
the participant while making it. She failed to convince others, despite some effort on her 
behalf, of the image’s comedic value. In motivated cognition terms, her bid for social 
support failed. Perhaps as a result, she made a limited contribution to the rest of the 
discussion. 
 
The collapsing ice shelf, the second most commonly selected image, was described as 
“clear and unambiguous” by one participant; by another, “the most vivid representation of 
the photos, it’s the most representative”. The ice planet for one participant represented 
returning to a “primordial state after our interference”, while for others it was a reminder 
of the changeability of Earth’s climate: “I went to a seminar which detailed the past history 
of the ice age. Whatever your viewpoint about human effects, it demonstrated that that 
the climate can change”. 
.  
The map of the polar cap was talked about in different terms. For the participants who 
discussed this image, it represented formal, scientific evidence of climate change: “It’s the 
best evidence of change”; “It’s irrefutable”; “[it] visually shows the change”; “People who 
deny climate change are ignoring this information”.  
  
The preponderance of ice-related images was explained by one participant in the following 
way: “Cold is more fearful than warm…More people die through winter than [through] heat 
stress”. But the lack of personal relevance of ice-related images was also mentioned: “To 
Australians it can’t resonate though”. By contrast one participant chose three ice images 
because of that person’s time living in Alaska, where they “saw the glaciers retreating; so 
it’s an emotional connection”. For another, the collapsing ice shelf was a reminder of 




Positives, politics, and green power 
 
Figure 40. Mean affective ratings of images associated with positives, politics and green 
power. 
 
Despite the majority of all images being negatively evaluated, a small number of images 
were rated positively, including images relating to renewable or efficient power generation, 
and politicians and figureheads related to positive action on climate change (Figure 40). 
 
The windfarm and solar panel images were consistently evaluated positively. For many 
who selected these, they represented “things that combat [climate change] and have 
positive effects”. The windfarm “represents technology and [suggests] that it’s not all doom 
and gloom”. These alternative power sources were seen as solutions to a problem. Solar 
panels were described by one participant as representing “your visible green credentials”. 
 
At several points in discussions it emerged that some who had selected these images had 
done so after a process of considered deliberation (despite being instructed to select 
“quickly and instinctively”!). This deliberative process is illustrated in the following 
interchange between two participants: “Things that represent climate change are negative, 
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but the solutions are positive. But we were asked to find images that represent climate 
change, not the solution”. In response:  “I did the opposite because windfarms and so on 
are the solution, not the causes which represent panic. I’ve been conditioned into 
associating climate change with panic”. And from another participant, “I changed my 
images because they were all too negative and I wanted to represent positives too”. 
 
Images representing politicians were selected with relative infrequency, but discussions 
surrounding these images, once brought up, were often protracted.  Figureheads of green 
movements, Al Gore and Bob Brown,47 were seen by most of the participants who selected 
these images as representing hope. Of Al Gore: “He was the only person in the world to 
stand up. Copenhagen and Cancun didn’t work. Al put his money where his mouth is and 
was flying the flag for us”. Of Bob Brown: “We need icons. I think of climate change as a 
war, and we need a leader to follow. Government reflects the people”. Participants were 
not unanimous in this view though: “I have a strong view that he [Al Gore] is a hypocritical 
fraud”. There were also strong negative associations with the image showing Australia’s 
parliamentary leaders debating each other. This was described as a “helpless image” by 
one participant, but again, hope was mentioned: “If we are to have any hope they’re going 
to have to do something”; “Leadership is the only hope. Individuals have changed the 
world”.  
  
                                                          
47





Figure 41. Mean affective ratings of images associated with pollution. 
 
Pollution, whether through localised industrial and vehicle emissions, or as a by-product of 
power generation, formed a set of images that featured prominently in people’s selected 
image associations (Figure 41). These images were negatively evaluated, and produced a 
mixture of moderate to high arousal ratings. 
 
The image of smoke stacks had particular resonance, even though many participants 
disputed its link with climate change: “[The smoke stacks are] iconic if not accurate”; 
“Smokestacks are very powerful, even if they are an exaggeration of pollution”; “That is 
water vapour, but regardless we all have to breathe pollution in”. The disempowering and 
depressing nature of the image was articulated: “It makes me feel helpless and 






Figure 42. Mean affective ratings of images associated with natural disasters. 
 
Images of natural disasters featured heavily in participants’ selections (Figure 42). These 
images were consistently rated negatively, and were generally given high arousal ratings.  
 
The image of a flooded Sydney was the most commonly selected natural disaster image, 
despite its obvious artificiality. “It’s a fake but it really made me jump”; “It’s familiar and 
reminded me of Japan”48; “I’m from Sydney so it was relevant”.  But the most discussed of 
these images was the Victorian bushfires,49 which was noted for its personal relevance and 
immediacy: “This is happening already and we are powerless to stop it. A friend of mine 
was affected by the fires in Victoria. It’s a significant and powerful image”; “It’s the thought 
of people suffering. This is the consequence and it’s happening now. We have to do 
something about it”.  
                                                          
48
 This workshop occurred shortly after the Japanese earthquake and ensuing tsunamis of March 
2011. 
49
 A series of bushfires, known as the ‘Black Saturday Bushfires’, swept through the state of Victoria 
in February 2009, killing 173 people. These bushfires occurred during unprecedentedly extreme 
bushfire conditions, a combination of record high temperatures for the state and high winds.  
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 Drought & denuded landscapes 
 
Figure 43. Mean affective ratings of images associated with drought and denuded 
landscapes. 
 
Drought-related images were selected relatively infrequently by participants, despite being 
one of the strongest associations in the word-elicitation task. This set of images was rated 
as producing lower arousal levels relative to other negative image groups (Figure 43). 
 
Participants who talked about the drought-related images expressed the sentiment that 
they were about issues broader than climate change, and in this sense some had hesitancy 
in selecting them. For the drought farmer image: “this is not exclusively a climate change 
thing, so again I’m uncertain”, while for another participant, “It’s a natural photo, but it is 
very evocative now of global warming”. The most commonly selected image of this group, 
parched earth, seemed to have the most resonance, even though it was arguably the least 
representative of drought specific to Australia50: “At first I chose all the harsh land images. 
But I wanted ones that were related to climate change. This one is, with the red earth and 
                                                          
50
 Compare this image with ‘drought farmer’ and ‘distressed sheep’ for instance. 
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the one tree”. But again there was a proviso by another participant who selected this 
image: “The other image I loved, but which is not definitive, is the scorched earth”. 
 
Personal relevance 
Participants were asked whether any of the images in their selections has particular 
personal relevance. In addition to those images discussed above, a number of less 
frequently selected images were nominated. These images included mining and flood 
plains in Perth, “because of being in Western Australia”; hot sun and thermometer, 
“because of the weather at the moment”; the mosquito, “because I work in health”; 
coastal erosion, because “it’s relevant where I live. My house might go under”; refugees, 
because “I have worked in East Timor”; the submerged island, because “I’ve lived on an 
island that was only 12 feet above sea level”, and; images of children, “because I have a 
daughter”.  It is noteworthy that many of the images mentioned in this stage of the 
workshop discussions did not appear in participants’ top ten. 
 
Missing Images 
Participants were asked whether they thought anything was missing from the bank of 
images. Most considered the image set to contain an exhaustive list of associations. On 
probing, a few suggestions were made of images, or concepts, that were not present in the 
image set. Some participants stated that, while it was easy to demonstrate the 
environmental impacts of climate change, they had difficulty selecting images that 
represented humanity’s contribution to climate change. Other suggested images included 
stunted drought crops, “because that’s what climate change is doing to farms”; more 
evocative images of violence and food riots: “lots of people don’t realise what it means, 
when food won’t grow. People in the city don’t realise; they’re complacent. The food and 
water situation is horrific. It’s going to happen”; more evocative images of impacts to 
animals, or a representation of how “future generations will have no animals”; “People 
walking around on the street in water, like what will happen in low-lying areas like 
Bangladesh”; “graphs, charts and maps”; a representation of “deniers” or “the other side 
of the argument”; recent “floods in Queensland”; more Indigenous people: “there was a 
lot of Western culture images”, “climate change is supposed to be global, but all these 
images are Western”; and images evocative of war: “There is nothing now saying ‘fight for 




8.3.7 Discussion of the Imagery Associations Workshops 
Images associated with climate change vary appreciably, but nearly all of them are 
negative. In my workshops, nearly all of the 82 images were selected by at least one 
participant. Of those commonly selected, most were negatively evaluated, with medium to 
high levels of attendant activation (or arousal). Further, commonly selected images were 
often distant, both geographically and culturally. There was little contestation in image 
meaning, as evidenced by the terms used to signify the images.  
 
The traditional argument against the use of conventional climate change imagery is that it is 
disempowering and depressing. As such there has been a concerted effort to ‘move 
beyond’ polar bears and develop a more creative, personally meaningful, and powerful set 
of imagery (Manzo, 2010). The results from ratings on the emotions circumplex, however, 
suggest that some of the imagery most associated with climate change produces higher 
levels of arousal than these arguments suggest, and that the emotional states they are 
likely to produce are closer to anger and fear than to depression and withdrawal. But 
evidence from the workshop discussions concerning the activation of high-arousal 
emotions was conflicting: what was activating for one person was depressing for another. 
This conflict was also reflected in the relatively large spread of individual affective ratings 
for some of the top items (see Figure 37).  
 
Some general patterns on the emotion circumplex emerged. The impacts of climate change 
seemed to produce high arousal if they were associated with one-off extreme events like 
natural disasters. But ongoing, incremental impacts like dry and denuded landscapes were 
more depressing. Sources of pollution were also depressing, with discussions suggesting 
this imagery induced reductions in the perceived efficacy of responding to climate change.  
If this is the case, then the constant coupling of climate change in the media with imagery 
of belching smoke stacks risks perpetuating the notion that, as individuals, we are up 
against it to effect meaningful change, and that those responsible for climate change in the 




By contrast, solutions to the impacts and causes of climate change were rated positively, 
but subsequent discussions with participants suggested that these were outcomes of 
explicit, cognitive processes, rather than implicit emotional responses. It seems that long-
term concerted efforts to couple communication of climate change issues with positive 
imagery, such as renewable energy, is required if these stimuli are to become linked at a 
more automatic level. 
 
The polar bear on the iceberg was a clear stand-out association in the workshops, not only 
as a selected image but in subsequent discussions. It is also arguably the most iconic 
representation of climate change in the Western world (Manzo, 2010). Many participants 
found it evocative, despite also remarking on its being clichéd. Why is it such a powerful 
image? From a terror management perspective, the evocation of an animal, rather than 
humans, may function to reduce the connection between humans and nature in the face of 
a threat to one’s mortality. Viewing oneself as distinct from nature serves an important 
existential function because it allows for the denial of one’s connection to nature – 
mortality (Vess & Arndt, 2008). A similar explanation might be provided for the windfarms 
and solar panels. Culturally cultivated landscapes affirm the symbolic distinction between 
humans and the rest of nature, and are preferred when we are reminded of our mortality – 
images of wild nature are rated more negatively than cultivated landscapes for instance 
(Koole & Van den Berg, 2005).  
 
With regards to moral agency, images such as that of the polar bear, and the environment 
in general, may also be a way to deny the moral relevance of the victims of climate change. 
If the victims of climate change are other animals, not humans, it lies outside of our ‘moral 
community’ (Opotow & Weiss, 2000). Of course, for many people, charismatic mega-fauna 
like polar bears may form part of our moral community; we are still concerned for their 
welfare. Even so, the comic response to the polar bear evidenced by one participant 
supports a motivated cognition argument that people are drawn to judgements (or 
interpretations) that assuage negative affect and maximise positive affect. By reinterpreting 
the image, one is able to avoid the negative affect associated with the image and produce 
positive affect, supporting the notion that people explicitly assuage negative affect by 
suppression and distraction.  
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Retreating glaciers and melting ice, among the most frequently chosen images, are also 
iconic representations of climate change. As well as being culturally (and hence, arguably, 
morally) remote, Doyle (2007) considers such imagery problematic because it represents, 
temporally, the already seen effects of climate change.  But the obvious mock-ups of the 
flooded Sydney Opera House and an impossible tidal wave threatening high-rises on a 
beach were also popular selections. These images are a sign of things to come, rather than 
what has been, and suggest that imagined futures are also influential in making sense of 
climate change. Further, several images of the already seen effects of climate change that 
had particular resonance (and personal relevance for many), were images of local natural 
disasters, such as the Victorian bushfires. Perhaps it is these localised impacts that become 
the known anchor point (based on our prior knowledge) from which representations of 
future impacts are formed (Moscovici, 1988). Exactly what types of imagery serve proximal 
defence functions and what types promote pro-environmental adaptation choices would be 
an interesting area for further exploration.  
 
From what was presented in Chapter 4 it is clear that feelings of personal relevance are 
important in determining responses to climate change (after ethical and personal 
responsibility, and the perceived importance of climate change). The personal relevance of 
images varied from individual to individual, suggesting that moving toward more 
personalised messages of climate change will prove extremely challenging. More 
promisingly, in the workshop discussions, numerous references to ‘people’ were made 
during discussions about missing images (though it should be noted that the images that 
did contain people were rarely selected, refer to Appendix I). But again, proximal limitations 
were evident in these discussions. For example, when discussing possible impacts on 
animals, it was noted how this would impact on future generations of people. Similarly, 
representing the ‘other side of the argument’ (deniers) removes the focus (and perhaps the 
responsibility to act) from the individual who accepts climate change. And food riots were 
talked about as future events in foreign (non-Western, non-developed) lands.  
 
Much of the content and feel of the workshop discussions suggested an element of 
dissonant or dilemmatic thinking within individuals. On the one hand, there is a motivation 
to hold climate change at arm’s length, yet there is a countervailing force imposing the 
personal and immediate aspects of climate change and the implications these have on 
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people’s moral responses. Consider the following statement by one participant: “This is 
happening already and we are powerless to stop it. A friend of mine was affected by the 
fires in Victoria”. The personal relevance and immediacy of climate change is 
acknowledged, but it is coupled with feelings of powerlessness.  Whether immediacy and 
personal relevance spur this person to take action, or whether powerlessness means she 
can’t see the point of acting, we cannot say. How this tension is managed is probably best 
established at the level of the individual, with much more in-depth methods than these 
workshops, perhaps by applying an approach / avoid framework.    
 
Several other limitations of the workshops should be mentioned. Participants in the 
workshop were from Perth, rather than the whole of Australia as in the word-elicitation 
task. This may contributed to the inconsistency between the word-elicitation associations 
and the images commonly selected by workshop participants. However, Perth has suffered 
as much as any region in the country from extended periods of severe drought, culminating 
in persistent potable water shortages in the metropolitan region and crop failures in the 
surrounding wheat-belt area (Bates & Hughes, 2009). As such, it is arguable that drought-
related images should be just as topical and salient, if not more so, to residents of Perth 
than to other Australian communities. Nevertheless, the workshop participants should not 
be viewed as wholly representative of the broader Australian community. A self-selecting 
process might have operated whereby people who felt more engaged with climate change 
than the average person were overly represented (supported by the observation that the 
strong majority considered climate change human-induced).  
 
8.4 General Discussion  
In Part 1 we saw evidence that word-elicitation associations with climate change lacked 
personal relevance. But there were suggestions that associations with elements of national-
level content and cultural-historical climate legacies were also important. Even so, political 
matters appear to dominate some of these associations (they are the key ‘social amplifiers’ 
of risk – or lack of risk –  if you like). The findings from Part 2, by contrast, suggest that our 
visual associations with climate change are typically iconographic, and societal-level 
associations such as drought and water shortages largely disappear. This more remote 
iconography probably reflects dominant media representations of climate change, which 
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are often more relevant to northern hemisphere locations, remote locations in general, or 
imagined dystopian futures – all characteristics that facilitate proximal defences.  
 
When discussing the possible ‘boomerang effects’ of science communication, Byrne and 
Hart (2009)  suggest that communication can often unintentionally trigger cues important 
to self-identity that are seemingly unrelated to the topic itself. A recent finding from Hart 
and Nisbet (2011) suggests that, when communicating the impacts that climate change will 
have on people, the more remote and socially distant these people are from an individual’s 
own context, the more likely motivated reasoning is to occur, and the less likely support for 
action on climate change is to be granted. This is especially the case when climate change 
policy action is counter-attitudinal (for example, for those of conservative political 
persuasions). The results from the two studies in this chapter again suggest that politically-
relevant ideologies are cued when people are asked to think about climate change, and 
that most associations with climate change are personally remote – together this explains 
the political polarisation of climate change responses evidenced in previous chapters. If we 
extend this argument, we would expect further polarisation to occur unless (until) climate 
change communication is reframed and decoupled from political processes. Such further 
polarisation would also presumably facilitate distal defences, resulting in expressions such 
as the bolstering of support for strong conservative leaders, and increases in conspicuous 
consumption. Decoupling from political processes might also mean that underlying 
ideologies (such as system justification) as less likely to be accessed in response to climate 
change stimuli.  
 
The association with politicians arguably serves another purpose: it may smooth the way 
for inaction because it allows us to abdicate personal responsibility for the problem 
(consider this quote from one of the workshop participants: “If we are to have any hope 
they’re going to have to do something”). This in turn bodes ill for the prospect of becoming 
and remaining personally and morally engaged with climate change issues. 
 
How people feel about politicians (as measured by the evaluative component of people 
associations in the survey) is also critical. In their perceptual theory of legitimacy, Crandall 
and Beasley (2001), suggest that people imbue other people, politicians, and even 
governments themselves, with elements of moral worth, with notions of good and bad, and 
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consequently perceive them as legitimate or illegitimate. What is more, people are 
generally very poor at thinking ambivalently about politicians and governments; it is much 
easier to think of them as wholly good or wholly bad. Once we have established in our mind 
that, let’s say, a politician is generally a bad person that we are certain we don’t like, we 
tend to see all of their opinions, actions, and beliefs in a negative light (Crandall & Beasley, 
2001). No wonder moral appeals from Kevin Rudd fell flat with conservative climate change 
sceptics; a moral appeal from someone we imbue with little moral worth is bound to be 
seen as hypocritical. Coming from a motivated cognition approach, Redlawsk (2002) found 
that these sorts of affective biases may lead to lower-quality decision making, and that 
motivated reasoning may increase support for positively evaluated political candidates even 
upon learning of negatively evaluated information. So, perversely, if a politician you initially 
like believes in pro-active policy action on human-induced climate change, this can increase 
that politician’s likeability in your eyes even if you are sceptical about climate change’s 
causes. Perhaps this partly explains Malcolm Turnbull’s positive ratings, especially among 
those that deny climate change exists.   
 
Similar inferences can be drawn concerning our ability to respond effectively to current and 
future impacts of climate change, both at the level of the individual and at a societal level. 
Construal Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003) suggests that people are better at making 
decisions about events that are psychologically close than psychologically distant. If climate 
change is associated with stimuli that are removed geographically, temporally, culturally, 
and personally, we cannot expect it to enter into people’s ‘finite pool of worry’ anytime 
soon (Weber, 2006). However, somewhat antithetically, recent experimental research into 
framing effects has found that attitudes toward mitigating climate change are more 
positive if the problem is framed at the social rather than the personal level (Spence & 
Pidgeon, 2010). Whether these attitudes translate into pro-environmental behaviour 
though is another matter.51 Perhaps the solution lies somewhere in the middle, and 
prompting and promoting national or societal-level associations is an effective avenue.  
 
Natural disasters such as bushfires and floods were frequently selected both in the word-
elicitation task and in the workshops. For many participants these had personal relevance, 
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often because they knew someone who had directly experienced them. In this sense, these 
impacts are serious enough to capture attention (like communication about switching your 
lights off perhaps doesn’t ),52 and if not directly personal, are vicariously personal. It is this 
“vicarious emotional reaction”, moderated through perceived similarity with victims, that is 
bypassed in Bandura’s conception of dehumanisation and moral disengagement (Bandura, 
1990, p.38). Designing communication that has direct or vicarious personal relevance (at 
both an individual and societal level) may help promote more active engagement in climate 
change issues as it may prevent moral disengagement. 
 
Promoting and communicating climate change issues of societal-level relevance should also 
include the benefits accrued to society. As we saw in Chapter 4, the most important social 
attitude predictor of engaging in pro-environmental behaviours was the opportunity to be 
part of something bigger, which I also argued in the previous chapter might be a useful 
legitimising myth. Preparing for and responding to higher frequencies and intensities of 
natural disasters might also increase people’s perception of collective efficacy. 
Communication efforts could leverage our socio-cultural history (with caution) of dealing 
with natural disasters as part of ‘what we’ve always done’, to trigger cues important to 
social identity for some of the community, without triggering unwanted political cues. For 
others, global images (imbued with metaphor and personal meaning) rather than local 
images might be the cue that triggers environmental action, depending on the attendant 
levels of activated emotion (Devine-Wright, 2009).     
 
This brings us to the end of the investigation of the data. In the next chapter, I hope to 
bring these (sometimes disparate) threads of evidence together to say what, as a whole, 
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 See Lowe (2006) for a discussion of how seemingly trivial everyday solutions to climate change can 
reduce engagement rather than promote it. 
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CHAPTER 9. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING 
RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE  
“You develop an instant global consciousness, a people orientation, an intense 
dissatisfaction with the state of the world, and a compulsion to do something about it. From 
out there on the moon, international politics look so petty. You want to grab a politician by 
the scruff of the neck and drag him a quarter of a million miles out and say, ‘Look at that, 
you son of a bitch.’” 
Edgar Mitchell 
Apollo 14 astronaut 
 
In this the final chapter, I start with a recap of the major findings from each of the data 
chapters, in so doing synthesising the key evidence that responses to climate change serve 
multiple social and psychological functions. I will then present a model to help 
conceptualise climate change responses, drawn from both the data and theories of 
motivated social cognition. I conclude with some theoretical and applied implications of my 
research, some of the limitations of my approach, and suggestions for where to take the 
research next. 
 
9.1 A Recap of Major Findings 
9.1.1 Key Findings in Chapter 4 – Climate Change in Context 
The scientific consensus that climate change is happening, and is mostly caused by human 
activity, is not reflected in the opinions of the broader community. While most people 
consider climate change to be happening, the cause is in dispute. The view that climate 
change is caused solely by natural fluctuation has gained significant traction. This particular 
opinion (what might be called ‘qualified acceptance’) may operate as a rationalising 
mechanism to avoid engaging in effortful behaviour, as a cognitive reconstrual for self-
presentational purposes, or as a way of morally disengaging from the climate change issue.  
 
Nearly everybody has an opinion about climate change (very few don’t know what to 
think), suggesting that opinions may function to reduce uncertainty and bolster feelings of 
control and coping. Opinions are malleable for many; more than a quarter of respondents 
changed their opinion about the causes of climate change 12 months later. This malleability 
might reflect the changing needs and goals of the individual, or the influence of community 
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and media discourse. This second possibility is supported by the finding that opinions 
tended to shift toward the view that climate change is attributable to natural variability – 
an argument that has received increased exposure in the media in recent years. Shifts in 
opinion were largely decoupled from whether people had become more or less certain over 
the past year about climate change; this ‘conflict of accounts’ is a sign that opinions are not 
deep-seated, but serve underlying goals and needs that change over time. 
 
People tend to report that their views as most strongly reflecting morality or intelligence, 
regardless of their opinions about climate change, suggesting that both internal and 
external self-standards are operating. People who denied climate change strongly rated 
‘activism’ as what their views were not like, hinting at the importance of value-expressive 
self-identity needs. 
 
Considerable variation in pro-environmental behaviour occurred within types of opinion 
about the causes of climate change, suggesting that opinions only partially account for 
behavioural responses. Self-referent and social attitudes towards climate change revealed 
that moral and ethical engagement, and anticipated societal-level impacts of responding to 
climate change, were more important drivers of pro-environmental behaviour than 
certainty in anthropogenic causes. These results suggest that the element of engagement is 
central to understanding climate change responses, and that positive coping appraisals and 
meaning-striving might be important underlying needs.     
 
Finally, negative, high arousal emotions were linked to climate change acceptance and 
behaviour, suggesting that sceptical positions might function to ward off negative affect, 
and/or reduce the need to engage in effortful behaviours. 
 
9.1.2 Key Findings in Chapter 5 – Moral Responses to Climate Change 
People tend to place more responsibility on groups and organisations, and less 
responsibility on individuals, for both causing and responding to climate change, 
regardless of opinion-type. Further, those sceptical of climate change consider agents such 
as big-polluting countries and multi-national corporations as partly responsible for both 
causing and responding to climate change. This internal contradiction supports further the 
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notion that disavowal and diffusion of responsibility functions to fulfil moral and adaptive 
adequacy needs, self-presentational goals, and to maintain positive self-concepts. 
 
Levels of moral engagement mediate the link between opinions and pro-environmental 
behaviour, and between individual response efficacy and pro-environmental behaviour. 
Moral disengagement was also associated with higher levels of annoyance (even within 
opinion-type), suggesting that misattribution of arousal might facilitate moral 
disengagement. Further, moral disengagement increased as responsibility became more 
removed from the individual, irrespective of opinion, suggesting that diffusion and 
disavowal aid moral disengagement. Taken together, the results from Chapter 5 suggest 
that moral disengagement is a key mechanism through which needs and goals such as the 
reduction in effortful behaviour, and consequently, reduction of guilt, might be achieved.  
 
9.1.3 Key Findings in Chapter 6 – Climate Change and Consensus 
Estimates 
Estimates about what the Australian community thinks about climate change differ 
markedly from actual opinions. People thought their own opinion about climate change 
was more common than people holding other opinions think it was. This bias was evident 
for all opinion-types, but was more marled for those holding opinions with little external 
support. These findings suggest that false consensus bias is not just a general tendency 
among the population, but functions especially to fulfil needs for social support and to 
increase self-esteem and belongingness. Those who displayed high initial levels of false 
consensus were more resistant to changing their opinions about the causes of climate 
change, suggesting that false consensus also functions to reduce uncertainty. High false 
consensus was also associated with reduced individual responsibility and response efficacy, 
suggesting it is an important precursor for moral disengagement. 
 
While privately most people hold the view that the climate is changing, the prevalence of 
outright climate change denial is strongly overestimated. This result suggests that external 
cultural influences (such as the media) have been instrumental in distorting actual 
community sentiment about climate change, and that pluralistic ignorance – whereby 
people grossly overestimate the prevalence of a minority opinion – may help unpopular 




9.1.4 Key Findings in Chapter 7 – System Legitmacy 
Underlying ideological values associated with system justification explain climate change 
responses above and beyond political preferences. High system-justifying tendencies were 
also associated with reduced negative affect and reduced moral engagement, the latter of 
which reduced support for policy action on climate change. Support for climate policies that 
include compensation for low-income households was unrelated to levels of personal and 
household income. These findings suggests that system justification tendencies are made 
salient by climate change, and justifications to defend the status-quo function to maintain 
positive concepts of the world, and reduce guilt and anxiety, for both members of 
privileged and underprivileged groups.  
 
System-justifying tendencies are related to attitudes about the potential negative and 
positive impacts of collective responses to climate change. The data suggest that social 
attitudes might function as legitimising myths that promote or undermine existing system 
hierarchies, and function to increase or decrease moral engagement at a system level. 
These myths and justifications might also influence acceptance and resistance to social 
change in the form of policy action.  
 
9.1.5 Key Findings in Chapter 8 – Climate Change Associations 
Images commonly associated with climate change include rising sea levels, drought, 
melting ice caps, and floods. Drought, floods, and water shortage feature more 
prominently for Australians than for US and UK respondents, regardless of whether 
Australians live in cities or rural areas. Many people found it hard to nominate three 
images, suggesting the construction of mental representations of climate change is difficult. 
While most image associations were broad and remote, national-level impacts of climate 
change were also salient for many people.  
 
Politicians dominate who we associate with climate change. Scientists and people close to 
us are less commonly associated with climate change. Scientists and self and family were 
generally evaluated positively, but the evaluation of politicians was largely dependent on 
opinion-type. This result suggests that politicians are important negative and positive 
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referents for people, and that people may look to politicians to inform their own opinions 
as a way to reduce anxiety in the face of uncertainty and complexity.  
 
When presented with climate change imagery, associations vary appreciably. Most 
imagery is negatively evaluated, with medium to high levels of attendant arousal. 
Strongly associated imagery is often distant, both geographically and culturally. 
Iconographic images of climate change dominate people’s associations. One-off extreme 
events like natural disasters were associated with higher arousal than ongoing, incremental 
impacts like dry and denuded landscapes. Workshop discussions suggest that some people 
imbue iconographic imagery with personal meaning, which is activating, while for others 
the same imagery is depressing and inhibiting. The prevalence of iconic imagery is further 
evidence that the media influences what people associate with climate change. Together 
the data suggest that both explicit and implicit imagery can function to reduce moral 
agency through a perceived lack of personal relevance and responsibility (proximal and 
distal defences). This is turn may alleviate moral agency, negative affect, and existential 
anxiety. 
 
Solutions to the impacts and causes of climate change are rated positively, but 
subsequent discussions with participants suggested that these were outcomes of explicit, 
cognitive processes, rather than implicit emotional responses. This suggests there is little 
automatic coupling of climate change stimuli with positive outcomes.  
 
9.2 A Model of Functional Responses to Climate Change 
Figure 44 conveys these findings conceptually. Its construction is guided by the data 
observations, including mediating influences and (where possible) causal directionality, in 
addition to theoretical accounts from motivated social cognition. It is a functional 
explanation of responses to climate change, intended to incorporate the vast array of 
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9.2.1 Model Characteristics 
Basic process When presented with information about an attitude-object (in this case, 
climate change), we automatically consider the implications of the information for our 
needs and goals. These needs and goals are primed by both the content and the context of 
the information. For example, the content might be personally threatening (to the point of 
priming existential threat reduction needs), and the information might co-occur with other 
information, such as in the midst of a political debate (perhaps priming social identity 
needs). Anticipated affect, influenced by our implicit associations (the mental 
representations we invoke), helps us determine whether we desire a particular conclusion 
in relation to this information (Kunda, 1990). If a particular conclusion is desired, we begin 
searching our sets of rules and beliefs for information consistent with that conclusion (i.e. 
we are directionally motivated). The rules and beliefs available to us are enormous, but 
associations, external socio-cultural influences, and motivational forces mean that certain 
sub-sets of information are more likely to be accessed than others. The subset of rules and 
beliefs that we access provide the ‘trigger’ (or cue) for our outward expressions about 
climate change. These expressions may have relevance to social systems, to certain groups, 
to ourselves as individuals, or to any combination of the three. There is horizontal interplay 
different levels of implicit responses and different levels of primary and secondary 
expressions, but if, for instance, the incoming information is coupled with system-relevant 
information, our primary expressions will be more likely to have relevance at the system-
level. Primary and secondary expressions are the mechanisms through which we can reach 
our pre-determined conclusions while fulfilling our salient needs and goals, without 
compromising any of our other needs and goals. 
 
Associations: Associations may have relevance to different levels: global, national, group, 
and personal. There is tension between these levels: we want to hold climate change at 
arm’s length, but a countervailing force reminds us of its personal relevance. Consistent 
with a motivated reasoning account, our cognitive representations of climate change are 
formed in part by the prior knowledge called upon, by anticipated affect, and by our end 
needs and goals (Kunda, 1990). Through repeated preferential accessing, these cognitive 
representations become associations: a ‘quick guide’ to climate change information that 
also influences our implicit emotion regulation (Westen et al., 2006). Associations en masse 
permeate through society, and are amplified and shaped by external cultural forces – such 




information with particular imagery and content (Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, et al., 
1988). This coupling makes some associations more cognitively accessible, and provides the 
individual with a narrowed-down subset of rules and beliefs through which to sift to find 
the associations that best fit their needs and goals.  
 
Motivational forces: The first long column on the diagram represents motivational forces: a 
combination of individual differences (or tendencies), universal traits, socialisation 
processes, and cultural context. These forces exert influence over our overt expressions 
where they have relevance to the subset of rules and beliefs that are accessed in response 
to incoming information. For example, if the rules and beliefs accessed have system-level 
relevance, then whether one has high or low system-justifying tendencies will be important 
in shaping an individual’s outward response to the incoming information.  
 
Manifestations and mechanisms: The columns under this heading comprise ‘responses’ to 
climate change; the beliefs, attitudes, opinions, values, and behaviours we exhibit that 
relate to climate change. These responses can be thought of as mediators between the 
inner needs and goals of an individual, and external influences and motivational forces.  
 
Primary Expressions: Our basic opinion about the causes of climate change lies 
here. As such I am conceptualising opinions and attitudes about climate change as not 
deep-seated beliefs, but as malleable expressions that shift in accordance with changing 
needs and goals, and changing external social cues. In this sense we can think of climate 
change opinions as subservient expressions that do the bidding of dominant motivational 
forces , and implicit-level rules and beliefs about the world (that are less malleable). A 
person may hold multiple opinions and attitudes concurrently, and depending on what the 
end goals and needs are, a different attitude might be expressed by the same person on 
different occasions. Much of the work of primary expressions (including rationalisations, 
justifications, and neutralisations) is to find a way to successfully navigate the next stage. 
 
The Moral Gateway:  In order to arrive at the pre-desired conclusion, one must 
negotiate a moral gateway. This negotiation is necessary in large part due to the constant 




that individuals are naturally motivated to morally engage with threatening information, in 
the model it assumed that people are also motivated, even geared towards, moral 
disengagement. In this sense moral disengagement is a motivated active process. Moral 
disengagement allows one to proceed to the next stage without compromising other needs 
and goals: notably, our self-worth as a moral and adaptive person, and self-presentational 
needs of appearing moral and consistent (Monin et al., 2008; Steele, 1988). 
 
Secondary Expressions: Pro-environmental behaviour, policy support, and support 
for social change are all examples of secondary expressions. These expressions are the 
natural consequence of the proceeding stages, and function to finally satisfy the original 
needs and goals: for instance, pro-environmental behaviour may reinforce self-identity 
needs or group belongingness, or make us feel we are contributing to something that will 
outlast our own lifetimes. These secondary expressions serve important social identity 
needs too – they are a signal to others of our own individual rules, beliefs, and group 
belongingness, and these expressions help us to differentiate ourselves from other groups 
and collectives (in so doing reinforcing the cultural bases of these rules and beliefs). 
 
Needs & Goals and Functional Areas: Our needs and goals are competing. The context and 
content of climate change make different needs more or less salient at any one time. Needs 
at different levels can work concurrently: for instance mortality salience might trigger 
existential fear reduction and social and cultural belongingness needs at the same time. 
Within individuals, a particular need may predominate, such as chronic disposition to refer 
to normative standards of judgement (Cooper, 2012), and different expressions may fulfil 
the same need, dependent on the life history, social position, and cultural context of a 
particular individual (Smith et al., 1956). These competing needs and goals are grouped into 
three broad functional areas. Social and cultural needs are those relating to a desire to see 
prevailing social and cultural structures as fair and legitimate. If these needs are being 
frustrated, expressions that favour social change might manifest. Group and inter-individual 
needs might include need for social support or self-presentational goals: they are 
concerned with our need to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of others. Intra-individual 
needs concern our own internal coherence; that we are stable, agentic, moral, and worthy 





Reinforcement of preferential accessing: Finally, the dotted line running along the bottom 
of the model symbolises how the subsets of rules and beliefs we access when confronted 
with climate change information are reinforced through repeated accessing.  
 
9.2.2 An Introspective Example 
I will use an example drawn from my own life to illustrate how the processes contained in 
my model might work on an everyday basis.53 I have to work tomorrow. I’ll probably drive. 
I’ll probably drive despite the having a perfectly good bicycle sitting in my spare room. I’m 
aware that my decision to drive or ride is relevant to climate change, and that climate 
change is an issue I’ll read about tomorrow morning (there are floods in Queensland and 
bushfires in Victoria at the moment, accompanied by intense media debate about the part 
played by climate change). Therefore my decision of whether to ride or drive is weighed up 
in the context of the information I know about climate change. My decision is in part 
guided by anticipated affect: I suspect I’ll feel a twinge of guilt from driving, but on the 
other hand I’ll suffer physical discomfort from riding. I have two competing needs. In this 
case, the avoidance of discomfort from riding outweighs the anticipated guilt, so I want to 
take the car. I now have pre-determined outcome, so I am directionally motivated to come 
to a conclusion that accords with that outcome. But I have to come to that conclusion in a 
way that doesn’t jeopardise other needs and goals that are important to me. 
 
What sort of implicit associations come to mind I can only speculate, but chances are on 
this occasion I will preference those that represent climate change as a big global problem; 
I won’t get a mental image of people saving the world in lycra bike-shorts. Similarly, I can’t 
really know what motivational forces are shaping my reasoning process. But there’s that 
nagging sense of guilt still lurking; I know I’m going to have to morally justify my decision at 
some point. I’ve gone through this reasoning process a lot. In fact I’ve done it so many 
times I know (implicitly) which set of rules and beliefs to access if I’m to reach my desired 
conclusion. This particular set allows me to construct rationalisations and justifications for 
what I’m about to do. Lucky for me, I have loads. I live close to work and it’s a fuel-efficient 
car (what about those guys who drive an hour each way to work in their massive tanks, 
there’s a handy self-exonerating comparison), it sports a recently attached World Wildlife 
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Fund sticker – evidence of my green credentials (the sticker, ironically designed to be stuck 
on cars, serves a nice value-expressive function), and besides “do you know how dangerous 
cycling in traffic is?”, and so on and so forth. Meanwhile, societal forces and constraints 
mean other choices (car-pooling, working at home, and so on) remain largely invisible to 
me. 
 
All of these rationalisations have an individual-level focus. System and group level 
processes are less likely to be considered, for several reasons. First, the end-goal (avoiding 
effortful behaviour and the attendant physical discomfort), has individual-level relevance. 
Second, if I start accessing group level information, this might trigger the needs and goals of 
those higher levels, and that’s bad news for me. Many of my colleagues ride to work, 
potentially frustrating belongingness needs, and accessing my system-level rules and beliefs 
would remind me of my deeply-held view that I have a social responsibility to always make 
the ‘right’ decision, making it fiendishly difficult to navigate that moral gateway.  
 
Yet I think that climate change is happening, and that humans are largely causing it (how do 
I know this? I don’t. But scientists are my positive referents, and probably how I self-
categorise when it comes to climate change). What I think causes climate change isn’t 
relevant to this particular decision, and my individual-level rationalisations and 
justifications have done the work for me. I negotiate the moral gateway through the path 
of moral disengagement. But if the mental gymnastics of rationalisation start to get too 
taxing, and my competing needs become too frustrated (such as my self-identity as 
somebody who cares for the environment), and my discomfort builds and builds, I’ll 
probably have to take the bike (or decide that climate change is one big myth).  
 
Every time I go through this process I reinforce my preferential accessing. Though 
oversimplified, I hope the example demonstrates how one can act (in this case habitually) 
in opposition to their expressed attitudes and values. 
 
9.3 Theoretical Implications 
One of the consequences of co-opting motivated social cognition accounts to perform my 




This might seem a strange omission for an analysis on climate change responses, but I 
suggest that environmental attitudes and values are largely redundant, except when 
environmentalism lies at the heart of a person’s identity (Kantola, Syme, & Campbell, 
1984). To go one step further, I propose that many environmental values and attitudes are 
the outcomes, or expressions, of implicit processes – that is, for most people, 
environmental attitudes and values (and opinions towards environmental issues like 
climate change) are subservient to deep-seated beliefs and rules, such as system-justifying 
ideologies. A corollary of this thinking is that environmental ‘beliefs’ are not stable traits 
that differ from individual to individual, but are malleable.  
 
Considering expressions about the environment as subject to rapid change opens up 
further possibilities.  I propose that environmental values, beliefs, and norms (as they are 
referred to by Stern) are cultural constructions than can be strategically and selectively 
deployed as discursive and rhetorical tools to help justify and legitimise (both to oneself 
and to others) a pre-determined conclusion. This plasticity of environmental values is 
similar to Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky’s (1990) conception of ideas of ‘nature’ as socially 
constructed; our ideas can be squeezed into whatever configuration suits us at the time, 
within certain limits. Because we have competing needs and goals, we also have competing 
(or conflicting) sets of arguments that pertain to the environment. These different attitudes 
are available to a person (within a latitude of acceptance that does not threaten our 
internal consistency), and these different attitudes are accessed dependent on the needs 
and goals of the individual at the time, each potentially serving a different function. There is 
tension within this attitude system, resulting in shifting attitudes, context-dependency, and 
attitudinal ambivalence. This tension is observed through logical inconsistencies, or a 
conflict of accounts (e.g. “I don’t believe in climate change and big-polluting countries are 
responsible for it anyway”). 
 
At an individual level these shifting environmental expressions function in a similar way to 
Bersoff’s (1999) notion of a ‘neutralisation’: rationalisations and justifications used for 
performing a behaviour at odds with pre-existing values. Such an idea might also explain 
the low levels of correspondence evident in much environmental research between 




might take the form of legitimising myths, also a rationalisation for acting out of keeping 
with previously expressed attitudes.  
 
An assumption in my above argument (and also within my model), is that it is pre-formed 
conclusions that are being neutralised, implying that all responses to climate change are 
directionally motivated. I argue that responses to climate change are, if not universally, 
then much more likely to be directionally than non-directionally motivated, due in part to 
the inherent complexity and intangibility of the attitude-object.54 This argument is 
supported by the frequently observed conflict in accounts. The strong ideological 
relationships with climate change responses also suggest that directionally motivated 
reasoning processes are engaged. Further, associations with scientific content or with 
scientists themselves were far less prevalent than associations with natural disasters and 
politics and politicians. The work of Westen et al. (2006) suggests that political judgements 
and decision-making arouse ‘hot’ cognition processes, a form of directional reasoning.  
 
9.4 Applied Implications 
The results presented in this thesis reiterate findings elsewhere that a deficit-approach to 
climate change communication is severely limited (Evans & Durant, 1995; Kahan et al., 
2012; Zia & Todd, 2010). Simply giving people more evidence, or more scientific 
information, will not necessarily translate into broadscale acceptance that humans are 
driving climate change. Communications predicated on the assumption that everyone 
strives for scientific accuracy when formulating their opinions are likely to miss their 
intended mark, for they fail to recognise that humans’ needs and goals are multiple and 
varied, and that opinions are formed and shaped by a myriad of competing forces. A further 
problem arises when one considers the results of estimating community sentiment: 
negative authority referents (those who we do not wish to identify ourselves with) seemed 
particularly important in shaping, informing, and bolstering the opinions of those sceptical 
about climate change, and those negative referents were scientific and academic sources. 
‘Shouting the science more loudly’ is unlikely to sway sceptical opinion if those doing the 
shouting are not trusted to begin with; perversely, it might even entrench scepticism.  
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Unfortunately, even if and where opinions can be swayed by scientific evidence alone, this 
will not necessarily translate into pro-environmental behaviour. A range of other 
mechanisms (rationalisations, justifications, suppression, and so on) can be employed to 
morally disengage from the consequences of inaction, even when the ‘correct’ opinions 
have been generated. But perhaps non-directional motivations can be induced. People are 
more likely to be non-directional in their judgements when they expect evaluations to 
affect their livelihood, and when they are highly involved in the subject (Kunda, 1990). 
Concerted efforts to frame the impacts of climate change in personally meaningful ways – 
such as focussing on impacts specific to the nation or locale – may be an effective means to 
connect climate change with personal livelihoods. The attendant anticipated affect 
associated with localised climate change impacts might precipitate a reasoning process 
whereby people are motivated to reach accurate conclusions because it is the best threat 
reduction method available. But such information must also avoid activating proximal and 
distal defences in response to threatening information, so positive outcomes need to be 
offered as well. This last task will be difficult given that climate change is not implicitly 
associated with positive outcomes. Constant coupling with positive messages and 
outcomes will be required over the long term.   
 
There are other ways of designing communications to appeal to different motivations. For 
instance, communications that emphasise community engagement and participation as 
part of the solution might prime and fulfil meaning-striving and belongingness needs, 
particularly for those who have the ‘correct’ opinions, yet are not fully engaged with the 
issue. For high system-justifiers, exploiting the legitimising myth that engaging with climate 
change is ‘an opportunity to be part of something bigger’ need not necessarily run counter 
to dispositional tendencies.  Previous research suggests that people high in conservatism 
(and other system-justifying tendencies) have higher levels of existential anxiety (Jost, 
2006). This deep-seated proneness to mortality salience may even drive tendencies 
towards conservatism (Jost et al., 2003). So, somewhat perversely, promoting a hierarchy-
attenuating myth might engage both those with liberal and conservative ideologies 
concurrently. Communications that anticipate and undermine hierarchy-enhancing myths 
(such as the low efficacy of national response), may also make it more cognitively difficult 






 Another characteristic of conservativism is nationalism. Results from the word-elicitation 
task suggest that many climate change associations have national-level relevance. 
Exploiting this level of relevance, including the potential benefits accrued to Australia from 
effective policy response (including pride and national security) might also be 
advantageous, similar to suggestions from research in the US (Feygina et al., 2010; Zia & 
Todd, 2010).   
 
My longitudinal analysis of changes in moral engagement revealed that, as people moved 
away from acceptance of human-induced climate change, they became morally 
disengaged, but moves toward acceptance did not result in any appreciable increase in 
engagement. To me this suggests that ‘moral engagement’ and ‘moral disengagement’ 
might be distinct rather than the one bipolar construct. Strategies to prevent 
disengagement may be more beneficial in stimulating and maintaining pro-environmental 
behaviours than strategies designed to increase engagement. But there is another 
explanation to the different rates of change observed: that it reflects a broader cultural 
disengagement with climate change in general. 
 
According to system justification theory, when enough momentum for a new system is 
gathered, and that emerging system starts to look inevitable, people automatically justify 
and support the emerging system. If adequately assuaging the threat of climate change to 
society entails a major shift in the prevailing economic system, then false consensus and 
pluralistic ignorance, in conjunction with status-quo biases, could severely hamper any 
required change. We know there are many determinants of opinions about climate change, 
and that our own opinions in turn shape our opinions of what others in our community 
think: our consensus estimates reflect our own thinking on the matter. But our perception 
of what the broader community thinks is a dynamic process: these perceptions can 
reinforce our own patterns of thinking, or convince us to believe differently (Shamir & 
Shamir, 1997). This, in combination with political and media influences, sow the ground 
from which pluralistic ignorance can grow. Communication of the actual consensus: that 
climate change is happening (perhaps the question of what causes it should be irrelevant in 
this case), and that we need to adapt accordingly, warrants extended air-play. 




In feedback-conformity studies on right-wing authoritarians, Altemeyer (2006) found that 
people high in right-wing authoritarianism were much more likely than others to change 
their opinions (including on the issues of homosexuality and religion) in line with a 
supposed norm. Altemeyer attributed these findings to high right-wing authoritarians’ 
desire for conformity; to the high value placed on “being normal” (Altemeyer, 2006, p. 29). 
As high right-wing authoritarianism is associated with outright denial in the existence of 
climate change, then making the point that this opinion is one only a small minority of the 
population hold might be especially fruitful. 
 
Broader cultural forces are just as important as intra-individual psychological mechanisms; 
individuals have to adjust their responses in accordance with changing cultural forces to 
ensure their needs and goals remain met. Let’s revisit that first chart in Chapter 1, shown 
again below as Figure 45. Although we only have polling data that goes back 10 years at the 
most (which says something in itself), that climate change denial and scepticism were not 
researched (and weren’t in common parlance, refer to Figure 46) is evidence that a cultural 
shift has happened in at least countries. It appears this cultural shift has happened in 
Australia. But why?  
 
Figure 45. Scopus search results for number of research articles on climate change 







Figure 46. Google search patterns for “climate change denial”, 2004-2013. 
 
Rapid consensus changes in society often occur when a perceived consensus is revealed as 
having little real support by individuals (a ‘conservative lag’), or where a minority is able to 
impose the appearance of consensus on the majority (a ‘liberal leap’) (O’Gorman, 1986). 
Liberal leaps55 occur when the establishment of pluralistic ignorance allows for rapid 
change. Given the strong association between climate change and political orientations, it 
may seem peculiar that pluralistic ignorance surrounding climate change ‘denial’ should be 
an example of a liberal leap. Perhaps this peculiarity is due to the recent establishment of a 
new brand of conservatism that co-opts the populist, dynamic, and mobilising dimensions 
of tactics normally associated with social progressive movements. These tactics may use 
social media and other forms of mass communication, high-profile ‘grass-roots looking’ 
demonstrations and so on, to create the impression that the minority (but highly visible) 
view reflects the silent majority. Some commentators have argued that various interested 
parties in Australia and the US have co-opted the tactics of social progressive movements 
and that the domain used as its vehicle has been climate change and carbon pricing policies 
(Wilkinson, 2011).  This sort of ‘progressive’ or ‘radical’ conservatism, motivated by the 
desire to maintain positions of societal privilege, respond to or against particular events or 
issues that bear relation to state intervention. One of these issues, it seems, is climate 
change (Leiserowitz et al., 2011). If this is so, it once again highlights the importance of 
communicating the consensus that climate change is happening, and challenging media 
bias that presents denial as a pervasive sentiment in the community. 
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In sum, framing communication about climate change at multiple levels concurrently 
(individual, group, and system) may prime a host of competing needs and goals (individual, 
interpersonal, and social and cultural needs). Under such circumstances, I suggest it 
becomes much more difficult to build rationalisations and justifications to meet competing 
needs and goals at all levels simultaneously, and hence harder to negotiate the moral 
gateway via disengagement.  Successful change campaigns may be contingent upon 
appealing to all categories of needs simultaneously. Such communication should use 
diverse messengers and media channels in order to combat shared false ideas in the 
community.  
 
9.5 Methodological and Conceptual Reflections 
There is a key limitation with the approach used in this thesis: the needs, goals, and 
functions are inferred, rather than directly tested. Arguably, by their implicit, automatic, 
and often unconscious nature, functions cannot be directly tested, but must always rely on 
inference from observed phenomena. Nevertheless, other methods to those used here 
(such as discursive analysis and case history studies) would go a long way to corroborating 
the inferences I have made.  
 
Self-report instruments designed to capture motivated social cognition processes have a 
further limitation. There is evidence that directional decision-making occurs especially 
under time pressure and when hasty reasoning is involved (Kunda, 1990). Online survey 
instruments might be a good way to uncover directional processes if respondents are 
rushing through the survey. But respondents might also strive for cognitive consistency, 
slowly deliberating about each response and revising it carefully. Even when I attempted to 
control for this in the workshops by careful instruction, there was evidence that people still 
sometimes engaged in slow, deliberative thinking and revised their selections (perhaps for 
self-presentational purposes). Self-report is particularly problematic for pro-environmental 
behaviour. If we assume that people strive for consistency, not only in questionnaire 
responses, but between sets of values, or between sets of values and behaviours in order 
to maintain a consistent self-identity, then items that rely to some degree on a subjective 
interpretation are problematic. For example, do you switch lights off around the home 




behaviours that accord with occasions where this statement rings true are more readily 
accessible than are behaviours inconsistent with one’s identity. It should be acknowledged 
that these hidden reasoning processes potentially account for some of the relationships I 
observed.  
 
A further limitation of my studies again concerns pro-environmental behaviours. The 
behaviours I tested for were, primarily, climate change mitigation behaviours. But climate 
adaptation behaviours are arguably just as, if not more, relevant to society now. At 
present, adaptation behaviour is under-researched at the individual level, principally 
because these behaviours are so hard to define. This is where Health Belief Models, such as 
Protection Motivation Theory, arguably have the most to offer when considering the 
functions of climate change responses. Devising a good metric of adaptation behaviours, 
and empirically testing conceptual models such as a revised health belief model 
incorporating social and cultural influences (such as that proposed in Swim et al., 2011), 
seems particularly fertile ground for a functional analysis. 
 
9.6 Research Directions 
Many questions emerge from the current research. To what extent are the functions 
contained in Figure 44 universal, and to what extent are they contingent upon the specific 
socio-political Australian context? Within Australia, how enduring are the mechanisms 
employed to meet these goals and needs? And how translatable are these functions to 
other environmental domains, such as water conservation or agricultural practices? 
 
Future research could attempt to trace individual pathways in the conceptual model using a 
variety of different approaches. Such research would ground-test components of the 
model, and subsequent findings would enable its revision and refinement. Using more 
intensive approaches, such as individual case studies, might reveal more about functions 
than correlational studies. For instance, what about those who buck the trend? The left-
wing, equity-loving climate change denier? Are there particular processes going on for 





While I have touched on how the potential functions of individual responses relate to social 
and cultural processes, I have said correspondingly little about small-group processes and 
dyadic relationships. Further targeted testing could examine how people react to small-
group consensus on climate change, for example. How do people’s privately held opinions 
differ from their publicly expressed sentiments in the face of normative group pressures? A 
functional analysis might also be upscaled to organised groups and other collectives. It 
seems valid to assume, for instance, that certain functions are entailed in a corporation’s 
response to climate change (beyond naked greed).  
 
One methodological tool that would test some of the present findings more formally is the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Establishing which 
personal and authority referents are most important, for whom, and in what context, 
would help communicators frame messages more effectively, and decide who the 
messengers should be under which circumstances. Establishing how people self-categorise 
when presented with different climate change stimuli would be of similar benefit. 
Employing the IAT would also corroborate findings that some images, or stimuli, (such as 
natural disasters) are associated with high arousal, while other images (such as denuded 
landscapes) are associated with low levels of arousal. How these arousal patterns shape our 
subsequent attitudes, needs, and actions should also be considered, particularly in relation 
to approach / avoid behaviours. 
 
In the current research I used a single index of pro-environmental behaviours, but there are 
advantages to testing the drivers of different subsets of behaviours, as they may well fulfil 
different needs and goals. For example, socially visible behaviours (such as public 
protesting) may fulfil self-presentational needs, while private behaviours might satisfy 
intra-individual goals. There are presumably different rationalisations and justifications 
associated with these different sub-sets of behaviours that strategies aimed at neutralising 
might benefit from understanding. Future research could also incorporate a more objective 
measure of behaviour, and compare it with responses to more subjective measures such as 
the one used here. In this way we might infer how self- identity and the desire for 
consistency can result in the selective accessing of memory. Finally, taking part in some 
pro-environmental behaviours might be able to excuse our bad behaviours in other areas. 




level, whereby previous moral behaviour by in-group members excuses the subsequent 
immoral behaviour of an in-group individual (Kouchaki, 2011). Future research should 
pursue the interaction of good and bad behaviours, and how these interact at individual, 
group, and collective levels. 
 
The apparent centrality of moral engagement in responses to climate change suggests that 
this mechanism in particular warrants further investigation. Such research could establish, 
for instance, whether direct moral appeals accentuate moral disengagement, and whether 
this is more likely when appeals are targeted to the individual than when made at a more 
general level. Whether any subsequent moral disengagement assuages threats to, or 
bolsters, self-image could also be measured.  Inclusion of a third time-point in time-series 
data would enable causal pathways and trends to be established with greater certainty. A 




The list of functions, phenomena, and motivational forces tested here is by no means 
exhaustive, guided as the research was by a particular disciplinary approach and previous 
research in the climate change domain.56 Doubtless I unwittingly engaged in my own 
motivated search of rules and beliefs when establishing what to include and what not to 
include (but hopefully not one intended to reach a pre-formed conclusion!). It is of course 
impossible to eliminate such unconscious biases from the research process, but more 
collaborative efforts at functional analyses might help to reduce them. 
  
Irrespective of any shortcomings, hopefully I will have convinced you that denial and 
scepticism about the causes of climate change is but a small piece of the puzzle in 
understanding the range of possible ways we respond to climate change, and why. I would 
be even more satisfied if I have persuaded you of (or reaffirmed to you) the importance of 
understanding what needs and goals are fulfilled by responses to climate change.  This is 
not to say that what drives denial and scepticism is unimportant. Indeed, the growing 
popularity of ‘qualified believers’ in Australia tells us a lot about the influences of culture, 
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politics, and groups, and by extension, about the inaction of believers. All of this, I believe, 
has relevance to the next big collective challenge: physically adapting to the impacts of 
climate change in a way that doesn’t compromise us psychologically. I hope the work 
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Table 45. List of survey measures used and the data chapters in which they appear 
Measure Measure type/description Ch4 Ch5 Ch6 Ch7 Ch8 
Respondent demographics Categorical measures of age, gender, individual income, and location X   X X 
Belief in climate change One dichotomous item X      
Opinion-type about climate 
change 
One item with four response categories 
X X X X X 
Pro-environmental behaviour  Aggregated scale of 16 behaviour items (alpha = .84) X X X   
Self-referent attitudes Ten separate attitudinal items X     
Social attitudes Eight separate Likert scale items X     
Emotional responses Twelve separate descriptor items X X X   
Negative arousal Scale of four emotion items (alpha = .80) X   X  
Positive arousal Scale of three emotion items (alpha = .76) X     
Depressed Scale of four emotion items (alpha = .66) X     
Annoyed Scale of four emotion items (alpha = .71) X X    
Political preference Voting behaviour in last federal election X     
Self descriptions Sixteen separate descriptor items guiding views on climate change X     
Ratings of responsibility for 
causing climate change 
Separate Likert scale items for responsibility accorded to 7 groups and to 
individuals 
 X    
Ratings of responsibility for 
responding to climate change 
Separate Likert scale items for responsibility accorded to 7 groups and to 
individuals 
 X X   
Disparity in responsibility 
ratings 
Aggregated and averaged group responsibility scores subtracted from 
individual responsibility scores 




Measure Measure type/description Ch4 Ch5 Ch6 Ch7 Ch8 
Moral (Dis)engagement Scale of two Likert scale items (alpha = .77)  X X X  
Individual Efficacy Scale of two Likert scale items (alpha = .74)  X X   
Negative Social Attitudes Three separate Likert scale items  X    
Certainty in Anthropogenic 
Climate Change 
Sliding 1-100 scale  
 X  X  
Changes in Opinion-Type Changes over time in individual responses to categorical Opinion item   X X   
False consensus in opinion Estimated community consensus with the respondent’s own opinion-type   X   
Trust in friends and family Trust in friends and family and four other information groups on a 5-point 
scale 
  X   
Economic System Justification Scale of 17 items  (alpha = .77)    X  
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale of six items (alpha = .74)    X  
Social Dominance Orientation Scale of eight items (alpha = .87)    X  
Policy Support Two (split-sample design) separate Likert scale items    X  
Voting Intentions Intended voting behaviour in next federal election    X  
Household and Personal 
Income 
Personal income level per week; household income per year 
   X  
Moral Justifications and 
Legitimising Myths 
Four separate negatively worded Social Attitude Likert scale items; Three 
separate  worded Social Attitude Likert scale items 
   X  
Associations Word-elicitation task recording up to three image and person association 
responses 
    X 




































Thank you for agreeing to take part in this 30-minute survey.  
 
This research is being conducted on behalf of the CSIRO. We want to understand the thoughts and 
opinions of people from all over Australia about climate change. The information will be used to 
monitor how Australian’s views about climate change change over time.  
 
Participation in this survey is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time without penalty. 
Your responses and personal information will be kept confidential. You are free to stop the survey at 
any time, and you may choose not to answer some questions. Should you choose to stop the survey, 
the information you have given us will be discarded. If you have any questions, concerns or 
complaints about the survey, please contact project officer Ms. Zoe Leviston on (08) 9333 6169 or the 
CSIRO Ethics Officer, Cathy Pitkin, on (07) 3214 2905. This study has received ethical approval from 
the CSIRO Human Research Ethics Committee. 
 
We hope you enjoy taking part in our survey 
 
Sincerely, 
The Research Team 
 
 


























We would like to start by asking you a series of questions about some of the other things you think 
about when you think about climate change 
 
 
[FOR QUESTION 1: SPLIT SAMPLE. 50% respondents answer Q1a; 50% respondents answer Q1b – 
Pair with Q2a and Q2b] 
 
1.  
A. What are the first three words that come to mind when you think of climate change? 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
   
 
B. What are the first three images that come to mind when you think of climate change? 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  




A. Using the following scale, how would you rate each of the three words 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 + 5 
Very 
Negative 








 First word   
 Second word   
 Third word   
 
B. Using the following scale, how would you rate each of the three images 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 + 5 
Very 
Negative 








 First image   
 Second image   






3. Which three people do you think of first when you think of climate change? 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
4. Using the following scale, how would you rate each of these people in relation to climate 
change? 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 + 5 
Very 
Negative 








 First person   
 Second person   
 Third person   
 
 
We would now like to ask you some general questions about what you think about climate change. 
Don’t spend too long answering each question; just go with your initial thoughts. 
 






[FOR QUESTION 6: SPLIT SAMPLE. 50% respondents answer Q6a; 50% respondents answer Q6b] 
 
6.  
a. How sure are you that climate change is happening? Tick one box only 
 
 Extremely sure 
 Very sure 
 Somewhat sure 
 Not at all sure 
 
b. How sure are you that global warming is happening? Tick one box only 
 
 Extremely sure 
 Very sure 
 Somewhat sure 








7. Given what you know, which of the following statements best describes your thoughts 
about climate change? Tick one box only 
 
 I don’t think that climate change is happening 
 I have no idea whether climate change is happening or not 
 I think that climate change is happening, but it’s just a natural fluctuation in Earth’s temperatures 
 I think that climate change is happening, and I think that humans are largely causing it 
 
8. Try and guess the percentage of Australians who would think the following ways about 
climate change (HINT: the numbers you place beside all four boxes should add up to 100) 
 
Don’t think that climate change is happening ____ 
Have no idea whether climate change is happening or not ____ 
Think that climate change is happening, but it’s just a natural fluctuation in Earth’s temperatures 
____ 




9. Over the past year, have you become more or less sure that climate change is happening? 
Tick one box only 
 
 Much more sure 
 Somewhat more sure 
 Neither more or less sure 
 Somewhat less sure 
 Much less sure 
 
 
10. How worried are you about climate change? Tick one box only 
 
 Very worried 
 Somewhat worried 
 Not very worried 
 Not at all worried 
 
 
11. How much do you think climate change will harm you personally? Tick one box only 
 
 A great deal 
 A moderate amount 
 Only a little 
 Not at all 
 Don’t know 
 
 
12. How important is the issue of climate change to you personally?  
 
 Extremely important 
 Very important 
 Somewhat important 
 Not too important 






13. How much have you personally experienced the effects of climate change? Tick one box 
only 
 
 A great deal 
 A moderate amount 
 A little 
 Not at all 
 
 
14. Which of the following best describes your thoughts about climate change? Tick one box 
only 
 
 I don’t think it’s real and I don’t think it’s important;  
 I doubt it’s real but I think it’s an important issue;  
 I think it’s probably real but I’m not really interested in it 
 I think it’s real and I feel it’s important 
 
 
15. If you had to sum up your position on climate change in one word, what would it be? 
 
 






16. Using the scale below, how much do you trust the following organisations or people to tell 
you the truth about climate change? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Distrust  
a lot 





Consumer organisations       
Environmental organisations      
University scientists       
Government scientists       
Industry scientists       
Environmental group scientists      
People from your community      
Friends and family       
Doctors         
Government        
Local authorities        
Oil companies        






17. Using the scale below, how much do you think each of the following groups is responsible 
for doing something about climate change?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 










Normal individuals       
Local governments       
State governments       
The Federal government       
Global organisations such as the United Nations    
Wealthy countries       
Big polluting countries        
Multi-national corporations      
 
 
18. Using the scale below, how much do you think each of the following groups is responsible 
for causing climate change? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 









Normal individuals       
Local governments       
State governments       
The Federal government       
Global organisations such as the United Nations    
Wealthy countries       
Big polluting countries        
















19. Using the scale below, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements  
 




Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
 
 
Having a car gives someone more freedom than not having a car   
 
Realistically, nothing will be done about climate change until it’s too late    
 
The impacts of climate change on people’s lives are huge      
 
I think climate change will affect me personally       
 
The impacts of climate change are really beyond my control      
 
I enjoy buying things          
 
Climate change may mean that wealth and resources end up being distributed  
more fairly           
 
It gives me more satisfaction to try and make things last than to buy new things    
 
I don’t believe in climate change         
 
Doing something about climate change is an opportunity to be part of  
something bigger than ourselves     
 
I would prefer not to be charged more for my energy bills       
 
I have stopped listening to people go on about climate change because I am  
tired of hearing about the topic         
 
Individuals can make a difference to climate change       
 
People should be entitled to buy things they’ve worked hard to earn     
 
The thought of climate change scares me        
 
Eating less meat would save me money        
 
Climate change will foster greater community spirit and connectedness    
 
The impacts of climate change are inevitable now so there’s not much point  
worrying about it           
 
I don’t have the information I need to reduce the impact of climate change    
 
A lot of household waste that is put into recycling bins ends up in landfill    
 
Climate change will result in financial hardship for many people      
 
Using a car less often would be better for my health       
 





People should pay more for the natural resources that they use     
 
There’s nothing Australia can do about climate change that will make a 
meaningful difference          
 
For most of the things I do, it would be more convenient for me to drive than to walk, ride,  
or take public transport          
 
There are meaningful things I can do to reduce the impact of climate change    
 
People should be accountable to the whole of society for their behaviours    
 
I don’t like being morally judged for my private behaviours      
 
I don’t have enough money to do things that would reduce the impact of  
climate change           
  
Attempting to respond to climate change will cost the country too much money   
 
People should stop and ask themselves “do I really need this?” before they 
buy new things   
 
I don’t have enough time to do things that would reduce the impact of  
climate change           
 
I try not to think about climate change        
 
Meat is an important part of my diet        
 
I would save money if I used my car less        
 
Climate change will mean better weather in some parts of the world     
 
Trying to do something about climate change will mean a lot of people lose  
their jobs           
 
The whole climate change issue could turn out to be one gigantic mistake by  
scientists           
 
I feel a moral duty to do something about climate change      
 
The challenge of climate change will provide people with a sense of purpose    
 
















20. Which of the following statements best matches your view: 
 
The environment is fragile and will only be protected if there are large changes in human behaviour 
and society 
 
The environment can be managed by the government and experts if there are clear rules about what 
is allowed  
 
The environment can adapt to changes and technology will solve environmental problems eventually  
 
The environment is unpredictable and we can't control what happens   
 
 
21. Using the scale below, rate how much each word or phrase reflects your view on climate 
change? 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 + 5 
Not at all 
like my 
view 








 Uninterested   
 Cautious   
 Considerate   
 Uninformed   
 Sceptical   
 Undecided   
  Passionate   
 An Activist   
 Informed   
 Gullible   
 I don’t believe everything I hear   
 Moral   
 Denying   
 Immoral   
 Selfish   















22. Which of the following least describes you and your standpoint on climate change? (tick one 
box only) 
 
  Uninterested 
  Uninformed 
  An Activist 
  Gullible 
  Sceptical 
  Denying 
  Immoral 
  Selfish 
  Powerless 
 
 
23. If your close friends and family could sum up your attitude to climate change, it would most 
likely be… 
(tick one box only) 
 
  Considerate 
  Passionate 
  Sceptical 
  Cautious 
  Informed 
  Moral 
  In two minds 




24. Using the scale below, how does the issue of climate change make you feel? 
 




Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
 
 Angry    
 Ashamed   
 Guilty   
 Fearful   
 Hopeful   
 Powerless   
 Joyful   
 Confused   
 Despairing   
 Excited   
 Bored   







25. Using the scale below, please rate how much you agree with each statement 
 




Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
 
 Climate change is all about… 
 
 Power   
 Money   
 Politics   
 The Environment   
 Scientists   
 Energy corporations   




26. Where do you get most of your information about climate change from? 
 
 





27. We are now going to ask you some questions about some of the things you do. There are no 
right or wrong answers! For each of the activities below, we would like to know if you take 
the action mainly for environmental reasons, or mainly for other reasons such as 
convenience, time, money, and so on. If you do an action for both environmental and other 
reasons, please select the strongest reason.   
 




other reasons  
I don’t do this  
I usually walk/cycle/carpool/take public 
transport to work 
   
    
Most of my cleaning products are 
environmentally friendly 
   
    
I have a vegetarian  (or vegan) diet    
    
I have switched to products that are more 
environmentally friendly 
   
    
I have a front-loading washing machine    
    
I live within 5 kilometres of my workplace    
    
Where possible, I buy products that are made 
locally  
   
    
I have contacted a government member about 
climate change 
   
    
I have reduced the amount of gas and/or 
electricity I use around the house 
   
    
I have taken part in a political campaign about 
an environmental issue 
   
    
I have reduced the amount of water I use 
around the house and garden 
   
    
I grow a lot of my own vegetables     
    
I try to buy products that are second-hand     
    
I recycle my household waste    
    
I switch lights off around the house whenever 
possible 
   
    
I will usually try to fix things rather than 
replace them 
   
    









Finally, we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself  
 
 
28. What is your year of birth?   
 
29. What is your sex? 
 
  Female  Male 
 
30. What is the total income (including all wages and government benefits) that you personally 
receive? 
 
  $2000 or more per week ($104,000 a year) 
  $1,600 - $1,999 a week ($83,200 - $103,999 a year) 
  $1,300 - $1,599 a week ($67,600 - $83,199 a year) 
  $1,000 - $1,299 a week ($52,000 - $67,599 a year) 
  $800 - $999 a week ($41,600 - $51,999 a year) 
  $600 - $799 a week ($32,000 - $41,599 a year) 
  $400 - $599 a week ($20,800 - $31,199 a year) 
  $250 - $399 a week ($13,000 - $20,799 a year) 
  $150 - $249 a week ($7,800 - $12,999 a year) 
  $1- $149 a week ($1 - $7,799 a year) 
  Nil income 
  Negative income 
  Prefer not to respond 
 
31. What is your household’s gross annual income before tax? 
 
 Less than $30,000    $30,000 - $59,999 
 $60,000 - $89,999    $90,000 - $119,999 
 $120,000 - $149,999     More than $150,000 
 Prefer not to respond 
 
 
32. How many people usually live in your home?  
 
 Adults  ____  
 Children ____ 
 
 Age of children ____  ____ ____  
  
 








34. Cultural background  
 







35. Which of the following best describes your religion? 
 
   Atheist 
   Agnostic 
   No religion 
  Catholic 
  Anglican (Church of England) 
  Uniting Church 
  Presbyterian 
  Greek Orthodox 
  Buddhism 
  Baptist 
  Islam 
  Lutheran  
  Other – please specify:     
 
 
36. Which of the following best describes the area in which you live? 
 
  Capital city 
  Regional town 
  Rural town 
  Other – please specify:    
 
 
37. What is your postcode? 
 
   
 
 
38. Which State or Territory do you live in? 
 
  Australian Capital Territory 
  New South Wales 
  Northern Territory  
  Queensland 
  South Australia 
  Victoria 
  Western Australia 
 
 
39. Which political party are you most likely to vote for in the next federal election? 
  
  Labor Party 
  Liberal Party 
  National Party 
  Greens Party 
  Independent 
  Family First 
  Other – please specify:    
  I have no idea! 
 
 





  Some of primary school 
  Completed primary school 
  Some of high school / tertiary school 
  Completed tertiary school 
  Some of trade / TAFE qualification 
  Completed trade / TAFE qualification 
  Some of undergraduate degree 
  Completed undergraduate degree 
  Some of postgraduate qualification 





41. This questionnaire is part of a multi-year research program being undertaken by the CSIRO. 
Would you be interested in participating in future phases of the project? (saying ‘yes’ does 
not commit you future participation, it only indicates that you may be interested) 
 
  Yes, I may be interested 








THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY. IF YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS TO 
























Thank you for agreeing to take part in this 30-minute survey.  
 
This research is being conducted on behalf of the CSIRO. We want to understand the thoughts and 
opinions of people from all over Australia about climate change. The information will be used to 
monitor how Australian’s views about climate change change over time.  
 
Participation in this survey is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time without 
penalty.Your responses and personal information will be kept confidential. You are free to stop the 
survey at any time, and you may choose not to answer some questions. Should you choose to stop 
the survey, the information you have given us will be discarded. If you have any questions, concerns 
or complaints about the survey, please contact project officer Ms. Zoe Leviston on (08) 9333 6169 or 
the CSIRO Ethics Officer at csshrec@csiro.au. This study has received ethical approval from the CSIRO 
Human Research Ethics Committee. 
 
We hope you enjoy taking part in our survey 
 
Sincerely, 
The Research Team 
 
 






We would like to start by asking you a few questions about yourself 
 
1. Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the scale 
below indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line 
preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding. 
 















In most ways my life is close to my ideal.       
The conditions of my life are excellent.       
I am satisfied with my life.         
So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.     
If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.      
 
 
2. The following sets of questions are about your participation in the community. Please circle the 
most appropriate response 
 
 
Do you help out a local group as a volunteer?  
1 2 3 4 
No not at all   
Yes often (at least 
once a week) 
 
Have you attended a local community event in the past 6 months (eg, church fete, school concert, 
craft exhibition)? 
1 2 3 4 
No not at all   
Yes several (at 
least 3) 
 
Are you an active member of a local organisation or club (eg, sport, craft, social club)? 
1 2 3 4 
No not at all   
Yes several (at 
least 3) 
 
In the past 3 years, have you ever joined a local community action to deal with an emergency? 
1 2 3 4 
No not at all   
Yes frequently (at 










3. Do you rely on the following sources for information about news and current events?  
         YES  NO 
National newspapers   
State newspapers   
Local or community newspapers   
Specialist magazines and journals   
Internet news sites   
Independent blog sites   
Issue-based internet sites and chat rooms   
Social media and networking sites   
Televised news programs on commercial stations   
Televised news programs on non-commercial stations   
Televised current affair programs on commercial stations   
Televised current affair programs on non-commercial stations   
Televised science programs   
Morning TV shows   
Commercial radio   




4. From which three sources do you get most of your information about news and current affairs? 
 
      
 
      
 























5. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  
Neither 








If people work hard, they almost always get what they want   
Laws of nature are responsible for differences in wealth in society    
It is virtually impossible to eliminate poverty   
Most people who don’t get ahead in our society should not blame  
the system; they have only themselves to blame   
Social class differences reflect differences in the natural order of things   
There will always be poor people, because there will never be enough  
jobs for everybody    
If people wanted to change the economic system to make things equal,  
they could    
It is unfair to have an economic system which produces extreme wealth  
and extreme poverty at the same time    
There are no inherent differences between rich and poor; it is purely a  
matter of the circumstances into which you are born    
The existence of widespread economic differences does not mean that   
they are inevitable    
There are many reasons to think that the economic system is unfair   
Poor people are not essentially different from rich people    
Equal distribution of resources is a possibility for our society   
Economic differences in the society reflect an illegitimate distribution of  
resources   
Economic positions are legitimate reflections of people’s achievements    
Equal distribution of resources is unnatural    












6. Using the scale below, to what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 




Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree 
 
 
Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain  
people should be made to show greater respect for them   
 
Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve  
much better care, instead of so much punishment   
   
Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn   
 
Organisations like the army have a pretty unhealthy effect upon men because they  
require strict obedience of commands from supervisors   
 
The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment would not do any  
good in cases like these   
 
Being kind to bludgers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage  
of your weakness, so it’s best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them   
 
 
7. Using the scale below, to what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 




Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a  
different opinion     
 
I don't like situations that are uncertain    
 
I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my life   
 
When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be right   
 
When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the  
issue as possible    
   
I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things   
 
It's annoying to listen to someone who can not seem to make up his or her mind   
 
I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me   
 
I always see many possible solutions to the problems I face    
 
I don’t usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view   







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Negative      Very Positive 
 
Some groups of people are simply inferior to others   
 
It’s OK if some groups have more of a life chance than others   
 
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups   
 
Inferior groups should stay in their place  
  
Group equality should be our ideal    
 
We should do what we can to equalise conditions for different groups    
 
Increased social equality    
 




We would now like to ask you some questions about climate change 
 
9. Which three people do you think of first when you think of climate change? 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
10. Using the following scale, how would you rate each of these people in relation to climate 
change? 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 + 5 
Very 
Negative 








 First person   
 Second person   


















12. How sure are you that climate change is happening? Tick one box only 
 
 Extremely sure 
 Very sure 
 Somewhat sure 




13.  Given what you know, which of the following statements best describes your thoughts about 
climate change? Tick one box only 
 
 I don’t think that climate change is happening 
 I have no idea whether climate change is happening or not 
 I think that climate change is happening, but it’s just a natural fluctuation in Earth’s temperatures 




14.  Try and guess the percentage of Australians who would think the following ways about climate 
change (HINT: the numbers you place beside all four boxes should add up to 100) 
 
Don’t think that climate change is happening ____ 
Have no idea whether climate change is happening or not ____ 
Think that climate change is happening, but it’s just a natural fluctuation in Earth’s temperatures 
____ 




[FOR THE NEXT QUESTION ONLY: SPLIT SAMPLE. 50% respondents answer QA; 50% respondents 
answer QB] 
 
15. A. Using the scale below, how much do you support or oppose the Government’s plan to reduce 
Australia’s carbon emissions by putting a price on carbon emitted by industry? Tick one box only 
 





















B. Would you support or oppose putting a price on carbon emitted by industry if the money raised 
was used to ensure low and middle income households are fully compensated for energy price 
rises?  Tick one box only 
 














16. Over the past year, have you become more or less sure that climate change is happening? Tick 
one box only 
 
 Much more sure 
 Somewhat more sure 
 Neither more or less sure 
 Somewhat less sure 
 Much less sure 
 
 
17. How worried are you about climate change? Tick one box only 
 
 Very worried 
 Somewhat worried 
 Not very worried 
 Not at all worried 
 
 
18. How much do you think climate change will harm you personally? Tick one box only 
 
 A great deal 
 A moderate amount 
 Only a little 
 Not at all 






19. How important is the issue of climate change to you personally?  
 
 Extremely important 
 Very important 
 Somewhat important 
 Not too important 











20. How much have you personally experienced the effects of climate change? Tick one box only 
 
 A great deal 
 A moderate amount 
 A little 
 Not at all 
 
21. How personally relevant is climate change to you? 
 
 Extremely personally relevant 
 Very personally relevant 
 Somewhat personally relevant 
 Not too personally relevant 
 Not at all personally relevant 
 
 
22. Given what you know, which of the following statements best describes your thoughts about 
the severity (intensity) natural disasters like floods, bushfires and drought? Tick one box only 
 
 I don’t think that these natural disasters are more severe than they used to be 
 I have no idea whether these natural disasters are more severe than they used to be 
 I think that these natural disasters are more severe than they used to be, but it’s just a natural 
fluctuation in Earth’s climate 
 I think that these natural disasters are more severe than they used to be, and humans are 
contributing significantly to this increase 
 
 
23. Given what you know, which of the following statements best describes your thoughts about 
how often natural disasters like floods, bushfires and drought are happening? Tick one box only 
 
 I don’t think that these natural disasters are more happening more often than they used to be 
 I have no idea whether these natural disasters are happening more often than they used to be 
 I think that natural disasters are happening more often than they used to be, but it’s just a natural 
fluctuation in Earth’s climate 
 I think that natural disasters are happening more often than they used to be, and humans are 




24. Thinking about the causes of climate change, which, if any, of the following best describes your 
opinion? Tick one box only 
 
Please read all these alternatives, then select one answer only 
 
 Climate change is entirely caused by natural processes 
 Climate change is mainly caused by natural processes 
 Climate change is partly caused by natural processes and caused partly by human activity 
 Climate change is mainly caused by human activity 
 Climate change is entirely caused by human activity 
 I think there is no such thing as climate change 
 Don’t know 








25. Move the cursor to the place on the slide which best represents how certain you are that 
humans contribute to climate change 
(100% sliding scale) 
 
  Unsure either way 





26. Using the scale below, how much do you trust the following organisations or people to tell you 
the truth about climate change? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Distrust  
a lot 





Consumer organisations       
Environmental organisations      
University scientists       
Government scientists       
Industry scientists       
Environmental group scientists      
People from your community      
Friends and family       
Doctors         
Government        
Local authorities        
Oil companies        







27. Using the scale below, how much do you think each of the following groups is responsible for 
doing something about climate change?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 










Normal individuals       
Local governments       
State governments       
The Federal government       
Global organisations such as the United Nations    
Wealthy countries       
Big polluting countries        
Multi-national corporations      
 
 
28. Using the scale below, how much do you think each of the following groups is responsible for 
causing climate change? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 









Normal individuals       
Local governments       
State governments       
The Federal government       
Global organisations such as the United Nations    
Wealthy countries       
Big polluting countries        







29. Using the scale below, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements  
 




Neither agree  
nor disagree 




Realistically, nothing will be done about climate change until it’s too late    
 
The impacts of climate change on people’s lives are huge      
 
I think climate change will affect me personally       
 
The impacts of climate change are really beyond my control      
 
 
Climate change may mean that wealth and resources end up being distributed  
more fairly           
 
 
Doing something about climate change is an opportunity to be part of  
something bigger than ourselves     
 
 
I have stopped listening to people go on about climate change because I am  
tired of hearing about the topic         
 
Individuals can make a difference to climate change       
 
I feel it is my ethical responsibility to change my individual behaviour to  
combat climate change          
 
The thought of climate change scares me        
 
 
Climate change will foster greater community spirit and connectedness    
 
The impacts of climate change are inevitable now so there’s not much point  
worrying about it           
 
I don’t have the information I need to reduce the impact of climate change    
 
 
Climate change will result in financial hardship for many people      
 
 
Responding to climate change will cost Australia a lot of money     
 
 
There’s nothing Australia can do about climate change that will make a 
meaningful difference          
 





Individuals working together can make a difference to climate change    
 
People should be accountable to the whole of society for their behaviours    
 
I don’t like being morally judged for my private behaviours      
 
I don’t have enough money to do things that would reduce the impact of  
climate change           
  
Attempting to respond to climate change will cost the country too much money   
 
I don’t have enough time to do things that would reduce the impact of  
climate change           
 
I try not to think about climate change        
 
Trying to do something about climate change will mean a lot of people lose  
their jobs           
 
The whole climate change issue could turn out to be one gigantic mistake by  
scientists           
 
I feel a moral duty to do something about climate change      
 




30. Using the scale below, how does the issue of climate change make you feel? 
 




Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
 
 Angry    
 Ashamed   
 Guilty   
 Fearful   
 Hopeful   
 Powerless   
 Joyful   
 Confused   
 Despairing   
 Excited   
 Bored   









31. The current federal government is.... 
 
 doing enough about climate change 
 
 doing too much about climate change 
 
 not doing enough about climate change 
 





32. Which of the following statements best matches your view: 
 
 The environment is fragile and will only be protected if there are large changes in human 
behaviour and society 
 
 The environment can be managed by the government and experts if there are clear rules 
about what is allowed  
 
 The environment can adapt to changes and technology will solve environmental 
problems eventually  
 








33. We are now going to ask you some questions about some of the things you do. There are no 
right or wrong answers! For each of the activities below, we would like to know if you take the 
action mainly for environmental reasons, or mainly for other reasons such as convenience, time, 
money, and so on. If you do an action for both environmental and other reasons, please select 
the strongest reason.   
 
 




other reasons  
I don’t do this  
I usually walk/cycle/carpool/take public 
transport to work 
   
    
Most of my cleaning products are 
environmentally friendly 
   
    
    
I have switched to products that are more 
environmentally friendly 
   
    
    
Where possible, I buy products that are made 
locally  
   
    
I have contacted a government member about 
climate change 
   
    
I have reduced the amount of gas and/or 
electricity I use around the house 
   
    
I have taken part in a political campaign about 
an environmental issue 
   
    
I have reduced the amount of water I use 
around the house and garden 
   
    
I switch lights off around the house whenever 
possible 
   
    
I will usually try to fix things rather than 
replace them 
   
    
I am on Green Power electricity    
 
 
34. In the last five years, have you undertaken any of the following actions? (Mark ALL that apply) 
 
Been a member of an environmental group or movement    
Given money to a group that aims to protect the environment    
Taken part in an environmental event (e.g. Earth Hour)    
Taken part in a conservation activity (e.g. Landcare, bush regeneration)   







Finally, we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself  
 
35. What is your year of birth?   
 
36. What is your sex? 
 
  Female  Male 
 
37. What is your total income (including all wages and government benefits) before tax? 
 
  $2000 or more per week ($104,000 a year) 
  $1,600 - $1,999 a week ($83,200 - $103,999 a year) 
  $1,300 - $1,599 a week ($67,600 - $83,199 a year) 
  $1,000 - $1,299 a week ($52,000 - $67,599 a year) 
  $800 - $999 a week ($41,600 - $51,999 a year) 
  $600 - $799 a week ($32,000 - $41,599 a year) 
  $400 - $599 a week ($20,800 - $31,199 a year) 
  $250 - $399 a week ($13,000 - $20,799 a year) 
  $150 - $249 a week ($7,800 - $12,999 a year) 
  $1- $149 a week ($1 - $7,799 a year) 
  Nil income 
  Negative income 
  Prefer not to respond 
 
38. What is your household’s gross annual income before tax? 
 
 Less than $30,000    $30,000 - $59,999 
 $60,000 - $89,999    $90,000 - $119,999 
 $120,000 - $149,999     More than $150,000 
 Prefer not to respond 
 
 
39. How many people usually live in your home?  
 
 Adults  ____  
 Children ____ 
 
 Age of children ____  ____ ____  
  
 
40. Which of the following best describes your occupation? 
 
o Professional 
o Clerical / Administrative Worker 
o Technician / Trade Worker 
o Manager 
o Sales Worker 
o Labourer 
o Community and Personal Service Worker 
o Machinery Operator / Driver 
o Not presently in the labour force 








41. Which of the following best describes the area in which you live? 
 
  Capital city 
  Regional town 
  Rural town 
  Other – please specify:    
 
 
42. What is your postcode? 
 
   
 
 
43. Which State or Territory do you live in? 
 
 Australian Capital Territory 
 New South Wales 
  Northern Territory  
 Queensland 
 South Australia 
 Victoria 
 Western Australia 
 
44. Move the cursor below to the place on the slide which best represents your political views 
(100% sliding scale) 
 






45. Which political party did you vote for in the last federal election? 
 
  Labor Party 
  Liberal Party 
  National Party 
  Greens Party 
  Independent 
  Family First 
  Other  
  Prefer not to say 
 
46. Which federal electoral boundary do you fall into? (if known) 
 
    
 
 




  Labor Party 
  Liberal Party 
  National Party 




  Independent 
  Family First 
  Other  
  I have no idea! 
 
 
48. What is the highest level of education you have attained? 
 
  Some of primary school 
  Completed primary school 
  Some of high school / tertiary school 
  Completed tertiary school 
  Some of trade / TAFE qualification 
  Completed trade / TAFE qualification 
  Some of undergraduate degree 
  Completed undergraduate degree 
  Some of postgraduate qualification 




49. This questionnaire is part of a multi-year research program being undertaken by the CSIRO. 
Would you be interested in participating in future phases of the project? (saying ‘yes’ does not 
commit you future participation, it only indicates that you may be interested) 
 
  Yes, I may be interested 






THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY. IF YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS TO 



































Table 46. Response formats for establishing Australian views on climate change 
causation.* 
Study / Poll Year Question wording & response options 
Griffith University 2010 
Thinking about the causes of climate change, which of the following 
best describes your opinion?  
 Climate change is entirely caused by natural processes  
 Climate change is mainly caused by natural processes  
 Climate change is partly caused by natural processes and partly 
caused by human activity  
 Climate change is mainly caused by human activity  
 Climate change is entirely caused by human activity  
 I think there is no such thing as climate change  
 Don’t know  






The planet is warming because of human activity producing 
greenhouse gases  
 Strongly disagree  
 Disagree  
 Uncertain  
 Agree  





Temperature rise is a part of global warming or climate change.  Do 
you think rising temperatures are a result of human activities, or a 
result of natural causes?  
 Human activities  
 A result of natural causes  
 Both (volunteered response)  
 Don’t know/refused  






Which of the following best represents your view about climate 
change? 
 Climate change is not happening 
 The climate is changing, but this has nothing to do with human 
activity  




Do you personally believe that climate change is...?  
 Entirely caused by human activity  




 Or do you believe climate change is not caused by human 
activity at all 






Do you agree that there is fairly conclusive evidence that climate 
change is happening and caused by human activity or do you 
believe that the evidence is still not in and we may just be 
witnessing a normal fluctuation in the Earth’s climate which 
happens from time to time?   
 
 Believe that climate change is happening and is caused by 
human activity  
 I think we are just witnessing a normal fluctuation in the 
Earth’sclimate  






Which best describes your opinion about the causes of climate 
change? 
 Climate change is partly caused by natural processes and partly 
by  human activity  
 Climate change is mainly by human activity  
 Climate change is entirely caused by human activity  
 Climate change is entirely caused by natural processes  
 There is no such thing as climate change 
 Don't know 
 
ARCCANSI Survey 2009 
On a 1 to 7 point scale (with 1 strongly disagree and 7 strongly 
agree), to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements about climate change? 
 Climate change is a natural process that humans have 
contributed to  




Market Research - 
DAFF Survey 
2009 
Tell me whether you agree or disagree or neither with the following 



























Table 47. List of T1 Pro-environmental Behaviours (N = 5036). 







I switch lights off around the house 
whenever possible 
3.9 50.1 46.1 
I recycle my household waste 8.9 21.4 69.7 
I have reduced the amount of water I use 
around the house and garden 
9.6 35.1 55.3 
I will usually try to fix things rather than 
replace them 
11.1 66.7 22.3 
I have reduced the amount of gas and/or 
electricity I use around the house 
12.7 48.8 38.5 
Where possible, I buy products that are 
made locally 
16.8 53.9 29.2 
I have switched to products that are more 
environmentally friendly 
24 21.5 54.5 
Most of my cleaning products are 
environmentally friendly 
25.8 25 49.2 
I grow a lot of my own vegetables 34.6 23.9 11.5 
I try to buy products that are second-hand 53.3 36.1 10.6 
I have a front-loading washing machine 61.4 17.7 20.9 
I usually walk/cycle/carpool/take public 
transport to work 
65.1 24.3 10.7 
I live within 5 kilometres of my workplace 68.6 24.9 6.5 
I am on Green Power electricity 70.9 8.4 20.7 
I have contacted a government member 
about climate change 
87.1 5 7.9 
I have taken part in a political campaign 
about an environmental issue 
87.4 4 8.6 























This Appendix is an extract from the following publication: 
Leviston, Z., & Walker, I. (2010). Baseline Survey of Australian attitudes to climate change: 
Preliminary report. Perth: CSIRO. Retrieved from 
http://www.csiro.au/files/files/p102a.pdf 
 
Opinions about climate change 
An initial question asking about the existence of climate change revealed that more than 
four in five respondents thought that climate change was indeed happening (Figure 48).  
 
Figure 48: Percentage of agreement that climate change is happening    (N = 5036) 
There was a statistically significant association between gender and belief in climate 
change, with women more likely than men to answer yes, though the association was small. 
Those in capital cities were more likely to believe in climate change than those in regional 
towns or rural areas, although again the effect size was small. There was a very weak 
correlation (.082) between age and belief in climate change, with older people more likely 
to believe that climate change is happening than younger people (p < .001). Income was 
unrelated to belief in climate change.  
Respondents were asked to rate which of a series of statements most accorded with their 
point of view (Figure 49). Responses to this question revealed that just over half thought 
about climate change as caused by human activities. More than 40% thought of climate 
change in terms of natural temperature variability. This suggests a lack of consensus 






Figure 49: Typological breakdown of thoughts about climate change (n=5036) 
 
Self-referent Attitudes Toward Climate Change 
Respondents were asked a series of general questions about their attitudes towards 
climate change and its impacts. Figure 50 and Figure 51 suggest that the majority of people 
are only a little or moderately concerned with climate change and do not see it as posing a 
great deal of personal harm. As one would expect, levels of worry and expected harm were 
greater for those who thought climate change was human-induced, than for those who 






Figure 50: Levels of worry about climate change as a percentage of respondents 
 
Figure 51: Levels of personal harm arising from climate change as a percentage of 
respondents 
Participants rated their level of personal experience with climate change and how 
important they thought the issue was. Figure 52 suggests that the majority of people 
consider that they have had little or no personal experience with the effects of climate 
change, although a large proportion (38.1%) of those who consider climate change to be 
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Happening but natural (n=2024)
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Figure 52: Levels of experience with climate change as a percentage of respondents 
The perceived importance of climate change varied according to whether people thought it 
was human-induced or natural, with larger levels of importance cited by those who 
considered it human induced (Figure 53).  
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Trust and responsibility 
Respondents were asked to rate their levels of trust in different sources to provide them 
with truthful information about climate change (Figure 54). There were significant 
differences in ratings according to climate change belief-type, with those who considered it 
a natural process recording lower levels of trust than those who considered it human-
induced in all sources but car and oil companies. 
 
 
Figure 54: Mean ratings of trust in climate change information sources by belief type 
While University scientists topped the rankings in trust, government faired relatively poorly 
– outranking only car and oil companies. Interestingly, friends and family were rated highly 
(second amongst the natural process respondents). Not surprisingly, car companies and oil 
companies faired poorly for both belief-types. 
The survey also sought views on what entities people considered most responsible for 



































































































































Happening but natural (n=2024)







Figure 55: Mean ratings of responsibility for causing climate change by belief type 
A question was also asked regarding which entities people considered had the greatest 
responsibility for responding to climate change. Figure 56 shows that greatest rating of 
responsibility was given to big-polluting countries; the responsibility of the individual was 
rated significantly lower than the others.  
 
Figure 56: Mean ratings of responsibility for responding to climate change by belief type 
Table 48 displays the strength of correlations between people’s rankings of responsibility 
for causing and responsibility for responding to climate change for the two main belief-
































































































Happening but natural (n=2024)






































































































Happening but natural (n=2024)










cause and response. Global organisations were rated most disparately, with relatively low 
ratings for causing climate change, but relatively high ratings for responding to it.  
Table 48: Rank order correlations between responsibility for causing and responding to 
climate change by belief type 
 Happening but 
natural 




Global organisations such as the UN 0.38 0.24 
The Federal government 0.52 0.38 
State governments 0.54 0.42 
Wealthy countries 0.56 0.48 
Local governments 0.56 0.43 
Normal individuals 0.58 0.51 
Big-polluting countries 0.59 0.47 
Multi-national corporations 0.62 0.51 
 
Pro-Environmental Behaviours 
Participants were asked 17 questions relating to behaviour relevant to greenhouse gas 
emissions (Figure 57). Behaviours ranged from personal transport choices to diet and 
purchasing decisions. An aggregated score was calculated for each respondent to capture 
the total number of behaviours engaged in. Motivations for performing carbon-friendly 





Figure 57: Percentage of respondents engaging in climate change relevant behaviours 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
I switch lights off around the house whenever possible
I recycle my household waste
I have reduced the amount of water I use around the house and garden
I will usually try to fix things rather than replace them
I have reduced the amount of gas and/or electricity I use around the house
Where possible, I buy products that are made locally
I have switched to products that are more environmentally friendly
Most of my cleaning products are environmentally friendly
I grow a lot of my own vegetables
I try to buy products that are second-hand
I have a front-loading washing machine
I usually walk/cycle/carpool/take public transport to work
I live within 5 kilometres of my workplace
I am on Green Power electricity
I have contacted a government member about climate change
I have taken part in a political campaign about an environmental issue










Opinions, pro-environmental behaviours, and political voting intentions 
Figure 58 displays the average aggregated behaviour score for respondents from each climate 
change belief group. People who thought human-induced climate change was happening 
scored significantly higher on average on pro-environmental behaviours than other 
participants. The average pro-environmental behaviour score for those who thought that 
climate change wasn’t happening was lower than for all other groups.  
 
Figure 58: Pro-environmental behaviour scores by climate change belief (n=5036) 
Participants were asked to nominate who they intended to vote for in the upcoming federal 
election. Voting intentions were related to pro-environmental behaviours (Figure 59), with 
those intending to vote for the Greens scoring higher on pro-environmental than other 
participants, followed by those intending to vote for the Labor Party.  
 
Figure 59: Pro-environmental behaviour scores by political voting intentions (n=5036) 
Voting intentions were also related to belief-type (Figure 60), with participants who intended 
to vote for the Greens and Labor more likely to state belief in human-induced climate change. 
Those intending to vote Liberal, National or for the Independents, were more likely to state 




































































































Figure 60: Belief in climate change as a percentage of respondents intending to vote for each 
party 
Emotional responses 
Participants were asked to rate a list of emotions, on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree), according to how climate change made them feel. Average ratings are 
provided in Table 49. The most highly rated emotions for each belief-type are presented in  



























































Table 49: Mean ratings of agreement with emotions prompted by climate change (n=5036) 
Emotion Descriptor  Mean SD 
Angry 3.12 1.01 
Hopeful 3.07 0.95 
Fearful 3.03 1.09 
Powerless 2.97 1.05 
Irritated 2.94 1.12 
Ashamed 2.90 1.08 
Confused 2.85 1.04 
Guilty 2.74 1.05 
Despairing 2.68 .99 
Bored 2.52 1.10 
Excited 2.24 .89 
Joyful 2.08 .84 
 
Table 50: Most highly rated emotion descriptor for each belief-type 
Belief type Most highly agreed with emotion 
descriptor 
Mean rating 
I don’t think that climate change is happening 
(n=283) 
Irritated 3.52 
I have no idea whether climate change is 
happening or not (n=189) 
Confused 3.50 
I think that climate change is happening, but 
its just a natural variation in Earth’s 
temperatures (n=2,024) 
Irritated 3.09 
I think that climate change is happening, and I 








Social attitudes to climate change 
Participants were asked to rate their agreement with several statements on a scale of 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) about how they thought about climate change and 
what some of its potential impacts might be. Average ratings for each statement are provided 
in Table 51, in order of most agreed with to least agreed with. Responses to this series of 
statements suggest that people hold both positive and negative thoughts about the potential 
impacts of climate change.  
Table 51:  Mean ratings of agreement with cognitive evaluations of climate change 
Statement (n=5036) Mean SD 
Responding to climate change will cost Australia a lot of money 3.61 1.01 
Doing something about climate change is an opportunity to be 
part of something bigger than ourselves 
3.57 0.99 
Climate change will result in financial hardship for many people 3.45 1.00 
The challenge of climate change will provide people with a sense 
of purpose 
3.26 0.94 
Climate change will mean better weather in some parts of the 
world 
2.96 0.97 
Climate change will foster greater community spirit and 
connectedness 
2.95 0.99 
Trying to do something about climate change will mean a lot of 
people lose their jobs 
2.79 1.02 
Climate change may mean that wealth and resources end up 
being distributed more fairly 
2.61 0.99 
There's nothing Australia can do about climate change that will 































Table 52. Zobs Values matrix for Moral Engagement to act on climate change with 
responsibility ratings of different groups to respond to climate change. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Normal individuals -       
2 Local Governments 2.76 -      
3 State Governments 3.91 1.15 -     
4 Federal Governments 50.1 2.26 1.10 -    
5 Wealthy Countries 5.77 3.01 1.86 0.75 -   
6 Global organisations 7.17 4.41 3.26 2.16 1.40 -  
7 Multi-National 
Corporations 
9.88 7.12 5.97 4.86 4.11 2.71 - 

























APPENDIX G: ECONOMIC SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION, RIGHT-WING AUTHORIANISM, AND 







Table 53. Responses to Economic System Justification Items (N = 5030). 
Item M SD 
If people work hard, they almost always get what they want 
5.74 1.86 
Laws of nature are responsible for differences in wealth in society 
4.22 1.86 
It is virtually impossible to eliminate poverty 
5.75 2.03 
Most people who don’t get ahead in our society should not blame 
the system, they have only themselves to blame 
5.38 1.95 
Social class differences reflect differences in the natural order of 
things 
4.70 1.92 
There will always be poor people, because there will never be 
enough jobs for everybody 
5.30 1.96 
If people wanted to change the economic system to make things 
equal, they could * 
5.04 1.85 
It is unfair to have an economic system which produces extreme 
wealth and extreme poverty at the same time * 
3.78 1.93 
There are no inherent differences between rich and poor, it is purely 
a matter of the circumstances into which you are born * 
5.33 2.03 
The existence of widespread economic differences does not mean 
that they are inevitable * 
4.39 1.62 
There are many reasons to think that the economic system is unfair 
* 
3.85 1.55 
Poor people are not essentially different from rich people * 
4.03 1.96 
Equal distribution of resources is a possibility for our society * 
4.88 1.99 
Economic differences in the society reflect an illegitimate 
distribution of resources * 
4.74 1.90 
Economic positions are legitimate reflections of people’s 
achievements 
5.18 1.79 
Equal distribution of resources is unnatural 
4.79 1.88 
There is no point in trying to make incomes more equal 
4.60 2.07 









Table 54. Responses to Right-Wing Authoritarianism Items (N = 5030). 
Item M SD 
Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, 
and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them  
3.82 1.05 
Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who 
deserve much better care, instead of so much punishment * 
3.97 1.04 
Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues 
children should learn. 
3.88 1.06 
Organisations like the army have a pretty unhealthy effect upon men 
because they require strict obedience of commands from supervisors * 
3.72 1.09 
The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment would 
not do any good in cases like these * 
4.03 1.12 
Being kind to bludgers or criminals will only encourage them to take 
advantage of your weakness, so its best to use a firm, tough hand when 
dealing with them 
3.72 1.19 
* Means and standard deviations after items were reversed coded 
 
Table 55. Responses to Social Dominance Orientation Items (N = 5030). 
Item M SD 
Some groups of people are simply inferior to others 2.80 1.68 
It’s OK if some groups have more of a life chance than others 2.79 1.56 
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups 2.54 1.55 
Inferior groups should stay in their place 2.23 1.44 
Group equality should be our ideal * 3.07 1.61 
We should do what we can to equalise conditions for different groups * 3.02 1.50 
Increased social equality * 2.95 1.47 
We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally * 2.74 1.52 
















APPENDIX H: Zobs VALUES MATRIX POLICY SUPPORT FRAMING: SYSTEM-JUSTIFYING 







Table 56. Zobs values matrix for policy support framing: System-justification tendencies by 
voting intention (N = 5030). 
 Government Carbon Price / 
Generic Carbon Price  
Labor          
(n = 1031) 
Liberal       
(n = 1759) 
Nationals 
(n = 176) 
Greens    
(n = 438) 
RWA 0.91 4.24* 3.35* 0.91 
ESJ 0.91 0.62 2.80* 2.18* 
SDO 1.50 2.35* 1.96* 1.74 






















Table 57. Examples of coding combinations for the associations Hot weather, Melting ice 



























































































































Table 58. Image associations nominated by respondents (N = 2502). 
Association n % Association n % Association n % 
Rising sea levels 411 16.4% smog pollution 50 2.0% dry 23 0.9% 
Drought 328 13.1% earth 50 2.0% overpopulation 23 0.9% 
Melting ice caps 256 10.2% no such thing 49 2.0% lifestyle changes 23 0.9% 
Floods 200 8.0% famine 49 2.0% government 22 0.9% 
Pollution 193 7.7% polar bears 47 1.9% 
children / future 
generations 
22 0.9% 
Hot weather 167 6.7% air pollution 47 1.9% resignation/ despair 22 0.9% 
Don't know 154 6.2% dead plants 46 1.8% 
changes to local 
conditions 
21 0.8% 
Water shortage 139 5.6% politics 45 1.8% 
coral bleaching & 
reef damage 
21 0.8% 
Global warming 132 5.3% cold 44 1.8% renewable energy 21 0.8% 
Vegetation 127 5.1% animals 44 1.8% 
more disease & ill-
health 
20 0.8% 
Hot sun 123 4.9% dry waterways 43 1.7% tsunami 20 0.8% 
Waterways 122 4.9% warmth 40 1.6% 
warming of the 
earth 
19 0.8% 
Rising temperatures 122 4.9% environment 40 1.6% better place to live 19 0.8% 
Ozone layer 121 4.8% clouds 40 1.6% death 19 0.8% 
Changing weather 
patterns 




Severe storms 114 4.6% seasons changing 38 1.5% saving energy 19 0.8% 
Weather 110 4.4% natural disaster 37 1.5% water pollution 18 0.7% 
Melting ice 107 4.3% crop failures 36 1.4% melting snowcaps 18 0.7% 
Desert 106 4.2% icebergs 35 1.4% industry 18 0.7% 
Smoke stacks 105 4.2% 
overhyped/ 
exaggerated 
34 1.4% high tides 16 0.6% 
Natural 
phenomenon 
90 3.6% extreme heat 32 1.3% carbon tax 16 0.6% 
Extreme weather 87 3.5% the greens 32 1.3% al gore 16 0.6% 
Rain 83 3.3% polar icecaps 31 1.2% coal 16 0.6% 







Bushfires 81 3.2% bad weather 31 1.2% iceage 16 0.6% 
animal extinction 75 3.0% snow 30 1.2% dead earth 16 0.6% 
carbon emissions 73 2.9% 
cyclones & 
hurricanes 
30 1.2% scientists 15 0.6% 
misc 71 2.8% bad science 29 1.2% carbon footprint 15 0.6% 
melting icebergs 70 2.8% tax 28 1.1% water conservation 15 0.6% 
hotter weather 70 2.8% ice 28 1.1% 
high cost of 
electricity 
15 0.6% 
parched land 65 2.6% winter 27 1.1% loss of habitat 15 0.6% 
ocean 64 2.6% crap/ rubbish 27 1.1% aridity 15 0.6% 




changes to our 
planet 
15 0.6% 
dead animals 56 2.2% greenhouse gases 26 1.0% manmade waste 14 0.6% 
temperature 54 2.2% islands inudated 26 1.0% human suffering 14 0.6% 




glaciers melting 53 2.1% sky 26 1.0% climate change 13 0.5% 
higher prices 54 2.2% 
confusion about 
facts 
25 1.0% kevin rudd 13 0.5% 
vehicle emissions 54 2.2% 
variablity in 
weather 
25 1.0% manmade 13 0.5% 
wind farms 52 2.1% heatwave 24 1.0% greenhouse effect 13 0.5% 





24 1.0% air 13 0.5% 




Table 57 continued... 
Association n % Association n % Association n % 
money grabbing 
scheme 
13 0.5% smog in cities 6 0.2% 
a way to control 
people 
2 0.1% 
electricity 12 0.5% bob brown 6 0.2% islands 2 0.1% 
fossil fuels 12 0.5% heavy rain 6 0.2% lack of oxygen 2 0.1% 
earthquakes 12 0.5% traffic congestion 6 0.2% inversion layers 2 0.1% 
antarctica 12 0.5% atmosphere 6 0.2% 
reduce fossil fuel 
use 
2 0.1% 
future 11 0.4% control pollution 6 0.2% acid rain 2 0.1% 
don't believe in 
climate change 
11 0.4% vested interests 5 0.2% andrew bolt 1 0.0% 
not man-made 11 0.4% 
conservation of 
resources 
5 0.2% christine milne 1 0.0% 
volcanoes 11 0.4% overuse of aircon 5 0.2% water rise 1 0.0% 
dry gardens 11 0.4% humidity 5 0.2%    
exploitation of 
natural resources 




10 0.4% resource depletion 5 0.2%    
government inaction 10 0.4% solar system 5 0.2%    
human greed 10 0.4% salinity 5 0.2%    




inablity to heat/ 
cool homes 
5 0.2%    
controversial subject 10 0.4% green propanganda 4 0.2%    
skin cancer 10 0.4% sweat 4 0.2%    
carbon trading 10 0.4% nuclear energy 4 0.2%    
change in 
temperature 
10 0.4% economic impact 4 0.2%    
major problem 9 0.4% natural evolution 4 0.2%    
coal mining 9 0.4% 
better growing 
conditions 
4 0.2%    
media hype 9 0.4% starving livestock 4 0.2%    
misinformation 9 0.4% overcrowded cities 4 0.2%    
sunburn 8 0.3% wetter 4 0.2%    
jobs & 
unemployment 
8 0.3% negative 3 0.1%    
beaches 8 0.3% penny wong 3 0.1%    
ocean temperatures 8 0.3% barnaby joyce 3 0.1%    
rough seas 8 0.3% land pollution 3 0.1%    
oil spils 8 0.3% fear 3 0.1%    
dust storms 8 0.3% plant trees 3 0.1%    
unusual wind 8 0.3% 
expensive water 
bills 
3 0.1%    
protesting 7 0.3% blackouts 3 0.1%    
cut down on fuel 7 0.3% 
changing rainfall 
pattern 
3 0.1%    
human apathy 7 0.3% 
too much money 
spent on it 
3 0.1%    
mountains 7 0.3% annoying 3 0.1%    
sustainablity 7 0.3% snowstorms 3 0.1%    
plastics 7 0.3% julia gillard 2 0.1%    
sceptics 7 0.3% methane 2 0.1%    








































Table 60. Frequency selection and source of climate change images. 
Image Selection 
Frequency 
(N = 52) 
Image Source 






































solar panel 13 http://img.directindustry.com/images_di/photo-g/photovoltaic-
solar-panels-367270.jpg 





































drying dam 8 http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/08/01/2321144.htm 




































































































































































































the earth 0 http://en.epochtimes.com/news/7-1-31/51167.html 
volcano 0 http://www.naturewalls.net/wallpaper/Volcanoes-1/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
